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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
V.

ANTHONY A. SADDLER,
Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 20030439-SC

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, 67 P.3d 1025. cert, granted, 76 P.3d 691
(Utah 2003). The court of appeals' opinion in Saddler is attached hereto as Addendum A.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the court of appeals
properly ruled in State v. Saddler, that the totality of the circumstances as set forth in the
detective's affidavit failed to support probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
under the Fourth Amendment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals. State v. Levva. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997). The court of appeals
reviewed the issue here as follows:
"[T]his court, like the reviewing court below, is bound by the contents of the
[detective's] affidavit, we therefore need not defer to the trial court's finding ...."
State v. Deluna. 2001 UT App 401,1f9, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citation
omitted), cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. Instead, "'we make an independent
review of the trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written
evidence.'" Id (quoting State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah Ct. App.

1991)). "However, 'the [FJourth [A]mendment does not require that the reviewing
court conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination^]
Instead, it requires only that the reviewing court conclude "that the magistrate had
a substantial basis for ... [determining] that probable cause existed.1"" IdL_
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989)
(quoting Illinois v.Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983))). We
therefore "pay great deference to the magistrate's determination." State v. Vigh,
871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).[]
State v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^[7. This Court applies the same standard in assessing
the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant. See State v. BabbelL
770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989V cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1036 (1992).
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following will be determinative of the question presented for review: U .S.
Const, amend. IV; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The text of the Fourth Amendment is contained in Addendum B, and the text of Gates is contained in Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case; Course of the Proceedings; Disposition in the Court Below .
On August 4, 2000, the state filed an Information against Saddler for unlawful
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and unlawful possession of cocaine,
both third degree felony offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8( 1 )(a)(iii) and (2)(a)(i)
(1998). (R. 1-3.) On August 15, 2001, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence
of the controlled substances on the basis that the evidence was obtained with an unlawful
search warrant. Specifically, the defense argued that the affidavit presented to the
magistrate judge in support of the warrant failed to support probable cause for the search.
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(R. 35-57.) A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum D, and a copy of the
search warrant issued in connection therewith is attached as Addendum E.
The state opposed the motion and on September 11, 2001, a hearing was held in
the matter. (See R. 60-69; 127.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge denied
the motion to suppress. (R. 127:12-13.)
On September 25, 2001, Saddler entered into a conditional plea for marijuana possession with intent to distribute, a 3rd° felony, and he reserved the right to appeal the trial
court's ruling on the motion to suppress. (See R. 79-84); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i)
(2003). On January 29, 2002, the trial court sentenced Saddler to an indeterminate prison
term of 0 to 5 years. The court then suspended the prison term and placed Saddler on
probation for 24 months with community service. (R. 107-08.) Saddler appealed, and the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. Saddler, 2003
UT App 82, %l. The state has asked this Court to review the matter. This Court agreed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 4, 2000, the state filed charges against Saddler for drug possession.
The charges were based on the following statement set forth in the Information:
The statement of West Valley Police Detective B. McCarthy that on June 15,
2000, at 3194 South 4300 West, in Salt Lake County, Utah, a search warrant was
executed at the residence of the defendant, Anthony Alexander Saddler. Detective
McCarthy states that defendant was present, and that a search of the residence revealed 277 grams [approx. 10 ounces] of field tested positive marijuana, weighing
scales, and a quantity of a substance that field tested positive for cocaine.
(R. 3 (emphasis added).) During trial court proceedings, the defense challenged the affi-
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davit presented in support of the search warrant referenced above. The defense argued
that the affidavit lacked probable cause to support issuance of the warrant. (R. 127.)
During a hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties looked to the four corners
of the affidavit. The affidavit stated the following:
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by the West
Valley City Police Department, and is currently assigned to the Neighborhood
Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been given the responsibility to investigate
narcotic offenses occurring in West Valley City and surrounding areas.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and in the
investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has personally purchased
various narcotics on numerous occasions in relation to police investigations.
Affiant was previously assigned to the Metro narcotics Strike Force and the Drug
Enforcement Strike Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic
and advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California Narcotics Officers
Association seminars in drug recognition, identification and investigative
techniques. Your affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb Technician.
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and distribution
of a controlled substances, specifically marijuana and cocaine. Your affiant
received information from a confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI.
Your affiant ask[s] the courts not to require your affiant to publish the CPs name.
Your affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were published.
Your affiant was told the following by the CI:
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year,
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on numerous
occasions during the last year,
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several occasions,
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being
within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana,
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the suspect uses to
weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale,
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with packaging
material,
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person,
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells marijuana and cocaine,
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled substances, inside
4

the named premises,
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently purchased the
listed premises,
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income is from a
part time waiter's job at the Salt Lake City restaurant, BACCI's [sic],
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to
afford his own usage and as a separate source of income,
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle frequently used by the
suspect (female companion of suspect), and hours of operation for the suspect,
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the
late evening hours,
The affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his home address
in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial surveillance your affiant did not
observe[] anyone at the residence, the surveillance was intermittent from 2000
hours until 0600 6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed
some short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related. Your affiant
had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic stop on one of the vehicles
leaving the listed premises. During the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was
arrested for outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of marijuana,
approximately one half ounce. During the search of the vehicle a small section of
plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appears to have residue of cocaine inside
the twist section of the bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and
would like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the ingestion of
marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was told by the transporting
officers, of the arrested person, that no drug paraphernalia was found on the
subject, Oba Tramel.
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are first hand, accurate
and truth full [sic], for the following reasons. CI's observations are first hand and
from a person that has used marijuana and would recognized [sic] the substance
when observed. CI has not been promised nor [sic] paid for any of the
information provided. CI has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and
desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the community.
CI's observations were over a long period of time, even though the suspect has
only recently occupied the listed premises, within the last couple of months. CI
states that the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been long term.
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named premises and
the registered owner was [as] described by CI. Your affiant has observed what
your affiant believes to be drug traffic, short term traffic coming and going to the
listed premises. Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of cocaine. Further
the arrested person was not found with any instruments used in the ingestion of
5

controlled substances, which your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was
purchased from the listed premises.
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently and works at a
restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was told that the employment is part
time, your affiant checked on 6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was
unknown when he was scheduled to return.
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for marijuana,
cocaine and associated packaging material and instruments used to ingest
controlled substances. Affiant has been told that all these items have been
observed inside the listed premises. Your affiant believes that the suspect should
be searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and carries controlled
substances on his person.
Your affiant prays for any time, announced authority of service. Your
affiant has been told that the suspect is usually only at home during the late
evening hours and your affiant's observations have confirmed this.
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy Salt Lake
County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben [sic] approved to be
presented to the courts for anytime and announced authority of service.
(R. 72-74; Addendum D, hereto.) According to the record, the magistrate issued the
warrant and McCarthy executed it on June 15. (R. 76-78; 3).
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court denied
the motion. Saddler appealed the matter, and the court of appeals reversed the ruling on
the motion to suppress. State v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82. The state asked this Court to
review the matter. This Court agreed to do so. Saddler is not incarcerated.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
According to the law, an affidavit for a search warrant must support probable
cause that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. To determine probable
cause, an affidavit will be assessed under the totality of the circumstances. If the affidavit fails to reveal information about the person who provided a tip to the authorities about
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the purported crime (i.e. the informant), that is not fatal to the probable cause analysis.
The court will look to other aspects of the affidavit to assess the relative weights of all
the various indicia of reliability or unreliability attending the tip. .See Gates, 462 U.S. at
233-34. The court may determine, for example, that the affidavit contains explicit,
detailed descriptions of the alleged wrongdoing or the officer has corroborated aspects of
the tip with an independent investigation to support probable cause.
In this matter, Detective McCarthy prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. It
was based on vague assertions by an anonymous informant. McCarthy engaged in an
independent investigation, but failed to reveal any details relevant to that investigation.
The court of appeals found the affidavit to be insufficient to support probable cause.
Saddler respectfully requests that this Court affirm that ruling here.
ARGUMENTS
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE
TOTALITY- OF- THE- CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS HERE TO
DETERMINE THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE.
A. THE PROBABLE-CAUSE STANDARD.
The Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. IV. An officer's request for a warrant may be made with a sworn affidavit
presented to a neutral, detached magistrate. The magistrate must determine whether the
7

circumstances identified in the affidavit support "probable cause" that evidence of crime
will be found in a particular place. If the standard is supported, a warrant shall issue.
Courts have ruled that probable-cause shall be assessed under the "totality-of-thecircumstances" set forth in the affidavit. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also State v.
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993); State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130-31
(Utah 1987); State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984); State v. Purser. 828 P.2d
515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, ^[9. Probable cause is a "fluid
concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts." Gates.
462 U.S. at 232. The standard does not lend itself to a "neat set" of legal or rigid rules,
but provides for an assessment of the total circumstances as set forth in the affidavit.
For example, where an officer has based his affidavit for the search warrant on an
informant's tip of criminal conduct, several aspects of the affidavit may be explored for
probable cause. See Gates. 462 U.S. 213; see also infra, subpart B., below.
Specifically, the magistrate may assess whether the affidavit supports reliability
for the informant in order that the tip may be deemed credible. If the affidavit is inadequate there, that may not be fatal to the analysis. The magistrate must continue the assessment: a deficiency in one aspect of the affidavit "may be compensated for, in determining
the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other [aspects of the affidavit], or by some other indicia of reliability." Gates. 462 U.S. at 233; (see State's Brief of
Petitioner, dated December 29, 2003 ("State's Brief), 19 (stating that reliability turns on
"whether the circumstances as a whole suggest that the informant was credible")).
8

Other indicia of reliability may include the informant's explicit, detailed
description of alleged wrongdoing as reported in the affidavit. Details in the affidavit
allow a magistrate to assess reliability for probable cause under an objective standard.
Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to
determine probable cause; [the magistrate's] action cannot be a mere ratification
of the bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review
the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Also, the Supreme Court has "consistently recognized the value
of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work," in the probable cause analysis. Id at 241. When an informant's tip is supplemented by independent
investigation, that may give credibility to the affidavit and to the report of criminal
conduct. See id. at 238: also State v. James. 2000 UT 80, TH[10-11. 13 P.3d 576 (recognizing that information provided by a citizen and coupled with available corroboration
may constitute sufficient reliability under the totality of the circumstances).
In this case, the state does not dispute that the court of appeals assessed the affidavit in its entirety to determine whether the affidavit supported probable cause. (See
State's Brief.) Rather, the state seems to argue that the court of appeals has required too
much from an affidavit under the analysis. Specifically, the state claims that the court of
appeals has applied "a rigid, excessively technical test" and "insists on more detail than is
required under Gates" for probable cause. (State's Brief, 16, 18.)
Yet, in this case, the court of appeals considered the total circumstances as set
forth in the affidavit. It did not give undue attention to any particular deficiency there,
9

and it did not isolate any one flaw and find it fatal to the analysis. Instead, the court of
appeals balanced all aspects of the affidavit to determine whether it contained sufficient
facts to allow an objective magistrate to make a common-sense judgment for probable
cause. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82. That is what Gates requires. Gates. 462 U.S. at 233-34.
Where the state seems to construe Saddler to require reliability for every aspect of
the affidavit (see State's Brief), the Saddler opinion requires indicia of reliability on
balance for the informant's tip. See Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, ^|27; Gates. 462 U.S. at
233-34. In this case, the court of appeals applied the analysis in Gates. Its ruling must
be affirmed, as further explained below. See infra, subpart C , below.
B. COURTS APPLY THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES
ANALYSIS IN A COMMON-SENSE FASHION.
1. The Gates Court Applied the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis.
In Gates, the Supreme Court introduced the probable-cause issue with a
"chronological statement of events" set forth in the affidavit. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-26.
According to the Court, on May 3, 1978, police officers received an anonymous
letter regarding Lance and Sue Gates. The letter identified where the Gateses lived and
how they made drug buys. According to the letter, Sue drove the family car from
Chicago to Florida, where she left it to be loaded with drugs, while Lance flew to Florida
to drive the car back. Id. at 225. The letter specified that the Gateses would be involved
in the next transaction on May 3, the date of the letter. On that day, Sue would drive to
Florida. Lance then would fly down "in a few days to drive [the car] back/1 He would
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have the trunk loaded with more than $1009000 in drugs for the drive to Chicago. Also,
the Gateses presently had over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their home and the home
was visited by "big drug dealers." Id. at 225.
The anonymous letter was written in the present tense, and it "contained a range of
details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the
tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted." IdL. at 245.
In connection with receiving the letter, Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale
Police investigated the tip with other agencies. IdL. at 226. He confirmed Lance Gates'
identification and address through the Illinois Secretary of State and an informant, and he
arranged surveillance with drug enforcement agents at the O'Hare and Florida airports.
Id. at 225-26. Officers reported that Lance Gates made a reservation on Eastern Airlines
to depart on May 5 from Chicago to Florida. IdL. Agents observed Lance board the plane
that day, and when he arrived in Florida, agents observed him go from the airport to a
Holiday Inn in West Palm Beach where he went to a room registered to Susan Gates. IdLance's stay in Florida was brief. The next morning at 7:00, Lance and a woman
left the motel in a Mercury "bearing Illinois license plates and drove northbound on an
interstate frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area." Id Agents confirmed that
the plates on the Mercury were registered to another car, a Hornet station wagon owned
by Lance Gates. IdL at 226. The drive time from West Palm Beach to Bloomingdale was
approximately 22 to 24 hours. Mader submitted an affidavit to the magistrate "setting
forth the foregoing facts." Id. at 226. He included a copy of the anonymous letter. IcL
11

The magistrate issued a search warrant. Id. at 226.
In Gates, the officers' investigations substantially corroborated the defendants'
mode of operation as set forth in the anonymous letter, where the Gateses were involved
in a pre-arranged drug run in the family car, which was conveniently waiting for Lance
Gates in Florida with unauthorized license plates.
On review, the Supreme Court looked to the total circumstances to determine that
the anonymous tip, supplemented by police investigations, supported probable cause for
the issuance of the warrant. Id. at 238, 243-44.] The Court first began the analysis with

1 The Gates Court expressly abandoned application of a rigid "two-pronged test" that
came to be known as Aguilar-Spinelli. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. That test required the tip
as set forth in the officer's affidavit to include facts supporting the informant's basis of
knowledge, and facts supporting reliability for the informant or veracity for the
informant's report. IdL at 228-29. The test required the tip to be self-verifying. A
deficiency in one prong would render the affidavit insufficient. IcL at 233-34; Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The "two-pronged test" did not take the officer's
independent corroborative efforts into proper consideration.
Specifically, in Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410, officers received a tip from a "confidential
reliable informant" that an Illinois party (defendant) was conducting gambling etctivities
in Missouri. In connection with receiving the tip, federal officers observed defendant
over an 11-day period making 4 separate trips before noon from Illinois to Missouri, and
returning in the afternoon to an apartment that had two separate phone lines. Id_ at 41315. The affidavit stated that defendant was known to the officer and others to be a "bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers." IcL. at 414.
On review, the Supreme Court focused on the paragraph in the affidavit relating to
the confidential informant's tip. Id_ at 416 (considering the weight to be given the informant's tip apart from the rest of the affidavit); kL. at 415 (stating that the magistrate must
ask whether the tip, even if corroborated by independent sources, "is as trustworthy as a
tip which would pass Aguilar ys test without independent corroboration"). The Court
determined that the informant and tip were not self-verifying. See id. at 415-16. Also,
the officers' investigation identified only innocent-seeming activity. See id. at 413-14.
The police investigation did not resolve problems with the tip since the investigation
failed to uncover criminal conduct. IcL at 417-18 (stating that the officers' observations
12

consideration of the informant and the informant's tip.
The Court stated that while an informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of
knowledge" are "highly relevant" in determining the value of the tip, they are not exclusive and rigid factors in the analysis. Id, at 230. Rather, an informant's veracity and
reliability may give credibility to the tip in the overall assessment of the affidavit. Also,
the informant's trustworthiness is weighed for reliability (or unreliability) with all other
considerations for a balanced assessment of the matter. See_ Gates. 462 U.S. at 230-34.
Thus, if there is doubt in an affidavit about the informant and his/her veracity and
reliability, the balance of the affidavit may nevertheless support probable cause where
other considerations in the affidavit provide indicia of reliability for the tip. See id. at
233. Stated another way, if the affidavit is deficient in establishing the veracity and
reliability of the informant, that may not end the analysis. The court may look to other

contain "no suggestion of criminal conduct when taken by themselves"). The officers'
report of innocent facts consistent with the tip did not give additional weight to the
report from the informant. Id. at 417-19; see JdL at 416-17 (approving of officer's actions
in Drapery. U.S., 358 U.S. 307 (1959), where identified informant described defendant's
criminal conduct, and predicted future actions with "minute particularity," thereby allowing officer to observe and verify specific facts). The affidavit was deemed insufficient.
In Gates, the Supreme Court disavowed the Spinelli "two-pronged test" and reiterated application of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach for probable cause. Gates,
462 U.S. at 238. Under that approach, an officer's investigation may give credibility to
the tip even if the investigation serves to corroborate only innocent facts. See id. at 24144. Utah courts also have abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli approach. S.L.C. v. Trujillo ,
854 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Singleton , 854 P.2d 1017, 1019-20
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); s_ee_
Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, Yi 9, 22 (stating that an officer's investigation may corroborate illegal activity or other material facts for the tip under the Fourth Amendment).
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matters, including the officer's investigation to determine if a substantial basis exists for
finding probable cause. Gatesm 462 U.S. at 233 (a deficiency "may be compensated for, in
determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other [considerations], or by some other indicia of reliability"); (State's Brief, 19 (stating the assessment
is "whether the circumstances as a whole suggest that the informant was credible")).
In Gates, the veracity and reliability of the informant were unknown. Thus, the
anonymous letter standing alone "would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination" of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 227. The Court looked to the remaining
parts of the affidavit for indicia of reliability for the tip. The Court found that the
affidavit set forth the details of the officers' investigations regarding the Gateses'
activities. The officers corroborated major parts of the "details set forth in the anonymous
letter," including the modus operandi: i.e., the prediction that shortly after May 3, Lance
Gates would fly to Florida and drive a car waiting there for him to Chicago. IdL at 24345. Thus, in assessing all relevant aspects of the affidavit, the Court determined that a
substantial basis existed for the magistrate to find probable cause. Id.
2. Utah Courts Apply the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis.
Utah courts applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis have considered
varying fact patterns in assessing whether the affidavit may contain indicia of reliability
for the tip. In State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, the court of appeals stated the following:
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause exists include an
informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233,
103 S.Ct. at 2329; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v.
14

Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). In some cases, the circumstances
may require the supporting affidavit to set forth in detail the basis of knowledge,
veracity and reliability of a person supplying information in order to establish
probable cause. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases,
if the circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's
report, a less strong showing is required. Id. at 1205-06. For example, reliability
and veracity are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives
nothing from the police in exchange for the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at
1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah
App.1989), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the informant's
knowledge is based on personal observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130;
Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing
reliability is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set forth in the
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts by police. See
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287.
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517.
Where an informant is an ordinary, disinterested citizen with no ties to the crime,
Utah courts may assume the informant's reliability and veracity. See James, 2000 UT 80,
Tfl 1 n.5 (recognizing that "the inherent reliability of information volunteered by a citizen
will usually be much greater than that provided by an anonymous tip or by a paid informant" under the totality of the circumstances for the Fourth Amendment); Bailey, 675
P.2d at 1206; State v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1972) (giving greater weight
to reports from citizen informants); Kaysville v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 237-38 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997), cert denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) (finding reliability where the
citizen-informer Olsen called in a detailed drunk-driving tip to police); St. George v.
Carter. 945 P.2d 165, 167, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah
1998) (finding that Rick Hafen, an uninvolved citizen and restaurant employee, gave a
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detailed, reliable report of a person at the drive-up window with an open container); State
v. Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, 1(14, 40 P.3d 1136.
In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, this Court found that the affidavit for the search
warrant supported probable cause where the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of
knowledge were established, as follows:
In the instant case, the affidavit stated facts which supported the
informant's veracity. According to the affidavit, the informant had previously
given truthful information to the police concerning the existence of contraband, an
accepted method for establishing an informant's veracity. See McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), where the United Slates
Supreme Court held there was a sufficient basis for probable cause of an arrest
because the informant had a history of giving reliable information to the police.
Furthermore, the reliability of the informant's statement was "boosted by
the detail with which the informant described his personal observation" of the
stolen property and the apartment. State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715, 719
(1983). In addition, some weight should be accorded the fact that the informant
an apparently disinterested person, came to the police and volunteered the
information. The informant gave his name, phone, address, and place of
employment. He stated that he was a concerned citizen who wanted to stop
burglaries and thefts. In State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 848
(1972), we held that information from citizen informants who stand to gain
nothing from providing information to the police is not viewed with the same
rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of a regular police informant.
Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206 (emphasis added); see Treadway, 499 P.2d at 847-48 (citizeninformer Poulsen identified himself and conferred with the officer twice; also, he had no
personal interest in whether defendant was arrested or not); see. also Brown. 798 P.2d at
286 (the citizen informant initiated contact, identified self, and volunteered information).
When an informant's reliability, veracity and basis of knowledge may not be
obvious from the affidavit, courts have looked to the total circumstances to balance the
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"relative weights of all various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234; kL at 241-45 (considering the anonymous letter and
its range of detail together with the independent investigation to support probable cause).
For example, in State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert denied,
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), Detective Brian prepared an affidavit for a warrant based in
part on a report from a confidential informant. The informant reported that defendant
lived in Ogden and supplied cocaine. Id at 641. Although Detective Brian did not identify the informant in the affidavit, it was plain that he met personally with the informant,
where the affidavit revealed that the informant took Brian to the area where defendant
made a drug transaction. Id at 642.
Also, Brian engaged in an independent investigation. He confirmed that
defendant lived at the reported address. Id at 642. He received information regarding
the defendant's conduct from Detective Sweat, who also knew the informant and used
the informant "during the last 72 hours" in a controlled buy with defendant. Id at 642.
Brian learned that Detective Shane Minor had seen defendant driving the vehicle of
"John Balaich," a known drug dealer; and Brian received information from other informants, who had previously provided accurate information about defendant and Balaich's
cocaine deals. Id. at 642. The court of appeals considered the affidavit to be sufficient to
support probable cause. Although the affidavit did not set forth the veracity and the
reliability of the confidential informant, "the circumstances as a whole supported] the
truthfulness" of the tip received from the informant. Id. at 644.
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Next, this Court has applied the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to an affidavit for a search warrant. In State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, defendant posed as a police
officer and approached the victim, K., and 3 friends camping in Millcreek Canyon. IcL at
989. Defendant requested identification from the campers, and when he learned that K.
was 19 years old, "he warned the group that K. was violating a curfew." IcL He offered
to take her out of the canyon to avoid arrest, and she agreed. As K. and defendant drove
away, the remaining campers noticed that defendant's truck had no bumpers and no
license plates. They became suspicious and followed the truck until it raced out of sight
of the friends, who then called police. Id. at 989.
The defendant took K. to Big Cottonwood Canyon, where he threatened her with
a knife, forced her to perform sexual acts on him, and raped her. I<L He then threatened
to kill K. and her family if she reported the crimes. He finally let her go. IcL at 989.
When police investigated the matter, they obtained a description of the assailant
and the truck from K. and the other campers. Based on the description of the assailant
and the modus operandi, an officer suggested Babbell may be a suspect. IcL at 989.
Thereafter, the officers researched vehicle records and learned that Babbell owned
a truck similar to that described by the witnesses. The officers later went to BabbelPs
home and saw a truck there "fitting the description given by the witnesses." IcL They
spoke with Babbell's mother and learned he was not home, but would return. They
waited for him. After Babbell did not return, the officers went back to the home and
obtained permission to look closely at the truck, but not to enter the cab. IcL at 989.
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The officers observed details inside the truck that matched the description given
by the victim. IcL (identifying description as a cracked windshield, a stick-pin button on
the visor with the slogan '55 mph sucks,' yellow-orange seat covers, a cassette player,
beverage holders, and a shifter on the floor). They left to obtain a search warrant. Id_ A
magistrate issued the warrant and the officers returned to the home and seized a number
of items from the truck. IdL
After Babbell was charged and convicted of several offenses, he challenged the
affidavit for the search warrant on appeal. This Court began the analysis as follows:
The first question is whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause.
The fourth amendment requires that when a search warrant is issued on the basis
of an affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to support a
determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists. State v. Nielsen,
727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 930, 94 L. Ed. 2d 758, 107
S. Ct. 1565 (1987). The affiant must articulate particularized facts and circumstances leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists. Mere conclusory statements will not suffice. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103
S. Ct. 2317, reWg denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453, 104 S. Ct. 33 (1983).
BabbeU, 770 P.2d at 990-91.
This Court then recognized that the affidavit for the warrant included a statement
by K. describing the crimes, and the affidavit included K.'s description of the truck. "[K.]
described the interior of the vehicle as having orange seat covers, a cracked [windshield],
beverage holders on the dashboard, a '55 mph sucks' button on the driver's side visor,
and a cassette player in the dashboard." LI at 991. Also, the affidavit specified that 3
other witnesses saw the assailant and described the truck as an "older model Chevrolet 4wheel drive pick-up, dark brown in color, with no front or rear bumpers." IcL The
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affidavit stated that officers recognized the witnesses' description of the assailant and the
modus operandi as Babbell, and the officers investigated the truck at Babbell's home and
noticed that it "matched the description" provided by the witnesses. Id. (emphasis added).
According to this Court, the affidavit "set out specifically and in detail the characteristics of the truck," as originally described by the victim and her friends. Id. at 992.
Also, the affidavit included facts relating to the officers' knowledge of defendant and
observations of the truck. IcL at 991-92. Nevertheless, this Court considered the issue of
probable cause in Babbell to be "a close question here because of the rather sloppy
drafting of the affidavit." IdL. at 992. The affidavit was "ambiguous in its use of the word
match fed]"," where the officers simply stated that when they observed the truck at
defendant's home, it "matched the description" given by the witnesses, without detail. Id.
at 992 (emphasis added). In the end, this Court permitted certain inferences because the
affidavit expressly described the characteristics of the truck as provided by the witnesses.
Id. at 992 (recognizing that the affidavit was sufficiently specific to support that the truck
in the driveway was that reported by the witnesses).
The cases identified above illustrate application of the probable-cause standard in
varying fact patterns. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 (identifying varying fact patterns for
the doctrine). The examples provide guidance as to how far a magistrate may venture in
issuing a warrant. "An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for
determining the existence of probable cause." Id at 239. A "wholly conclusory
statement" in an affidavit will "fail[] to meet this requirement." Id Also, decisions
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applying the totality of circumstances analysis "have consistently recognized the value of
corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work." Id. at 241.
In this case, the court of appeals assessed all relevant considerations before
determining that the affidavit failed to support probable cause. The court of appeals'
analysis is correct, as further set forth below.
C. THE SADDLER COURT APPLIED THE PROPER ANALYSIS.
1. The United States Supreme Court and the Court in Saddler Recognized the
Relevance of an Informant's Tip in the Fourth Amendment Analysis.
The court of appeals complied with Gates in its review of the affidavit in this case.
Where the United States Supreme Court considered the source of the tip, Gates , 462 U.S.
at 230, the court of appeals did likewise. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82,fflfl1-19.
Informants' tips are relevant to police investigations. In Gates, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the following:
Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different
types of persons. As we said m Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct.
1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), "Informants' tips, like all other clues and
evidence coming to a policeman on the scene may vary greatly in their value and
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. "One
simple rule will not cover every situation." Ibid.
Gates. 462 U.S. at 232 (note omitted).
Utah courts look to the specific facts of a case to assess an informant. Not all
informants may be deemed reliable. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205-06 (recognizing that
an identified, disinterested informant may be accorded more reliability); James. 2000 UT
80, ^11 n.5 (recognizing that "the inherent reliability of information volunteered by a
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citizen will usually be much greater than that provided by an anonymous tip or by a paid
informant" under the totality-of-the-circumstances of the Fourth Amendment)2; Purser,
828 P.2d at 517 (recognizing that an informant's reliability and veracity may vary
depending on the circumstances of the informant and tip); M ulcahy. 943 P.2d cit 235
(finding reliability where the citizen informant identified himself to police and was an
uninvolved citizen who called in a detailed drunk-driving tip); Deluna. 2001 UT App
401, THJ14-15 (finding that informants were reliable where they were mere witnesses to
the crime, they implicated a family member in the crime, they provided their full names

2
Although this Court dealt with "reasonable suspicion" in James., that case is
pertinent. Both reasonable suspicion and probable cause "are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Ornelas v. U.S.,
517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (citing Gates). Both standards require the acting officer to
articulate specific facts to support his/her conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Both
standards also require application of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The
standards differ in the burden of proof applicable to the government in justifying the
officer's conduct. If an officer is able to articulate sufficient objective facts to support
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he may stop a citizen for a limited investigation
that is strictly tied to the justification for the stop. See State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, IflflO11 999 P.2d 7; State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, ^ 31-32, 63 P.3d 650; James. 2000 UT
80, ^flO ("Reasonable suspicion may be based on information provided by a citizen if that
information, coupled with available corroboration, is sufficiently reliable under the
totality of the circumstances"). The standard of proof for reasonable suspicion is less
demanding than the standard for probable cause. See. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,^11.
Notwithstanding the difference in the burdens applicable to the government,
this Court has recognized the following: "While the required level of suspicion [for reasonable suspicion] is lower than the standard required for probable cause to arrest, 'the
same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion.'" Kohl. 2000 UT
35, Ifl 1; see Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, TfflO-11, 22 (considering the totality-of-thecircumstances analysis under the reasonable-suspicion standard).
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to the affiant, thereby subjecting themselves to the risk of penalty for providing false
information; and they came forward to the affiant with the information).
Also, LaFave recognizes distinctions between an informant who is a member of
the underworld or part of the criminal sector and "the average citizen who by happenstance finds himself in the position of a victim of or a witness to criminal conduct and
thereafter relates to the police what he knows as a matter of civic duty. One who qualifies as the latter type of individual, sometimes referred to as a 'citizen-informer,' is more
deserving of a presumption of reliability than the informant from the criminal milieu." 2
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.3 (3d 1996) (notes omitted). In order to determine
whether an informant may be deemed reliable, a court must consider the "particular
factual contexts" of the matter. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Conclusory statements, i.e. that
the informant is a reliable and credible person, will not do. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
In this case, the court of appeals recognized that McCarthy's initial source for the
information was a confidential informant. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^[2.
It is not obvious from the face of the affidavit whether the informant "was a citizen- or a police-informant." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^[14 (see R. 72-74). The
informant "used marijuana with [Saddler] on several occasions." Saddler, 2003 UT App
82, f|14 (see R. 72). Based on that information, "we know CI was part of the criminal
environment, lowering his veracity and reliability." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^14; see
James, 2000 UT 80, Til I n . 5.
The court of appeals also recognized that the CI provided information "'out of a ...
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desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the community/" and that
the "CI was '[neither] promised nor paid for any of the information provided/" Saddler .
2003 UT App 82, Tfl4. The court of appeals correctly stated that such information
generally will "bolster[] reliability and veracity in citizen-informants". IcL However, as
the Gates Court observed, "[o]ne simple rule will not cover every situation." Gates, 462
U.S. at 232 (cite omitted). Indeed, the conclusory statements were similar to those that
the Gates Court cautioned against: "An officer's statement that 'affiants have received
reliable information from a credible person and believe' that heroin is stored in a home,
is likewise inadequate." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. The court of appeals continued its
analysis of the informant. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, ffl[14-19.
The court recognized that the CI was anonymous. As the state asserts, "Detective
McCarthy did not expressly indicate that he knew the identity of the informant." (State's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated May 21, 2003 ("State's Petition"), at 14; see. also
State's Brief, 22 & 4 n.l (recognizing that even the informant's gender cannot be
determined).) Under the totality of the circumstances, "we do not know" whether "CI
and McCarthy met face-to-face or communicated by telephone or letter", Saddler, 2003
UT App 82, TJ16; whether CI "told McCarthy his name," i d j "whether CI had ever
provided McCarthy [with] information before and whether this information proved
reliable." IdL (citing Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206). And where "we do not know" whether
CI "told McCarthy his name," "we do not know" whether he/she even "subjected himself
to the penalty of providing false information." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,1J16.
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In the context of this case, the "CI made no statement against penal interest.
Although he did admit to using marijuana with Saddler on several occasions, this
admission means nothing if CI did not reveal his identity, thus subjecting himself to the
danger of prosecution." Id. ^}18.3 In short, like an anonymous letter, the assertions in the

3 The state has cited to U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), for the proposition that an
informant's admission against penal interest supports reliability. (State's Brief, 14.) In
Harris, an officer obtained a search warrant for defendant's premises based in part on
allegations from an unnamed informant. The face of the affidavit supported the
determination that the affiant/officer knew the informant. Specifically, the officer stated
that on the date of the affidavit, he interviewed the informant and obtained a "sworn"
statement from him regarding defendant's conduct. Harris. 403 U.S. at 575. Also, the
informant admitted to the officer that he had purchased illicit whiskey for a period of
more than two years and the informant feared for his life and safety if the officer revealed
his identity in the affidavit for the search warrant. Id. at 575, 583.
The warrant was issued, and then reversed on direct appeal. Id. at 576. On later
certiorari review, the Supreme Court articulated the issue as follows: "We granted
certiorari in this case to consider the recurring question of what showing is
constitutionally necessary to satisfy a magistrate that there is a substantial basis for
crediting the report of an informant known to the police , but not identified to the
magistrate, who purports to relate his personal knowledge of criminal activity." Id. at
575 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court stated that a bare statement from the affiant/officer that he
believed the informant to be truthful would not provide a factual basis for crediting the
report of an unnamed informant. Id. at 579. Also, "admissions of crime do not always
lend credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations of another." Id. at 584.
The Court recognized that in the factual context of Harris's case, the sworn statement provided by the informant admitted major elements of a federal offense and was
against the informant's penal interest. Thus, it carried its own indicia of reliability. Id. at
583. Under the particular facts of Harris, the affidavit contained an "ample factual basis"
for believing the informant's assertions, and the assertions were corroborated by the
"affiant's own knowledge" of the defendant's criminal background. IcL at 579-80.
The facts in Harris are distinguishable from the facts here. In this case, there is no
basis for determining whether McCarthy even knew who the informant was. (State's
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affidavit relating to the CI contained "nothing from which one might conclude that [the
informant was] either honest or his information reliable." Gates, 462 U.S. at 227.
Indeed, the state's brief identifies a central problem in the affidavit: the difficulty
in evaluating the informant. The state refers to the matter as an "exercise" in "futility."
(State's Brief, 19.) The lack of objective facts relating to the CI or to his or her
association with McCarthy provides no factual context for crediting the report of the
unidentified, confidential informant.
Notwithstanding the "futility" of the matter, the state urges application of its own
rigid test. The state maintains that if an anonymous drug user claims to volunteer
information "out of concern for the community and not for personal benefit," then "like
the majority's 'citizen informant,'" the anonymous informant's "credibility is enhanced."
(See State's Brief, 20.) In connection with that argument the state has cited to State v.
Brown. 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). (State's Brief, 20.) There, the court of
appeals assessed the validity of an affidavit for a search warrant based in part on
information from an identified citizen. IcL at 285. The court stated the following:
In the instant case, a citizen telephoned Crime Solvers, identified himself and
volunteered information because he had a particularized interest in one of the
children who brought marijuana from the described buildings. The informant was
a concerned citizen, not a confidential police informant expecting some personal
benefit from disclosing information. Therefore, his veracity should not be subject
to rigid scrutiny. In addition, the informant claimed to have personally confronted

Brief, 4 n.l; 22 (McCarthy did not say if he knew the informant's identity).) The CI's
anonymous admissions of crime in this case do not lend credibility to the CI's
accusations against another {i.e. Saddler). See. e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 584.
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the children with baggies of marijuana and thus had personal knowledge of the
information he supplied to police. Further boosting the informant's reliability is
the detail with which he described the houses and greenhouse.
Brown, 798 P.2d at 186-87 (emphasis added). The Brown court recognized that ff[c]ourts
view the testimony of citizen informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of
police informers." IdL at 186. The average citizen "is not the type of informant in need
of independent proof of reliability or veracity." Id^ (citing State v. Miller, 740 P.2d
1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.\ cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987); State v. Harris,
671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah 1983)). "This is because citizen informers, unlike police
informers, volunteer information out of concern for the community and not for personal
benefit." Brown, 798 P.2d at 186. Brown is not applicable here.
Finally, the state claims that the court of appeals' ruling in Saddler creates rules
"that an informant must meet" to qualify for the "favored status" of citizen informant
before they may be considered reliable. (State's Brief, 18-19.) Yet the court of appeals
has placed no obligation on informants. In this case, since McCarthy was seeking the
warrant, McCarthy was required to provide sufficient information to support probable
cause. See Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,ffl[8-9,27; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 & n.18
(1968) (requiring specific, articulable facts to support an officer's conduct under the
Fourth Amendment).
Surely McCarthy knew something about the CI's communications: McCarthy
knew when he received the tip from the informant (whether it was the day before the
investigation or months before), how he received the information (whether it was by
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anonymous letter, email, or telephone call; or in person in a back-alley meeting or in the
open), and how much detail the informant either did or did not provide (including
whether the informant provided his/her name to McCarthy).
McCarthy knew whether he met the informant in person, or whether the communication was anonymous. Yet, for whatever reason, McCarthy chose not to include the
particular factual context of the communication in the affidavit. (R. 72-74); compare
Harris, 403 U.S. at 575 (the affiant/officer knew the informant; he interviewed and
obtained a sworn statement from the informant on the date of the affidavit). McCarthy
did not disclose whether he had prior d ealings with the informant; whether he
investigated the informant in any way; whether the informant had a history of providing
false/true reports of criminal conduct; whether the informant had a criminal record of
his/her own; whether the informant could be found and held accountable if his/her report
in this case proved to be false; or whether the informant may be arrested/prosecuted as a
result of the admissions s/he made concerning his/her own criminal conduct. (R. 72-74.)
The affidavit reveals nothing regarding the communication or the informant. Sometime
after McCarthy received the tip (the affidavit does not reveal how long) McCarthy
investigated. The matter is more mysterious than the anonymous letter in Gates.
McCarthy's decision not to include facts about the informant or the method of
communication effectively prevented a detached magistrate from making a commonsense, objective assessment about the matter in the particular factual context of the case.
In this case, as in Gates, the anonymous information from the CI standing alone
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could "not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable
cause to believe contraband would be found" in the home. Gates , 462 U.S. at 227.
"Something more was required." Id, The court of appeals continued its analysis of the
totality of the circumstances in this case.
2. The United States Supreme Court Has Recognized that an Informant's Detailed
Description of Alleged Wrongdoing May Entitle the Tip to Greater Weight Even
if There Are Doubts Regarding the Informant's Reliability; the Court of Appeals
Recognized the Same in Saddler.
According to the Supreme Court in Gates, an informant's "explicit and detailed
description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed
first-hand, entitles [the informant's] tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the
case." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 (emphasis added); id. at 234 (the totality-of-thecircumstances analysis permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of the
various indicia of reliability and unreliability attending the tip); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21
n.18 (1968) (stating that the demand for "specificity in the information upon which
police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence").
In this case, the court of appeals assessed whether the affidavit contained facts or
details that would verify the confidential informant's tip. See. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,
^ 19-21 (recognizing that "an informant's veracity and reliability may be ""boosted by
the detail with which the informant described his personal observation'" of the
[crime]'") (citing Bailev. 675 P.2d at 1206); see also Brown, 798P.2d at 288 (citing
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Gates, 462 U.S. at 266, for the proposition that a detailed description and police
corroboration may support probable cause).
The court correctly observed that the affidavit lacked details. "We do not know
the type of relationship CI had with Saddler or how often and for what purpose CI visited
Saddler. Also, although CI says he saw marijuana, cocaine, packaging materials, and
scales in the home, we do not know how much marijuana and cocaine he saw, when he
saw it, or where it was located." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^[19. Further, the affidavit
failed to contain any facts regarding the CI's description of Saddler or the home, or of
Saddler's routine, the hours of operation, his vehicle, clients, or clients' vehicles. Id.;
see also id. at 1flj2-5, 21; (R. 72-75; State's Petition, 13 (stating that disclosure of
unknowns "may very well have enhanced the reliability of the informant," but claiming
that was not required); icL, 18 (stating "more detail may have been useful," but claiming it
was not critical); State's Brief, 4 (stating "the CI did not describe the precise nature of
[his/her] relationship with defendant," s/he provided generalities); id, 22 (stating that
"unknowns" may have enhanced reliability, but claiming they were not required); see
also id., 24 (claiming information was sufficient even though CI did not reveal "when
she made these observations"; also stating that court of appeals did not find inferences to
be reasonable because affidavit "was not as clear as it otherwise might have been").)
The court of appeals also stated, "we do not know how much detail CI gave" to
McCarthy because McCarthy failed to include specific facts in the affidavit. Saddler.,
2003 UT App 82, f21. "McCarthy provided a conclusory outline of CI's statement." I d .
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at ^[21. Also, "we do not know anything about CI's actual description" of matters. IdL. at
T|19. The conclusory statements in the affidavit fail to support probable cause. IdL_ at ^|27;
see Babbell, 770 P.2d at 990 (requiring affiant to "articulate particularized facts and
circumstances" leading to probable cause).
The court of appeals' analysis is correct. According to the affidavit, at an unspecified time prior to McCarthy's investigation, the informant disclosed that s/he had known
the suspect for more than a year (R. 72, Tfl); the suspect and/or informant used drugs on
unspecified occasions and at the suspect's home (R. 72-73, Tflj2, 3, 7, 9); the CI observed
the suspect in possession of scales, packaging material and drugs (R. 72, Tflj 4, 5, 6, 7);
the suspect sold drugs from the home on some unspecified occasion(s) (R. 72-73, ^ 5 , 6,
8, 12); the suspect recently purchased the home, worked part time at BACI restaurant,
and drove a vehicle (R. 73, IfljlO, 11* 13); and the suspect was home infrequently, he kept
"hours of operation," and he "usually" was home late in the evening. (R. 73, Tfl[13, 14.)
The affidavit failed to indicate whether the informant disclosed how or where s/he
observed the alleged marijuana in the home, what it looked like, or how it was packaged.
(R. 72-74.) The allegations raised several questions: what did the CI observe beyond the
general, unspecified use, possession and distribution of drugs and paraphernalia; when
did s/he make his/her observations; who was present; how did events appear or transpire
(i.e. modus operandi)', what was said and what was the CI's involvement; when did the
CI contact McCarthy; how did s/he make contact; what did s/he disclose to McCarthy in
detail; and why did McCarthy fail to disclose any of the details in the affidavit?
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The allegations in the affidavit were written in the past tense, and except for the
statement that the CI had been to the premises most recently within the last week to ten
days apparently from the date of the tip — whenever that was — the allegations made no
reference to time. In addition, there was no indication as to when the informant made the
disclosures to McCarthy in order that a magistrate may put the information in a "particular factual context[]." Gates, 462 U.S. at 232; see Sadder, 2003 UT App 82, ^|21. The
affidavit alleged general conduct under unspecified circumstances. It failed to contain
details or descriptions of unique events and circumstances to lend credence to the tip.4
Indeed, even the innocent allegations lacked detail. (R. 73, TJ13 (stating that the
CI "provided a description of the home," and "a vehicle" used by Saddler)); Gates, 462
U.S. at 232, 241-44 (stating that probable cause turns on the assessment of "particular
factual contexts"; and recognizing that corroboration of innocent facts may support
indicia of reliability for the tip); see Babbell 770 P.2d at 991, 992 (finding that the
statement, "matched the description," presented the Court with a close question, but
considering it sufficient since it referenced matters in the affidavit that were "set out
specifically and in detail" about the truck, including the particular make, color, year,

4 Also, the assertions in the affidavit at paragraphs 11 and 12 are improper. There,
McCarthy claimed the informant disclosed the following: "the suspect's only legitimate
source of income is from a part time waiter's job" at BACI restaurant, and "the suspect
sells controlled substances to be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of
income." (R. 73.) There is no indication in the affidavit as to how or why the informant
would possess such information. The CI did not indicate that s/he learned the facts from
Saddler or that s/he had personal knowledge of the facts; and McCarthy did not identify
any relevant source for the information. The statements are plainly insupportable.
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missing bumpers, cracked windshield, orange seat covers, and a stick-pin with slogan on
the driver's visor). If the CI had identified any specific facts relevant to his/her
observations, that may have furnished the tip with indicia of reliability. As it was, the
observations were ambiguous.
In the end, the trial judge considered it relevant that CI had been to the premises
"numerous times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days, and [he/she]
observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." (R. 72, f4; 127:12-13.) The allegation
read in a common-sense fashion supported that the informant had visited the premises on
numerous occasions, and during his/her visits s/he had observed 3 to 4 pounds of
marijuana. The informant's most recent visit was within the last week to ten days prior
to providing the tip — whenever that was.
That is insufficient to support the probable-cause standard. See State v.
Utterback. 485 N.W.2d 760, 767-68, 771 (Neb. 1992) (although informant "had been
inside said residence within the last five days, and had seen a large quantity of marijuana,
and lesser quantities of hashish, cocaine, LSD, and PCP," the affidavit was insufficient),
overruled on other grounds. State v. Johnson. 589N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1999). The
affidavit furnishes no information whatsoever as to when the informant witnessed events
and when s/he reported the information to McCarthy.
In State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated the following:
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[T]he unidentified informant's conclusory allegations that "Otto usually keeps the
drugs in the gas station" and that he "witnessed Otto dealing drugs" are
unsupported by any specific facts from which a neutral judge could independently
derive a reasonable suspicion that a search would yield evidence of criminal
activity. The fact that a police officer may be willing to believe the tip of an
informant—particularly one who has been helpful on prior occasions—does not
lessen the judge's duty to scrutinize the substance of the tip in order to weigh its
sufficiency against the practical standard of probable cause. As Justice Jacobs
observed in State v. Macri, [39 NJ 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963),] "Before the judge
is in a position to make his determination for issuance, he must properly be made
aware of the underlying facts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent
man in believing that the law was being violated." 39 NJ at 257, 188 A2& 389.
Here, the informant's tip is a bald conclusion, allegedly based on personal
observation, but unsupported by any reference to dates, events, or circumstances.
Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
Probable cause requires a degree of selectivity and accountability. General statements that the suspect drives a vehicle, lives in a home, and had marijuana there at some
time does not provide adequate assurance to support the probability that evidence of
crime will be found on the premises. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. "The affidavit must not
be couched in conclusory terms, since the magistrate must be in a position to know the
underlying facts in order to render his neutral judgment. Wherever a question indicates a
factual basis for a warrant, a reviewing court must examine it carefully to determine
whether the facts were sufficiently specific to assure that the magistrate's judgment is
more than a rubber stamp of the officer's conclusions." State in the Interest of R.B.C.,
443 A.2d 271, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); State v. Droneburg . 781 P.2d 1303, 1304
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that the action of the magistrate "must not be ca mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others'"); BabbelL 770 P.2d at 990. General
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assertions without necessary detail raise questions and suspicions; they do not support
"indicia of reliability."
The state disagrees with the court of appeals' analysis, and maintains that the
opinion in Saddler imposes "a burden of detail far greater than is required under the
Fourth Amendment." (State's Brief, 20.) Yet the court of appeals did not impose particular detail to the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. It did not give any specific
defect in the affidavit more weight than some other aspect of the affidavit. Indeed, a
deficiency in one area of an affidavit may be compensated for "by a strong showing" in
other areas or by "some other indicia of reliability." Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. In this case,
the court of appeals engaged in a balanced assessment of the considerations supporting
reliability (and unreliability) for the tip. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82; Gates, 462 U.S. at
234. In that regard, while the lack of detail would not weigh in favor of reliability, it
likewise did not end the analysis here. The court of appeals continued its analysis.
It continued to "conscientiously review the sufficiency of [the] affidavit[] on
which [the] warrant issued" pursuant to Gates. IcL at 239; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^[22.
3. The Supreme Court Has Recognized the Value of Police Investigations to Lend
Credibility to an Informant's Tip; the Court of Appeals Did the Same.
The court of appeals considered McCarthy's investigative efforts. Saddler, 2003
UT App 82, ffl[22-26. According to the affidavit, CI disclosed that Saddler kept
unspecified "hours of operation" (R. 73), and Saddler was home "usually during the late
evening hours." (IdJ Based on the information, McCarthy conducted an unspecified,
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"intermittent" surveillance. (Id.) According to the affidavit, "During the initial
surveillance your affiant [McCarthy] did not observe[] anyone at the residence, the
surveillance was intermittent from 2000 [8:00 p.m.] hours until 0600 [6:00 a.m.]
6/15/00." (Id.) Based on McCarthy's statements in the affidavit, the court of appeals
correctly recognized that "[b]etween 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., McCarthy saw nothing to
corroborate CI's information." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,1J23.
McCarthy then asserted that he saw "short-term traffic that he believed to be drug
related." Id at ^|24; (R. 73). McCarthy did not say when or describe what he saw regarding short-term traffic. He did not indicate why he believed it to be drug related. (R. 7374.) McCarthy did not reveal "how many vehicles he saw visit Saddler's home, whether
any of these vehicles arrived during Saddler's alleged hours of operation, [or] whether
any of these vehicles or their drivers were described by CI". Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,
^[24. McCarthy provided "conclusory information about his corroborative effort." I J L
Next, when McCarthy observed an unspecified car "leaving" the home (R. 73 (no
indication that McCarthy saw the car arrive or that McCarthy observed the driver make
contact with anyone at the home)), McCarthy requested that officers from West Valley
City perform a traffic stop on the car. The officers performed the stop and arrested the
driver, Oba Tramel, on outstanding warrants. At some point, the officers located onehalf ounce of marijuana in Tramefs possession. (R. 73-74.)
According to the state's brief here, the marijuana was located "on the driver's
person." (State's Brief, 5, 15, 26.) Yet the affidavit does not specify where the mari36

juana was located. (R. 73-74 (stating that Tramel was "later found to be in possession of
marijuana").) McCarthy did not indicate in the affidavit whether he was present when
officer's discovered the marijuana, and he did not identify — or attach a copy of the
report from — the officer who made the discovery. (See id.) Thus, for all McCarthy
revealed, the marijuana may have been sewn inside the lining of a jacket or glued in the
sole of a shoe; it may have been in a bill fold belonging to Tramel in the glove box or in
a sunglass case in the console of the car. The affidavit did not say. Also, it did not say
how the marijuana may be related to Saddler or the house. (R. 72-74.)
Next, McCarthy stated that he assisted with a search of Tramel's car. "[A] small
section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appear[ed] to have residue of cocaine
inside a twist section of the bag." (R. 73.) Although McCarthy apparently discovered
the plastic section, he did not indicate where it was located or how it related to his investigation of Saddler. (R. 73-74.) He did not say if it was wedged between the back seats,
in an ash tray, or in the trunk of the car. (Id.) Since McCarthy did not observe Tramel
outside the car at the residence, those facts would have been relevant to a m agistrate
making an objective, conscientious assessment of the affidavit for probable cause.
Likewise, McCarthy did not indicate whether Oba Tramel was someone who was
described by the CI as involved in drugs, or whether Tramel was "driving a vehicle
described by CI, or how long the stopped person was at Saddler's home." Saddler, 2003
UT App 82, T[24. McCarthy provided only vague assertions.
Also, according to the affidavit, Saddler worked at a restaurant part time. (R. 73.)
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As part of the investigation, McCarthy "checked" the restaurant at some point on
"6/15/00" and determined Saddler was not there. (R. 74.) It is not clear whether
McCarthy simply drove by the restaurant and perhaps saw it closed, or whether he
actually spoke to someone. The court of appeals considered the assertion to be vague,
and stated the following.
[McCarthy] learned Saddler was not at work and the person he spoke to did not
know when Saddler was scheduled to work next. With more detail, this
information may have provided important corroborative detail. However, as is, the
information is practically useless. Although McCarthy established that Saddler
worked at BACTs, we do not know who McCarthy spoke to or whether that
person was in a position to know Saddler's schedule. We also do not know
whether the person McCarthy spoke to thought it was unusual that Saddler was
not currently at work or whether the person thought Saddler's work schedule in
general was unusual.
Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, ^|26; (R. 74). Without more information here, it is unclear as
to whether McCarthy was able to confirm one way or another even innocent information
relating to Saddler's employment as reported by the informant.
Also, McCarthy did not indicate why he felt compelled to check for Saddler at the
restaurant on June 15. (R. 74.) Since the affidavit did not indicate whether McCarthy
saw Saddler (or anyone) at the house during his surveillance, he likely went to the
restaurant to determine if Saddler was there. The affidavit in that regard is unclear.
In Gates, the officers' investigations played a valuable role in the analysis. Gates.,
462 U.S. at 241-45. The corroboration of unique circumstances relating to defendants'
drug trafficking and to their future activities provided indicia of reliability for the
anonymous tip. Id.
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The agencies in Gates confirmed Lance's particular flight arrangements, and they
observed him along the way as he flew from Chicago to Florida and went to a motel for a
car that was waiting for him as predicted by the letter. Id. at 226. Agents observed
Lance as he went to a room that was registered to Susan, and they observed Lance as he
left with a woman at 7:00 the next morning directly for Chicago, all as predicted in the
anonymous letter. Id, at 225-26. In Gates, several agencies banded together to check
innocent facts and to corroborate unique circumstances as particularly set forth and
predicted in the letter. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-4. Also, the investigating efforts were
detailed in the affidavit. IcL at 226. The corroboration of innocent facts gave credibility
to the anonymous tip of criminal conduct.
The particular factual context of Gates is distinguishable from this matter. In this
case, the anonymous tip as set forth in the affidavit was vague and conclusory. The affidavit does not say whether the informant disclosed particular facts about criminal
conduct that may be confirmed or particular facts about innocent matters, i.e. a
description of Saddler, of the house, or of the car, and/or the name of the person it was
registered to. (R. 72-74.)
Also, the intermittent surveillance added nothing to the analysis. McCarthy did
not corroborate innocent or relevant facts to support indicia of reliability for the
anonymous tip. He did not ascertain if Saddler owned the home, or was at home during
the surveillance, he did not make any specific observations about the vehicle on the
premises, except that it was registered "as described," and he learned nothing about
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Saddler's employment. (R. 72-74); BabbelL 770 P.2d at 992 (considering the phrase
"matched the description" to be a close question, but approved where the affidavit
otherwise contained a specifically detailed description of the truck). McCarthy did not
even say if he observed anyone inside the house during his surveillance. Instead,
McCarthy made an ambiguous reference to "some short term traffic." (R. 73.)
With respect to Oba Tramel, McCarthy did not observe him make contact with
anyone at the residence or even get out of the car. Rather, McCarthy saw TrameFs car
leave. (R. 73.) That does not corroborate anything about Saddler or the home. The
conclusory allegations fail to reflect the factual and practical considerations necessary to
a magistrate in assessing the matter under an objective standard.
In this case, the court of appeals correctly determined that under the total circumstances, the affidavit failed to support probable cause. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, f27.
4. Other Considerations Relevant to the Analysis Fail to Support Probable Cause.
Finally, in this case McCarthy chose not to disclose specific facts that were known
to him about the informant, the tip, and the intermittent surveillance. This Court has
warned against such affidavits in Babbell. There, it stated the following:
Although we conclude that the magistrate did not err in finding the affidavit sufficient, we must observe that this is a very close question. If the affidavit were
more vague, we might well reach the opposite conclusion. Judges should be reluctant to base a probable cause determination on so poorly drafted an affidavit. The
better approach would be to require that an affiant take the simple but critical
additional step of clearly and unambiguously stating how the vehicle matches the
detailed description obtained from witnesses. A few short minutes spent in more
carefully preparing this affidavit would have ensured the protection of the
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accused's constitutional rights while saving a substantial amount of time for the
courts and parties.
Babbell 770 P.2d at 992 n.3.
In Gates, the officers did not provide vague assertions about the tip or how, when,
or where it was obtained, Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-26; they did not engage in abstract
investigations with conclusory allegations. Rather, the detective who prepared the
affidavit specifically included a copy of the anonymous letter, and he revealed in the
affidavit when he received the tip and the specifics regarding the agencies' corroborative
efforts. The affidavit contained facts about the investigation, including, for example, that
officers observed Lance Gates leave the motel in Florida at 7:00 a.m. on May 6 with a
woman in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates belonging to a Hornet station wagon.
Id. at 226. The affidavit identified the Mercury's route, and it specifically disclosed what
officers knew about the events in order that the detached magistrate could objectively
assess matters based on the particular factual context of the case. IdL
The same cannot be said of the affidavit that McCarthy submitted in this case.
Any details about the CI, the tip, or the intermittent surveillance were known only to
McCarthy. He did not divulge the particular facts; he did not say how, when, where, or
whether he came into contact with the informant; he did not say whether the informant
provided any detailed descriptions of criminal events (i.e. a particular modus operandi),
or of innocent facts (including, e.g., a description of the car used by Saddler, with color,
year, model, make or license plates). McCarthy did not disclose whether the informant's
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tip amounted only to vague generalities, or whether there was more to the matter.
Also, while McCarthy should have been able to provide detail about his own
intermittent surveillance, he failed to do even that. He did not identify "innocent" facts
in the affidavit: that is, whether he was able to confirm that Saddler owned the house, or
even a description of the car. While McCarthy reported "some" "short term traffic," he
did not specify what he observed, when he observed it or what it entailed. He indicated
that he believed the traffic was drug related without providing any particular factual context for the matter. (R. 73-74.) He did not indicate whether he observed a "visitor" make
contact with anyone at the home. (Id.) Indeed he did not say if he could confirm that
Saddler was at the residence that evening, or if he knew what Saddler looked like. (Id.)
McCarthy stated that during his intermittent surveillance, he observed nothing,
and/or he observed a car leave. (R. 73-74.) He did not say whether or when he saw the
car arrive or whether the driver got out of the car. (Id.) McCarthy stated that the driver
ultimately was arrested, and during a search marijuana was found. McCarthy did not say
who from West Valley police arrested Oba Tramel or where they purportedly found the
marijuana. (Id.) Likewise, McCarthy did not identify — or attach a report from — the
officer who purportedly made the arrest and discovery. (Id.)
According to the affidavit, McCarthy ultimately joined in a search of the car. (R.
73.) He located a section of plastic bag. Surely he knew where he located the bag, yet he
did not disclose that in the affidavit. (R. 73.) Likewise, he did not say how or whether
the section of bag or the marijuana could somehow be connected to Saddler or the house.
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Thereafter, McCarthy further investigated Saddler's whereabouts. He did not say
why that was necessary. Saddler was not at work during the investigation on June 15;
McCarthy did not say if Saddler was home. (R. 73-74.) The vague assertions do not
lend credibility to the matter.
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws [the
officers] can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. An officer must present sufficient facts to a neutral,
detached magistrate to allow that magistrate to assess the matter under an objective
standard. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a
magistrate properly issued a warrant based on an anonymous tip corroborated in relevant
respects by officers. See Gates. 462 U.S. at 217. There, the tip of criminal conduct
together with the facts of the corroboration supported probable cause. Here, the anonymous tip lacks any corroboration to speak of. McCarthy failed to identify any innocent
facts that would lend credibility to the anonymous report; he also failed to corroborate
allegations of suspicious conduct. In the end, the affidavit contains only anonymous
vague information, and sloppy detective work. That is insufficient.
The magistrate here failed to demand the particular, objective facts. Instead, he
abdicated his neutral assessment of the matter to McCarthy's subjective and ambiguous
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interpretation of the matter. That is unconstitutional. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Under a
practical, common-sense assessment of the total circumstances, the anonymous tip and
vague assertions regarding McCarthy's corroborative efforts cannot support probable
cause. The court of appeals' ruling was proper.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Saddler respectfully requests that this Court affirm
the court of appeals' ruling in Saddler.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

STATE v. SADDLER

Utah 1025

Cite as 67 P.3d 1025 (UtahApp. 2003)

where: (1) there is no evidence to establish a
causal connection, thus leaving causation to
jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be
derived from the evidence on proximate causation." Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.,
820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah Ct.App.1991), affd,
862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993).
[22] 1126 Utah is a comparative negligence state. Thus, "[e]ven though [Rose]
may have been negligent, [a directed verdict]
is [ordinarily] an altogether inappropriate
procedure for assessing [his] degree of negligence against the negligence of the defendants." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723,
728 (Utah 1985).

way rather than a pedestrian bridge. Because "reasonable persons could . . . differ on
the inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation," Steffensen,
820 P.2d at 487, we conclude proximate cause
presented a jury question.
CONCLUSION
11 29 In sum, we conclude Rose presented
sufficient evidence on each element to establish a prima facie case of negligence. We
therefore reverse the directed verdicts in
favor of the Barrientoses and the City and
remand.

H 30 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T.
[23] 1127 At trial, Rose testified that al- GREENWOOD, Judge and WILLIAM A.
though he had previously patronized the Bar- THORNE JR., Judge.
rientoses' restaurant, he had not ridden
through the "back" part of the parking lot.
Rose further testified that he proceeded
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
2?
slightly ahead of his wife through the lot at
about ten miles per hour. Although it is
unclear from what point, Rose and his wife
testified that the asphalted planter strip appeared to be a driveway that ran straight to
2003 UT App 82
the road. Some of the photo exhibits indiSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
cate a concrete pedestrian bridge a few feet
from the driveway, but it is unclear whether
v.
either Rose or his wife saw the bridge. Rose
Anthony A. SADDLER, Defendant
testified that when he approached the sideand Appellant.
walk between the parking lot and the asphalted planter strip, he looked left around a
No. 20020119-CA.
"blind" corner for traffic. Rose's wife testified that as Rose was crossing the sidewalk,
Court of Appeals of Utah.
she yelled, "Watch out!" Rose testified that
March 20, 2003.
he believed a car was coming and continued
to look left for cars. He testified that he did
not recall seeing the ditch and he did not
Defendant pleaded guilty and was conapply his brakes. Although Rose rode into
victed
in the District Court, West Valley
the ditch, his wife testified that she was able
Department,
Terry Christiansen, J., of unto turn her bike and stop without riding into
lawful
possession
of a controlled substance
the ditch.
with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed
U28 Although the evidence may suggest
denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
Rose negligently failed to keep a proper lookThe Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that
out, the evidence presented was sufficient to
affidavit based on information provided by
raise "[a] question of fact for the jury . . . as
confidential informant did not establish probto whether his distribution of attention was
able cause to search defendant's home, abreasonable." Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d
sent a showing of informant's veracity and
224, 265 P.2d 401, 404 (1953). Further, a
reliability.
jury could find that a bicyclist could reasonably choose to exit over an apparent driveReversed and remanded.
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Billings, Associate P.J., dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Criminal Law <S=*1139,1158(2)
On review of whether affidavit provided
probable cause to issue search warrant, an
appellate court is bound by the contents of
the affidavit, and it therefore does not need
to defer to the trial court's finding, but rather it makes an independent review of the
trial court's determination of the sufficiency
of the written evidence. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
2. Criminal Law ®=>1139,1158(2)
On review of whether affidavit provided
probable cause to issue search warrant, the
Fourth Amendment does not require that the
reviewing court conduct a de novo review of
the magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, it requires only that the reviewing court conclude that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
3. Criminal Law <3=>1158(2)
Reviewing court pays great deference to
the magistrate's determination that probable
cause existed to issue search warrant.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
4. Criminal Law <S=>1158(2)
On review of whether affidavit provided
probable cause to issue search warrant, the
appellate court will not give deference to the
magistrate if there is no substantial basis for
determining that probable cause existed.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Controlled Substances <^=>148(4)
Affidavit based on information provided
by confidential informant did not establish
probable cause to search defendant's home
for evidence of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, absent a showing of informant's veracity and reliability; it was not
known whether information was provided for
pecuniary gain, informant had obtained information while engaged in criminal activity, it
was not known whether police were aware of
informant's identity, informant made no
statement against penal interest, affidavit
contained only a conclusory outline of infor-

mant's statements and alleged observations,
and officer's surveillance of defendant's home
did not corroborate informant's information.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Searches and Seizures @=>H1
When a search warrant is issued on the
basis of an affidavit, that affidavit must cowtain specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutral magistrate that
probable cause exists. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
7. Searches and Seizures <3=>111
Utah courts employ the "totality-of-thecircumstances test" to determine the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search
warrant. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
8. Searches and Seizures <^=>113.1
Probable cause to issue a search warrant
is determined by a magistrate who makes a
practical common-sense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
9. Searches and Seizures ^ 1 1 7
Where information obtained from an informant is the primary support for a search
warrant, an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances requires the court to consider
three factors in determining probable cause:
(1) the type of tip or informant involved; (2)
whether the informant gave enough detail
about the observed criminal activity to support a warrant; and (3) whether the police
officer independently confirms the informant's information. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
4.
10. Searches and Seizures <s=>115.1
Not all informant tips are of equal value
in establishing probable cause to support a
search warrant. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
11. Searches and Seizures <3=>117
Factors to consider in determining
whether probable cause exists to support a
search warrant based on an informant's np
include the informant's veracity, reliability
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and basivS of knowledge.
Amend. 4.

U.S.CA. Const.

12. Searches and Seizures <s>117
In an analysis to determine whether an
informant's tip provided probable cause to
support search warrant, satisfaction of basis
of knowledge portion of totality of the circumstances test does not alone establish
probable cause in the absence of information
concerning informant's veracity and reliability; while basis of knowledge tells the court
how informant acquired his information, it
does not tell whether he was qualified to
assess the information, whether he relayed
the information accurately, or whether he is
trustworthy. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
13. Searches and Seizures <3>117
In an analysis to determine whether an
informant's tip provided probable cause to
support search warrant, the basis of knowledge portion of totality of the circumstances
test is satisfied where the informant speaks
from personal observation. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 4.
14. Searches and Seizures <3>117
In an analysis to determine whether an
informant's tip provided probable cause to
support search warrant, generally, an ordinary citizen-informant needs no independent
proof of reliability or veracity when he relates to the police what he knows as a matter
of civic duty; however, a police-informant
who gains information through involvement
in criminal activity or who is motivated by
pecuniary gain is lower on the reliability
scale. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
15. Searches and Seizures ^ H S
Because an anonymous caller's basis of
knowledge and veracity are typically unknown, anonymous tips are toward the lowend of the reliability scale for purposes of
establishing probable cause to support search
warrant; informants who give their full
names, thus subjecting themselves to a penalty for providing false information, are more
reliable than informants who hide behind the
cloak of telephonic or other anonymity so
&at their identities cannot be traced.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.

16. Searches and Seizures <2>117
In an analysis to determine whether an
informant's tip provided probable cause to
support search warrant, an informant's reliability and veracity are improved where he
provides information against his penal interest. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
17. Searches and Seizures o»117
In an analysis to determine whether an
informant's tip provided probable cause to
support search warrant, an informant's veracity and reliability may be boosted by the
detail with which the informant described his
personal observation of the crime. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
18. Searches and Seizures (3=>111
A search warrant cannot issue solely on
the strength of a mere conclusory statement
that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at
all for making a judgment regarding probable cause. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
19. Searches and Seizures <£=>105.1
Judges should be reluctant to base a
probable cause determination on poorly
drafted affidavits. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
20. Searches and Seizures @=*121.1
Where affidavit offered in support of
search warrant properly recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of
time becomes less significant. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
21. Searches and Seizures <§=*117
In an analysis to determine whether an
informant's tip provided probable cause to
support search warrant, the independent police corroboration portion of totality of the
circumstances test means, in light of the
circumstances, the officer confirms enough
facts so that he may reasonably conclude that
the information provided is reliable.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
22. Searches and Seizures <£=>117
To satisfy the independent police corroboration portion of totality of the circumstances test in an analysis to determine
whether an informant's tip provided probable
cause to support search warrant, a police
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officer may corroborate the tip either by
observing the illegal activity or by finding
the material facts substantially as described
by the informant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

"the courts not . . . require [McCarthy] to
publish the CFs name," for McCarthy l<believe[d] .. the CI [could] be harmed if CFs
name were published."

23. Criminal Law <3=>1162
An error amounting to a violation of the
federal constitution requires reversal unless
it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

113 According to the affidavit, CI told
McCarthy the following:
CI has known the suspect, Saddler for
over one year;
CI has observed the suspect use cocaine
and marijuana on numerous occasions during the last year;
CI has used marijuana with the suspect
on several occasions;
CI has been to the premises numerous
times, the most recent being within the
last week to ten days, and observed approximately three to four pounds of marijuana;
CI has observed three scales inside the
home, that the suspect uses to weigh out
repackaged marijuana for resale;
CI has observed cocaine inside the
premises, along with packaging material;
CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person;
The suspect has told CI that the suspect
sells marijuana and cocaine;
CI has observed the suspect sell and use
controlled substances, inside the named
premises;
CI has been told by the suspect that the
suspect recently purchased the listed
premises;
CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income is from a part-time
waiter's job at a Salt Lake City restaurant,
BACFs;
CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to afford his
own usage and as a separate source of
income;
CI provided a description of the home, a
vehicle frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and hour's of
operation for the suspect;
CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the late evening hours.

Linda M. Jones and Shannon N. Romero,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, for
Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and
Jeffrey T. Colemere, Assistant Attorney
General, for Appellee.
Before BILLINGS, Associate Presiding
Judge, DAVIS and GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
H 1 Anthony A. Saddler (Saddler) appeals
his conviction for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute,
a third degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp.2000). Saddler
challenges the trial court's order denying his
motion to suppress evidence and upholding
the constitutionality of the search warrant.
We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
112 On June 15, 2000, Detective Bill
McCarthy (McCarthy) obtained a warrant to
search Saddler's residence for marijuana, cocaine, and related items. In issuing the
search warrant, the magistrate relied on an
affidavit provided by McCarthy, who prepared the affidavit using information from a
confidential informant (CI). The affidavit established McCarthy's nineteen years of general police experience and his specific experience and training in narcotics investigation.
It also stated UC1 has not been promised nor
paid for any of the information provided,'1
and claimed "CI . . . provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to stop
the sales and usage of controlled substances
into the community." Further, it requested

U 4 The affidavit also describes McCarthy's
corroboration efforts. On June 14 and 15,
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2000, McCarthy conducted surveillance of
Saddler's home between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00
a.m. and did not observe anyone. At an
unspecified time on June 15, McCarthy observed some "short term traffic," which he
believed was "drug related." West Valley
Police stopped one of the vehicles leaving the
premises and found the driver in possession
of one-half ounce of marijuana. Police found
no drug paraphernalia in the vehicle or on
the driver's person, which indicated to
McCarthy "the marijuana was purchased
from [Saddler's] premises."
15 McCarthy also "observed vehicles described by CI at [Saddler's] premises and the
registered owner was a[sic] described by CI."
Finally, McCarthy checked BACI's restaurant on June 15, and Saddler "was not at
work and it was unknown when he was
scheduled to return."
U6 After obtaining and executing the
search warrant, on June 15, police seized
approximately ten ounces of marijuana and
one gram of cocaine, along with drug packaging material, triple beam scales, and $478.00
in cash. Saddler subsequently filed a motion
to suppress the evidence. After the trial
court denied the motion. Saddler pleaded
guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, conditional upon his right to appeal the suppression
issue. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 93839 (Utah Ct.App.1988).

omitted), cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150.
Instead, " 'we make an independent review of
the trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written evidence.'" Id. (quoting State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah
Ct.App.1991)). "However, 'the [F]ourth
[Ajmendment does not require that the reviewing court conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's probable cause determination!.]
[I]nstead, it requires only that the reviewing
court conclude "that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for . . . [determining] that
probable cause existed." ' " Id. (alterations
in
original) (quoting State v. Babbell, 770
R 2 d 987 9 9 1
>
< U t a h 1989> (quoting Illinois v.
Gates
462 u s
>
- - 2 1 3 ' 238> 1 0 3 S - C t 2 3 1 7 '
2332 7 6
>
L-Ed.2d 527 (1983))). We therefore
"Pay ^ e a t deference to the magistrate's determination." State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030,
«B3 (Utah Ct.App.1994).*
ANALYSIS
[5-8] 118 Saddler argues McCarthy's affidavit supporting the search warrant did not
establish probable cause for the search. We
agree.

f 9 The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees that "no
[wjarrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause." U.S. Const, amend. IV. u[W]hen a
search warrant is issued on the basis of an
affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific
facts sufficient to support a determination by
a neutral magistrate that probable cause exISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ists." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990
[1-4] 11 7 The sole issue is whether the (Utah 1989). "It is well settled that Utah
trial court erred by denying Saddler's motion courts employ the 'totality-of-the-circumto suppress evidence and concluding McCar- stances test' articulated in Illinois v. Gates,
thy's affidavit established probable cause to 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76
search Saddler's residence. "[T]his court, L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) to determine the suffilike the reviewing court below, is bound by ciency of an affidavit supporting a search
the contents of the affidavit, we therefore warrant." State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033
need not defer to the trial court's find- (Utah Ct.App.1994). Thus, "[p]robable cause
ing. . . . " State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,- is determined by a magistrate who *make[s] a
19, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citation practical common-sense decision whether,
!• The dissent is concerned that we do not give
sufficient deference to the magistrate's determination "We pav great deference to the magistrate's deteimination," State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d
1030. 1033 (Utah Ct.App.1994), because " '[a]
grudging or negative attitude toward warrants is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's
strong preference tor searches conducted pursu-

ant to a warrant' " State v. Deluna, 2001 UT
App 401,11 10, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002
Utah LEXIS 150 (citation omitted). However,
our preference for warrants does not extend to
warrants that are not based on probable cause.
We will not give deference to the magistrate if
there is no "substantial basis for .
[determining] that probable cause existed." Id. at H 9
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given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit!.,] . there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.' " Id. (second
alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at
2332).
[9J f 10 "Where, as here, information obtained from [an| informant!.] is the primary
support for the search warrant, an analysis
of the totality of the circumstances requires
us to consider the three factors articulated
by this court in Kaysvdie City v. Mulcahy,
943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah Ct.App.1997):'
State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,1111, 40
P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS
150; see State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App
332,111116-17, 37 P.3d 260 (extending application of Mulcahy factors to probable cause
determinations). We now7 consider those
three factors.
1. Type of Informant/Basis of Knowledge
110,111 1111 The first factor is "the type
of tip or informant involved.'' Kaysville City
v Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Ct.App.
1997). "After all, '[n]ot all tips are of equal
value in establishing [probable cause].' " Id.
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
"Factors to consider in determining whether
probable cause exists include an informant's
veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge."
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (other citations omitted);
see also State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303,
1306 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("Although the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of
confidential informants are no longer strict
prerequisites for establishing probable cause,
they are still relevant considerations, among
others, in determining the existence of probable cause under a totality-of-the-circumstances." (quotations and citations omitted)).
2. The dissent argues that we dismiss the basis oi
knowledge poition too quicklv in out analysis of
the totality of the cneumstances This is not
true We acknowledge that the basis of knowledge portion of the test is satisfied
However,
the basis of knowledge portion alone does not
establish probable cause HI the absence oi inioi-

[12,13] 1112 In this case, the basis of
knowledge portion is satisfied.2 Basis of
knowledge is satisfied where the informant
speaks from personal observation. See
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Here, the affidavit
sets forth information based on CFs personal
observations. For instance, the affidavit
notes that CI "observed [Saddler] use cocaine and marijuana," "observed approx. 3 to
4 pounds of marijuana," and "observed cocaine inside [Saddler's] premises."
[14] 1113 However, the veracity and reliability portions are not satisfied. Generally,
"an ordinary citizen-informam needs no independent proof of reliability or veracity."
State v. Deluva, 2001 UT App 401,114, 40
P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS
150 (quotations and citations omitted). A
citizen-informant is "an average citizen wrho
is in a position to supply information by
virtue of having been a crime victim or witness." State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1199
(Utah Ct.App. 1993) (quotations and citations
omitted). Such an informant "thereafter relates to the police what he knows as a matter
of civic duty." State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 2L6,
219 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (cited for this proposition by
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 n. 2). Alternatively, a police-informant (or criminal-informant)
is "one who gains information through involvement in criminal activity or wTho is
' "motivated
by pecuniary gain," '" and
thus is "lower on the reliability scale." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 n. 2 (quoting Evans,
692 So.2d at 219).
1114 In this case, wre do not know whether
CI was a citizen- or a police-informant.
However, we do know that CI "used marijuana with [Saddler] on several occasions."
Thus, we knowT CI was part of the criminal
environment, lowering his veracity and reliability. We also know that CI "provided the
information out of a . desire to stop the
sales and usage of controlled substances into
the community," and that CI wTas "[neither]
mation concerning CI's veracity and reliability.
While basis of knowledge tells us how CI acquired his information, it does not tell us whether he was qualified to assess the information,
whether he lelaved the lnlormation accurately,
or whether he is trustworlhv
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promised nor paid for any of the information
provided." Although this information bolsters reliability and veracity in citizen-informants, see Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (assuming
reliability and veracity for citizen-informant
who volunteered the information and "receiveLdJ nothing from police in exchange for
the information"), we do not know whether
CI qualified as a citizen-informant or volunteered the information to police. Further,
we fail to see how the conclusory statement
that CI is providing the information out of a
sense of guilt and a desire to stop the sale of
controlled substances significantly bolsters
his veracity and reliability when he is a participant in the criminal environment and has
not indicated a remorse for his past participation or a determination to avoid future
involvement. See People v. Kershaw, 147
Cal.App.3d 750, 195 Cal.Rptr. 311, 314 (1983)
(noting that informants who are "criminals,
drug addicts or professional 'stool pigeons'"
may be motivated to volunteer information
not only for promises or payments, but also
for "revenge or the hope of eliminating criminal competition"), superceded by statute on
other grounds, People v. Burch, 188 Cal.
App.3d 172, 232 Cal.Rptr. 502 (1986).

not know whether McCarthy ever, using his
police training and experience, had the opportunity to evaluate CFs truthfulness. We
also do not know whether CI told McCarthy
his name/1 Consequently, we do not know
whether CI subjected himself to the penalty
of providing false information. Similarly, we
do not know whether CI had ever provided
McCarthy information before and whether
this information proved reliable. See State v.
Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (noting that information in the affidavit showing
"the informant had previously given truthful
information to the police concerning the existence of contraband" is "an accepted method
for establishing an informant's veracity").

[15] 1115 Also important to veracity and
reliability is whether the informant is anonymous. " 4[B]ecause an anonymous caller's
basis of knowledge and veracity are typically
unknown/ anonymous tips are toward 'the
low-end of the reliability scale.' " Mulcahy,
943 P.2d at 235 (citation omitted). Informants who "g[i]ve their full names," thus
"subject[ingl themselves to a penalty for providing false information," Deluna, 2001 UT
App 401 at 1115, 40 P.3d 1136, are more
reliable than informants who "hid[e] behind
the cloak of telephonic [or other] anonymity"
so that their identities cannot be traced.
State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703-04
(Minn.1990).

U 18 Here, CI made no statement against
penal interest. Although he did admit to
using marijuana with Saddler on several occasions, this admission means nothing if CI
did not reveal his identity, thus subjecting
himself to the danger of prosecution. Furthermore, even if we knew CFs identity, his
statement would still not be an admission
against penal interest because there is no
other evidence against him. See State v.
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 n. 24 (Utah
1993) (noting the "corpus delicti rule states
that a person may not be convicted of a
crime if no independent evidence, outside of
the defendant's own statement, exists").

1116 Here, we do not know whether CI and
McCarthy met face-to-face or communicated
by telephone or letter. Consequently, we do

[17] 1119 Finally, an informant's veracity
and reliability may be " 'boosted by the detail
with which the informant described his per-

3. The State argues that we should defer to the
trial court's inference that CI was not anonymous See Stale v Babbell, 770 P 2d 987. 992
(Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable
construction ' of that ambiguity) We disagree

It is not reasonable to infer, without more information, that CI, who was too afraid to allow his
name to be published in the aftidavit, was not
also too afraid to give his name to the police
officer drafting the affidavit.

[16] 1117 Next, an informant's reliability
and veracity are improved where he provides
information against his penal interest. See
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 9l
S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (holding statements "against the informant's penal
interest" "carr[ied] their own indicia of credibility"); In re Shon Daniel K, 125 N.M. 219,
959 P.2d 553, 558 (Ct.App.1998) (noting statements against penal interest are one indication of informant reliability).
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sonal observation' of the [crime]." Bailey,
675 P.2d at 1206. Here, the affidavit provides
little more than an outline of what CI told
McCarthy. We do not know the type of
relationship CI had with Saddler or how
often and for what purpose CI visited Saddler. Also, although CI says he saw marijuana, cocaine, packaging materials, and scales
in the home, we do not know how much
marijuana and cocaine he saw, when he saw
it, or where it was located.4 Finally, aside
from the conclusory statement that CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle
frequently used by Saddler, and Saddler's
hours of operation, we do not know anything
about CI's actual description of these facts.
II. Information Detail
[18,19] 1120 "The second Mulcahy factor
we must consider is whether 'the informant
gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a [warrant].' " State
v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,1119, 40 P.3d
1136 (alteration in original) (citation omitted),
cerL denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. "It is
well established that a warrant cannot issue
solely on the strength of 'a mere conclusory
statement that gives the magistrate virtually
no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause.' " State v. Babbell, 770
P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted).
Moreover, judges should be reluctant to base
a probable cause determination on poorly
drafted affidavits. See id. at 992 n. 3 (noting
the finding of probable cause was "a very
close question" where the affidavit included
the witnesses' description of a truck but not
4.

the officer's description of the truck he said
matched the witnesses' description). "The
better approach would be to require that an
affiant take the simple but critical additional
step of clearly and unambiguously stating"
the detail provided by the informant. Id. "A
few short minutes spent in more carefully
preparing [an] affidavit would have ensured
the protection of the accused's constitutional
rights while saving a substantial amount of
time for the courts and parties." Id.
[20] 1121 Here, we do not know how
much detail CI gave. Rather than provide a
detailed description of CI's statement in the
affidavit, McCarthy provided a conclusory
outline of CI's statement. We do not know
how CI knew Saddler or when and how often
CI visited Saddler's residence. Nor do we
know how often or how recently CI observed
controlled substances in Saddler's residence.5
We also do not know what detail CI gave
about Saddler's residence, routine, hours of
operation, vehicles, clients, or clients' vehicles.6
III. Confirmation by Police Officer
[21,22] 1122 "The final Mulcahy factor is
whether the police officer independently confirms the informants' information." State v.
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,1120, 40 P.3d 1136,
cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. Corroboration "means, in light of the circumstances,
[the officer] confirms enough facts so that he
may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable." Kay sH lie City v.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct.App.

We know that at some point, CI observed what
he described as three to four pounds of marijuana at Saddler's premises. However, we do not
know when CI made this observation. Although
the affidavit says CI had been to the house within
the last seven to ten days, wc cannot reasonably
infer that it was during this visit that CI saw the
marijuana

5. The State argues that probable cause exists
even though the affidavit fails to provide specific
dates and time periods because it establishes a
course of conduct. We disagree. " '[Wjhere the
affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity
of a protracted and continuous nature, a course
of conduct, the passage of time becomes less
significant.' " Stale v. Siromberg, 783 P.2d 54.
57 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citation omitted). Although CI uses the picsent tense to sav Saddler

"sells controlled substances," see Slaw v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258. 1261 (Utah 1983) (holding
information in search warrant not stale because
the language used was "couched
m the present tense which desciibes ongoing criminal conduct "), CI only talks about Saddler using and
selling controlled substances fiom his home in
the past tense and docs not pro\idc sufficient
detail for us to ascertain whether the activity was
of a protracted and continuous nature.
6.

We do know CI said Saddler was home infrequently and usually during the late evening
hours. Although seemingly helpful, this detail
was discounted by McCarthy's own attempt at
coiroboration. When McCarthy conducted surveillance of Saddler's home during the late evening hours (8 00 p.m. to o:00 a m ). he did not
gather anv corroboi ating information

STATE v. SADDLER

Utah

1033

Cite as 67 P.3d 1025 (UtahApp. 2003)

'may corroborate
1997). A police officer
the tip either by observing the illegal activity
or by finding [the material facts] substantially as described by the informant.' " Id. (citations omitted).

detail, this information may have provided
important corroborative detail. However, as
is, the information is practically useless. Although McCarthy established that Saddler
worked at BACI's, we do not know who
1123 Here, McCarthy's corroboration was McCarthy spoke to or whether that person
not helpful. First, McCarthy conducted sur- was in a position to know Saddler's schedule.
veillance of Saddler's premises during the We also do not know whether the person
hours CI said Saddler was home. Between McCarthy spoke to thought it was unusual
8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., McCarthy saw noth- that Saddler was not currently at work or
whether the person thought Saddler's work
ing to corroborate CI's information.
11 24 Second, at some point the next day, schedule in general was unusual.
McCarthy says he saw short-term traffic that
he believed to be drug related. 7 One car was
CONCLUSION
stopped and one-half ounce of marijuana was
[23] 1127 Under the totality of the cirfound on the driver, which McCarthy becumstances, we are convinced that the search
lieved was purchased at Saddler's home bewarrant affidavit in this case failed to estabcause no drug paraphernalia was found.
lish probable cause for the search of SadHowever, McCarthy provides only conclusory
dler's home. Although the affidavit suffiinformation about this corroborative effort.
ciently established CI's basis of knowledge, it
See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah
failed to establish CI's veracity and reliabili1989) ("It is well established that a warrant
ty. Moreover, the detail and corroboration
cannot issue solely on the strength of 'a mere
included in the affidavit were not enough to
conclusory statement that gives the magisestablish probable cause in the absence of a
trate virtually no basis at all for making a
showing of veracity and reliability. Accordjudgment regarding probable cause.' " (citaingly, we conclude that the trial court erred
tion omitted)). He does not state how many
in denying defendant's motion to suppress
vehicles he saw visit Saddler's home, whether
the seized evidence.
"Since an error
any of these vehicles arrived during Sadamounting to a violation of the federal constidler's alleged hours of operation, whether
tution requires reversal unless it is harmless
any of these vehicles or their drivers were
beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse [Saddescribed by CI, whether the stopped person
dler's] conviction[ ]." State v. Droneburg, 781
was a person described by CI or was driving
P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
a vehicle described by CI, or how long the
stopped person was at Saddler's home.
1128 Saddler's conviction is reversed and
1125 Third, McCarthy observed vehicles
described by CI at Saddler's premises whose
registered owner was described by CI.
Again, McCarthy provides no detail as to
what type of vehicles were present, how
many vehicles he observed, whether they
were part of the short-term traffic, or whether they were present during Saddler's alleged hours of operation. See id.
126 Finally, McCarthy visited BACI's,
Saddler's place of employment, where he
learned Saddler was not at work and the
person he spoke to did not know when Saddler was scheduled to work next. With more
7. Although the dissent concludes McCarthy saw
the short-term traffic during the early morning

the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1129 I CONCUR: PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD, Judge.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge
(dissenting):
1130 I respectfully dissent. I would conclude that under the "totality-of-the-circumstances test" required by Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the magistrate had a
"substantial basis for . . . [determining] that
hours, no actual time is provided by the affidavit.
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probable cause existed." State v. Delutia,
2001 UT App 401,19, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citations omitted).

desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances in the community." Further, the majority refuses to acknowledge CI
11 31 As a threshold matter, I disagree with told Officer McCarthy CI's name and was
the majority's application of the facts to con- therefore not anonymous. Where an affidatrolling law. First, I conclude the affidavit vit is ambiguous, we must defer to the magisestablishes CI's reliability. As the majority trate where, given the affidavit's language,
acknowledges, CI's basis of knowledge was the magistrate could reasonably construe a
strong. The affidavit set forth facts person- meaning that favors a probable cause deterally observed by CI over a one-year period: mination. See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,
CI observed Saddler using marijuana and 992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of
cocaine; CI used marijuana with Saddler; an affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's
CI within the last ten days observed three to "reasonable construction" of that ambiguity).
four pounds of marijuana; CI observed Although Officer McCarthy did not directly
scales in Saddler's home that Saddler alleg- state that he knew CI's name, a magistrate
edly used to weigh and package marijuana could reasonably construe Officer McCarfor re-sale; CI stated that Saddler admitted thy's knowledge of CI's name from the affito him that he sells marijuana and cocaine; davit's language. The affidavit clearly asks
and CI observed Saddler selling controlled that the court not require Officer McCarthy
substances inside the named premises.
to "publish the CI's name." One cannot
H 32 However, the majority dismisses this publish a name one does not know.
strong basis of knowledge and claims the
U 35 The majority is hyper-technical1 in
veracity and reliability prongs are not satisfied. I disagree. Veracity and reliability claiming CI's admission that he used drugs
can be buttressed by a high degree of detail with Saddler was not against his penal interpresented by CI in the affidavit and indepen- est and thus did not bolster his reliability.
dent corroboration of such detail by the po- See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
lice. See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723
(Utah Ct.App.1992). Both are present here. (1971) (holding statements "against the informant's penal interest" "carr[ied] their own
1133 CI admittedly used drugs with Saddler in the past. However, CI was "[neither] indicia of credibility"). As previously stated,
promised nor paid for any of the information in my view, the affidavit establishes that CI
provided." This bolsters CI's reliability and did reveal his identity to the officer. I also
veracity. See State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, disagree with the majority's conclusion that,
1034 (Utah Ct.App.1994) ("Because the confi- because there is no other evidence against
dential informant here received nothing in CI, there was no admission against penal
exchange for information about [the] illegal interest. We simply do not know if there is
activities, the magistrate properly assumed other evidence against CI, nor should we
that the informant was reliable/'); State v. expect such evidence in the affidavit. CI
Purser, 828 P 2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct.App.1992) made incriminating statements with both the
(assuming reliability and veracity for citizen possibility that such statements could be ininformant who "receive[dj nothing from the vestigated and the possibility that other evipolice in exchange for the information" (cita- dence could be found. "People do not lightly
tions omitted)).
admit a crime and place critical evidence in
11 34 I further disagree with the majority's the hands of police in the form of their own
claim that we do not know if CI volunteered admissions." Id. at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2082. In
the information to Officer McCarthy. On the Harris, the Supreme Court similarly found,
contrary, a fair reading of the affidavit estab- without more, that an informant's disclosure
lishes that he did. The affidavit plainly that he purchased illegal whiskey from the
states that CI told Officer McCarthy the defendant over a period of two years was a
information out of "a sense of guilt and a statement against penal interest that
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"carried Hits] own indicia of credibility."
403 U.S. at 575, 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2078, 2082.

1136 As the majority acknowledges, an informant's veracity and reliability may be
"boosted by the detail with which the informant described his personal observation of
the [crime]." State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203,
1206 (Utah 1984) (quotations and citation
omitted). However, the majority finds the
description of the ongoing use and sale of
drugs over a period of a year, including the
observation of scales, packaging material,
and three to four pounds of marijuana within
the previous ten days,1* to be insufficient detail. The majority requires the affidavit recite, for example, more detail about Saddler's
residence, such as, presumably, where in the
house CI saw the materials. The Fourth
Amendment's search warrant requirements
are not that burdensome. We "pay great
deference to the magistrate's determination,"
Vigk 871 P.2d at 1033, because " '[a] grudging or negative attitude . . . toward warrants'
is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's
strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant." Deluna, 2001 UT
App 401 at 110, 40 P.3d 1136 (quoting Gates,
462 U.S. at 236,103 S.Ct. at 2331).
1137 The majority further complains CI's
statements are conclusory. Again I disagree. The sufficient details include CI
knowing Saddler for over one year and observing cocaine and marijuana in the home,
including three to four pounds of marijuana
within the previous ten days; observation of
scales and packaging material; observation
of Saddler selling drugs from the home; and
numerous observations of Saddler using
drugs in the home. Where, as here, " 'the
affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature,
8. According to the Harris court, "[t]hat the informant may be paid or promised a 'break' does not
eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of
having admitted criminal conduct." United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S.Ct.
2075. 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) Here, CI
was "[neither] promised nor paid for any of the
information provided."
'• The majority claims they could not reasonably
infer CI saw marijuana within the last ten days.
I disagree. The affidavit provides, "CI has been
to the premises numerous times, the most recent

a course of conduct, the passage of time
becomes less significant.'" State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct.App.1989)
(citation omitted). In Stromberg, for instance, the court noted with approval under
similar facts that "[t]he informant observed
marijuana use and marijuana paraphernalia
in the home on not one occasion, but on
numerous visits to the home." Id.
II 38 Even if veracity and reliability were
weak, this is not fatal under the totality-ofthe-circumstances test. See State v. Hansen,
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (noting "an
informant's 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are but two relevant considerations,
among others, in determining the existence
of probable cause," and concluding "[a] weakness in one [area] or the other is not fatal to
the warrant so long as" the affidavit, as a
whole, provides a "substantial basis for finding probable cause"). In sum, however, under the totality-of-the-circumstances, I conclude the affidavit established the veracity
and reliability of CI.
1139 The majority also faults Officer
McCarthy's corroboration of CI's information. A police officer "may corroborate the
tip either by observing the illegal activity or
by finding [the material facts] substantially
as described by the informant."
Kaysville
City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah
Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The majority finds Officer McCarthy's
corroboration unhelpful. On the contrary, I
conclude Officer McCarthy met both prongs
of the corroboration requirement.
1140 Officer McCarthy both observed illegal activity and verified the facts as described by CI. On June 15, 2000, in early
morning hours (as described by CI), Officer
McCarthy observed short term traffic to and
being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana."
Although this language arguably does not link the
observation of marijuana with CI's most recent
visit to Saddler's premises, we "pay great deference to the magistrate's determination," Slate v.
Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct.App.1994),
and a magistrate could reasonably infer such a
link. See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992
(Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable
construction" of that ambiguity).
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from Saddler's house which, based on his
nineteen years of experience and training in
narcotics investigation, he believed indicated
the sale of drugs in the home. See Purser,
828 P.2d at 516, 518 (concluding that where
the detective "described his narcotics experience" and "observed persons enter defendant's residence and leave after only a few
minutes, . . . suggesting] narcotics trafficking," such corroboration was helpful in finding probable cause); State v. White, 851 P.2d
1195, 1196-97 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (finding
that where the detective stated in his affidavit "he had seen vehicles arrive at the [defendant's residencel and stay for a very short
period of time[,J . . . consistent with the buying and selling of narcotics," such corroboration supported the state's case).

basis for .. [determining] that probable
cause existed." Delwia^ 2001 UT App 401 at
119, 40 P.3d 1136 (alterations in original)
(quotations and citations omitted). 1 believe
the majority conducts a de novo review and
gives no deference to the magistrate's determination.

1144 Furthermore, although the majority
pays lip service to the "totality-of-the-circumstances" standard for the review of search
warrants, I believe it in reality applies the
older and stricter Aguilar-Spinelli test. See,
e.g., State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286
(Utah 1983) (applying two-pronged AguilarSpinelli test requiring an affiant demonstrate
both basis of knowledge and reliability/veracity). This has not been the law in Utah since
1983, when State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1253,
1141 Further, Officer McCarthy had the 1260-61 (Utah 1983), first applied the "totaliWest Valley Pohce stop one of the vehicles ty-of-the-circumstances test" required by
leaving the premises and the driver pos- Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
sessed one half ounce of marijuana. Police See also State u Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303,
found no drug paraphernalia in the vehicle or 1306 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (noting that "veracion the driver, and based on his training and ty, reliability, and basis of knowledge of conexperience, Officer McCarthy concluded this fidential informants are no longer strict preindicated the driver had just purchased mari- requisites for establishing probable cause,"
juana in Saddler's house.
and are instead " 'relevant considerations,
H 42 In verifying the facts described by CI, among others,'" under the totality-of-the-cirOfficer McCarthy observed the vehicles de- cumstances test (citation omitted)). The mascribed by CI at Saddler's home, verified the jority's approach undermines what should be
registered owner of a vehicle was as de- our preference for searches conducted pursuscribed by CI, and verified that Saddler ant to search warrants. See Delmia, 2001
worked at BACI'S. In my opinion, officer UT App 401 at H 10, 40 P3d 1136 (observing
McCarthy made significant successful efforts the Fourth Amendment hab a " 'strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a
to corroborate CI's information.
warrant'" (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236,
1 43 In conclusion, I reach a different re- 103 S.Ct. at 2331)).
sult than the majority based on my application of the facts to the law. This can often
1! 45 In sum, I would deny Saddler's mohappen in the fact sensitive area of the tion to suppress and uphold the search,
Fourth Amendment. However, what trou- which was conducted pursuant to a search
bles me about the majority's analysis is that warrant, because I conclude under the totaliI think it is contrary to the deference wTe ty-of-the-circumstances that the affidavit
should afford to the magistrate in determin- supporting the issuance of the search waring whether a search warrant is valid. See rant established probable cause to search
Vigk 871 P.2d at 1033 (noting the "great Saddler's residence.
deference" we pay to the magistrate's determination). "[T]he lF]ourth [A]mendment
( O f KEYNUMBEPSYSTtM>
does not require that the reviewing court
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's
probable cause determination!.] [I]nstead, it
requires only that the reviewing court conclude that the magistrate had a substantial

ADDENDUM B

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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Supreme Court of the United States
ILLINOIS, Petitioner
v.
Lance U A I £,:> ei ux.
No. 81-430.
Argued Oct. 13, 1982.
Reargued March 1, 1983.
Decided June 8, 1983.

Petition for certiorari was filed seeking review of a
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court 85 I11.2d 376.
53 Ill.Dec. 218. 423 N.E.2d 887, which affirmed
decision of lower state court, 82 HLApp.3d 749. 38
Ill.Dec. 62. 403 N.E.2d 77. which upheld order
granting motion suppressing evidence seized pursuant
to a search warrant. The Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist, held that: (1) rigid "two-pronged test"
under Aguilar and Spinelli for determining whether an
informant's tip establishes probable cause for issuance
of a warrant would be abandoned and a "totality of the
circumstances" approach that traditionally has informed
probable cause determinations would be substituted in
its place, and (2) probable cause for warrant
authorizing search of defendants' home and automobile
was established by anonymous letter indicating that
defendants were involved in activities in violation of
state drug laws and predicting future criminal activities
where major portions of the letter's predictions were
corroborated by information provided to affiant by
federal agents.
Reversed.
Justice White filed separate opinion concurring in the
judgment.
Justice Brennan filed dissenting opinion in which
Justice Marshall joined.
Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined.

HI Federal Courts €=>502
170Bk502 Most Cited Cases
If both of the requirements that a federal question has
been raised and decided in the state court below do not
appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court fails. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
121 Federal Courts €=>502
170Bk502 Most Cited Cases
In the application of the "not pressed or passed on
below" rule, there is no reason to treat the state's failure
to have challenged and asserted federal claim
differently from the failure of the proponent of a
federal claim to have raised that claim. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1257.
131 Federal Courts €==>511.1
170Bk511.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 170Bk511)
Due regard for the appropriate relationship of the
Supreme Court to state courts demands that state courts
be given an opportunity to consider constitutionality of
acts of state officials, and, equally important, proposed
changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional
actions before the Supreme Court will consider them.
28 U.S.C.A. 6 1257.
141 Federal Courts €==>511.1
170Bk511.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 170Bk511)
Supreme Court would not decide the issue of whether
the exclusionary rule should be modified, even though
the Supreme Court in its order granting certiorari
directed that the issue be briefed, where the issue of the
exclusionary rule modification was not pressed or
passed upon in the state courts.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4: 28 U.S.C.A. S 1257.
151 Federal Courts €=^511.1
170Bk511.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 170Bk511)
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Fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the
federal exclusionary rule by suppressing evidence in
prosecution for violating state drug laws did not alter
Supreme Court's decision to not consider issue of
modification of the exclusionary rule when the issue
was not pressed or passed on below. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257.
161 Federal Courts €==>508
170Bk508 Most Cited Cases
State's repeated opposition to defendant's substantive
Fourth Amendment claims in drug prosecution did not
suffice to have raised the question whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified so that the
Supreme Court might decide the issue since the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy and not
a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257.
121 Federal Courts €=>445
170Bk445 Most Cited Cases
Where difficult issues of great public importance are
involved, there are strong reasons for the Supreme
Court to adhere scrupulously to the customary
limitations on its discretion since by doing so the court
promotes respect for its adjudicatory process and the
stability of its decisions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257.
181 Searches and Seizures €>=>117
349k 117 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349k3.6(3))
Rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and Spinelli for
determining whether an informant's tip establishes
probable-cause for issuance of a warrant would be
abandoned and a "totality-of-the-circumstances"
approach that traditionally has informed probable-cause
determinations would be substituted in its place.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
191 Searches and Seizures C=>113.1
349k 113.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349kl 13, 349k3.6(2))
An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the existence of
probable-cause for issuance of search warrant.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
HOI Searches and Seizures C=>113.1

349k 113.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349k 113, 349k3.6(2))
Sufficient information must be presented to the
magistrate to allow that official to determine
probable-cause for issuance of search warrant; his
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare
conclusions of others. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Ill] Searches and Seizures €=>200
349k200 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349k3.9)
In order to insure that an abdication of the magistrate's
duty does not occur, courts must continue to
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on
which warrants are issued. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[121 Drugs and Narcotics €=>188(2)
138kl 88(2) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 13 8k 188)
Probable-cause for warrant authorizing search of
defendants' home and automobile was established by
anonymous letter indicating that defendants were
involved in activities in violation of state drug laws and
predicting future criminal activities where major
portions of the letter's predictions were corroborated by
information provided to affiant by federal agents.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[131 Searches and Seizures € = > l 13.1
349k 113.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349kl 13, 349k3.6(2))
In making a determination of probable-cause for
issuance of search warrant the relevant inquiry is not
whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty,"
but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular
types of noncriminal acts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[14] Searches and Seizures £ = > H 7
349k 117 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349k3.6(3))
It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable-cause
for issuance of search warrant, that corroboration of
informant's tip through other sources of information
reduced the chances of reckless or prevaricating tale,
thus providing substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
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[151 Searches and Seizures 0=^117
349k 117 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 349k3.6(3))
There is no requirement that informants used by the
police be infallible. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
**2319 Syllabus TFN*1

States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637.
since they failed to satisfy the "two pronged test" of (1)
revealing the informant's "basis of knowledge" and (2)
providing sufficient facts to establish either the
informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the
informant's report.
Held:

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by
the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit
Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 321.337.26 S.Ct. 282.
287. 50 L.Ed. 499.
*213 On May 3, 1978, the Police Department of
Bloomingdale, 111., received an anonymous letter which
included statements that respondents, husband and
wife, were engaged in selling drugs; that the wife
would drive their car to Florida on May 3 to be loaded
with drugs, and the husband would fly down in a few
days to drive the car back; that the car's trunk would be
loaded with drugs; and that respondents presently had
over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.
Acting on the tip, a police officer determined
respondents' address and learned that the husband made
a reservation on a May 5 flight to Florida.
Arrangements for surveillance for the flight were made
with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), and the surveillance disclosed that the husband
took the flight, stayed overnight in a motel room
registered in the wife's name, and left the following
morning with a woman in a car bearing an Illinois
license plate issued to the husband, heading north on an
interstate highway used by travelers to the
Bloomingdale area. A search warrant for respondents'
residence and automobile was then obtained from an
Illinois state-court judge, based on the Bloomingdale
police officer's affidavit setting forth the foregoing
facts and a copy of the anonymous letter. When
respondents arrived at their home, the police were
waiting and discovered marihuana and other
contraband in respondents' car trunk and home. Prior to
respondents' trial on charges of violating state drug
laws, the trial court ordered suppression of all the items
seized, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. The
Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the
letter and affidavit were inadequate to sustain a
determination of probable cause for issuance of the
search warrant under Aguilarv. Texas. 378 U.S. 108.
84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723. and Spinelli v. United

1. The question-which this Court requested the parties
to address-whether **2320 the rule requiring the
exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment should be modified
so as, for example, not to require exclusion of evidence
obtained in the reasonable *214 belief that the search
and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment will not be decided in this case, since it
was not presented to or decided by the Illinois courts.
Although prior decisions interpreting the "not pressed
or passed on below" rule have not involved a State's
failure to raise a defense to a federal right or remedy
asserted below, the purposes underlying the rule are,
for the most part, as applicable in such a case as in one
where a party fails to assert a federal right. The fact
that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the federal
exclusionary rule does not affect the application of the
"not pressed or passed on below" rule. Nor does the
State's repeated opposition to respondents' substantive
Fourth Amendment claims suffice to have raised the
separate question whether the exclusionary rule should
be modified. The extent of the continued vitality of
the rule is an issue of unusual significance, and
adhering scrupulously to the customary limitations on
this Court's discretion promotes respect for its
adjudicatory process and the stability of its decisions,
and lessens the threat of untoward practical
ramifications not foreseen at the time of decision. Pp.
2321-2325.
2. The rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and
Spinelli for determining whether an informant's tip
establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is
abandoned, and the "totality of the circumstances"
approach that traditionally has informed probable-cause
determinations is substituted in its place. The elements
under the "two-pronged test" concerning the
informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of
knowledge" should be understood simply as closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the
common-sense, practical question whether there is
"probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence
is located in a particular place. The task of the issuing
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magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court
is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. This
flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the
accommodation of public and private interests that the
Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach
that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli. Pp.
2328-2333.
3. The judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause to search
respondents' home and car existed. Under the "totality
of the circumstances" analysis, corroboration by details
of an informant's tip by independent police work is of
significant value. Cf. Prayer v. United States. 358
U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329. 3 L.Ed.2d 327. Here, even
standing alone, the facts obtained through the
independent investigation of the Bloomingdale police
officer and the DEA at least suggested that *215
respondents were involved in drug trafficking. In
addition, the judge could rely on the anonymous letter,
which had been corroborated in major part by the
police officer's efforts. Pp. 2334-2336.
85 I11.2d 376. S3 Ill.Dec. 218.423 N.E.2d 887 (19811
reversed.
Paul P. Biebel,Jr., First Assistant Attorney General of
Illinois, reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs on reargument were Tyrone C. Fahner,
former Attorney General, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney
General, Michael A. Ficaro and Morton E. Friedman,
Assistant Attorneys General, Daniel M. Harris, and
James B. Zagel. With him on the briefs on the original
argument were Messrs. Fahner and Harris.
Solicitor General Lee argued the cause on reargument
for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal.
With him on the brief on reargument were Assistant
Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General
Frey, Kathryn A. Oberly, Geoffrey S. Stewart, and
Robert J. Erickson. With him on the brief on the
original argument were Mr. Jensen, Alan I. Horowitz,
and David B. Smith.
James W. Reilley reargued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief on reargument were Barry E.
Witlin and Thomas Y. Davies. With him on the brief on

the original argument were Mr. Witlin, Allan A.
Ackerman, and Clyde W. Woody*
* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H.
Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William
D. Stein, Assistant Attorney General, and Clifford K.
Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for the State
of California; by Fred E. lnbau, Wayne W. Schmidt,
James P. Manak, Patrick F. Healy, William K. Lambie,
and James A. Murphy for Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., et al.; by Robert L. Toms, EvelleJ.
Younger, G. Joseph Bertain, Jr., and LloydF. Dunn for
Laws at Work et al.; and by Newman A. Flanagan,
Jack E. Yelverton, James P. Manak, Edwin L. Miller,
Jr., Austin J. McGuigan, and John M. Massameno for
the National District Attorneys Association, Inc.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by
Sidney Bernstein and Howard A. Specter for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America; by John C.
Feirich, Melvin B. Lewis, Joshua Sachs, and Michael
J. Costello for the Illinois State Bar Association; by
Herman Kaufman and Edward M. Chikofsky for the
New York Criminal Bar Association; and by James M.
Doyle for the Legal Internship Program, Georgetown
University Law Center.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Jim Smith,
Attorney General, and Lawrence A. Kaden and
Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attorneys General, for
the State of Florida et al.; by Gerald Baliles, Attorney
General, and Jacqueline G. Epps, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia;
by Morris Harrell, William W. Greenhalgh, William J
Mertens, and Steven H. Goldblatt for the American Bar
Association; by Charles S. Sims and Burt Neuborne
for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Peter
L. Zimroth and Barbara D. Underwood for the
Committee on Criminal Law of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York; by Marshall W. Krause,
Quin Denvir, Steffan B. Imhoff, and Paul Edward Bell
for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al.; by Kenneth M. Mogill for the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association; by Frank G.
Carrington, Jr., Griffin B. Bell, Wayne W. Schmidt,
Alan Dye, Thomas Hendrickson, Courtney A. Evans,
Rufus L. Edmisten, David S. Crump, Howard A.
Kramer, Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Wayne
T Elliott, G. Stephen Parker, and Joseph E. Scuro for
Seven Former Members of the Attorney General of the
United States' Task Force on Violent Crime (1981) et
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al.; and by Dan Johnston, pro se, for the County
Attorney of Polk County, Iowa.

1982, — U.S. —-. 103 S.Ct. 436. 74 L.Ed.2d 595.
I

*216 Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for
violation of state drug laws after police officers,
executing a search warrant, discovered marijuana and
other contraband in their automobile and home. Prior
to trial the Gates' moved to suppress evidence seized
during this **2321 search. The Illinois Supreme
Court, 85 I11.2d 376. 53 Ill.Dec. 218. 423 N.E.2d 887
0981) affirmed the decisions of lower state courts, 82
Ill.App.3d 749. 38 Ill.Dec. 62. 403 N.E.2d 77 f 1980)
granting the motion.
It held that the affidavit
submitted in support of the State's applicationfor a
warrant to search the Gates' property *217 was
inadequate under this Court's decisions in Agiiilar v.
Texas. 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723
(1964) and Sninelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89
S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the
Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a
search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated
anonymous informant's tip. After receiving briefs and
hearing oral argument on this question, however, we
requested the parties to address an additional question:
"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a
criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, Mavp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643.81
S.Ct. 1684.6L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United
States. 232 U.S. 383. 34 S.Ct. 341. 58 L.Ed. 652
(1914). should to any extent be modified, so as, for
example, not to require the exclusion of evidence
obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and
seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment."
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue
we framed for the parties was not presented to the
Illinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it.
Rather, we consider the question originally presented
in the petition for certiorari, and conclude that the
Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our
Fourth Amendment decisions too restrictively.
Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not
addressing the question regarding modification of the
exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29,

HI Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from state
courts derives from 28U.S.C. § 1257, which provides
that "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
follows:... (3) By writ of certiorari,... where any title,
right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes *218
of... the United States." The provision derives, albeit
with important alterations, see, e.g., Act of December
23, 1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c.
646, 62 Stat. 929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c.
20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning
of § 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in
some respects not entirely clear. We held early on that
§ 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no
jurisdiction unless a federal question had been both
raised and decided in the state court below. As Justice
Story wrote in Crowell v. Randell 10 Pet. 368. 391. 9
L.Ed. 458 (1836). "If both of these requirements do not
appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction fails."
See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee. 5 Cranch. 344.
3 L.Ed. 120(1809). fFN 11

FN1. The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell,
supra, that a federal claim have been both
raised and addressed in state court was
generally not understood in the literal fashion
in which it was phrased. See R. Robertson &
F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States § 60 (1951).
Instead, the Court developed the rule that a
claim would not be considered here unless it
had been either raised or squarely considered
and resolved in state court.
See, e.g.,
McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generate. 309
U.S. 430. 435-436. 60 S.Ct. 670. 673. 84
L.Ed. 849 (1940): State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Duel. 324 U.S. 154. 160.65
S.Ct. 573. 576. 89 L.Ed. 812(1945).

More recently, in McGoldrickv. Comvagnie Generate,
309 U.S. 430. 435-436. 60 S.Ct. 670. 673. 84 L.Ed.
849(1940). the Court observed:
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**2322 But it is also the settled practice of this
Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
that it is only in exceptional cases, and then only in
cases coming from the federal courts, that it
considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant
not pressed or passed upon in the courts below.... In
cases coming here from state courts in which a state
statute is assailed as unconstitutional, there are
reasons of peculiar force which should lead us to
refrain from deciding questions not presented or
decided in the highest court of the state whose
judicial action we are called upon to review. Apart
from the *219 reluctance with which every court
should proceed to set aside legislation as
unconstitutional on grounds not properly presented,
due regard for the appropriate relationship of this
Court to state courts requires us to decline to
consider and decide questions affecting the validity
of state statutes not urged or considered there. It is
for these reasons that this Court, where the
constitutionality of a statute has been upheld in the
state court, consistently refuses to consider any
grounds of attack not raised or decided in that court.
Finally, the Court seemed to reaffirm the jurisdictional
character of the rule against our deciding claims "not
pressed nor passed upon" in state court in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel. 324 U.S.
154. 160. 65 S.Ct. 573. 576. 89 L.Ed. 812 (1945V
where we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme
Court did not pass on the question, we may not do so."
See also Hill v. California. 401 U.S. 797. 805-806.91
S.Ct. 1106. 111 K 111 Z 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971V
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of
our more recent cases have treated the so-called "not
pressed or passed upon below" rule as merely a
prudential restriction. In Terminiello v. Chicago. 337
U.S. 1. 69 S.Ct. 894. 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949V the Court
reversed a state criminal conviction on a ground not
urged in state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise,
in Vachon v. New Hampshire. 414 U.S. 478. 94 S.Ct.
664. 38 L.Ed.2d 666 (1974V the Court summarily
reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not
raised in state court, or here, that it had been obtained
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court indicated in a
footnote, id. at 479. n. 3. 94 S.Ct.. at 665. n. 3. that it
possessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in
state court the question on which it decided the case.
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of

the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have
recognized that it often may be unclear whether the
particular federal question presented in this Court was
raised or passed upon below.
In Dewey v. Pes
Moines. 173 U.S. 193.197-198. 19 S.Ct 379.380-381.
43 L.Ed. 665 (1899V the fullest treatment of the
subject, the Court said *220 that "if the question were
only an enlargement of the one mentioned in the
assignment of errors, or if it were so connected with it
in substance as to form but another ground or reason
for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's]
judgment, we should have no hesitation in holding the
assignment sufficient to permit the question to be now
raised and argued. Parties are not confined here to the
same arguments which were advanced in the courts
below upon a Federal question there discussed." [FN2]
We have not attempted, and **2323 likely would not
have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between cases
involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented
below and those involving entirely new questions.

FN2. In Dewey, certain assessments had been
levied against the owner of property abutting
a street paved by the city; a state trial court
ordered that the property be forfeited when
the assessments were not paid, and in
addition, held appellant personally liable for
the amount by which the assessments
exceeded the value of the lots. In state court
the appellant argued that the imposition of
personal liability against him violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because he had not received personal notice
of the assessment proceedings, In this Court,
he also attempted to argue that the assessment
itself constituted a taking under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that,
beyond arising from a single factual
occurrence, the two claims "are not in
anywise necessarily connected," id. at 198.
19 S.Ct.. at 381.
Because of this, we
concluded that appellant's taking claim could
not be considered.

The application of these principles in the instant case
is not entirely straightforward. It is clear in this case
that respondents expressly raised, at every level of the
Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth
Amendment had been violated by the actions of the
Illinois police and that the evidence seized by the
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officers should be excluded from their trial. It also is
clear that the State challenged, at every level of the
Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the
substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had
been violated. The State never, however, raised or
addressed the question whether the federal
exclusionary rule should be modified in any respect,
and none of the opinions of the *221 Illinois courts
give any indication that the question was considered.
121 The case, of course, is before us on the State's
petition for a writ of certiorari. Since the Act of
December 23, 1914, c. 2,38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has
been vested in this Court to review state court decisions
even when a claimed federal right has been upheld.
Our prior decisions interpreting the "not pressed or
passed on below" rule have not, however, involved a
State's failure to raise a defense to a federal right or
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however,
we can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have
challenged an asserted federal claim differently from
the failure of the proponent of a federal claim to have
raised that claim.
We have identified several purposes underlying the
"not pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part,
these are as applicable to the State's failure to have
opposed the assertion of a particular federal right, as to
a party's failure to have asserted the claim. First,
"questions not raised below are those on which the
record is very likely to be inadequate since it certainly
was not compiled with those questions in mind."
Cardinale v. Louisiana. 394 U.S. 437, 439. 89 S.Ct.
1 1 6 U 163.22 L.Ed.2d 398 (1969). Exactly the same
difficulty exists when the state urges modification of an
existing constitutional right or accompanying remedy.
Here, for example, the record contains little, if
anything, regarding the subjective good faith of the
police officers that searched the Gates' property-which
might well be an important consideration in
determining whether to fashion a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of whether
.to modify the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit
from a record containing such facts.
[31[41 Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate
relationship of this Court to state courts," McGoldrick
v. Compaxnie Generate. 309 U.S. 430, 435- 436. 60
S.Ct. 670. 673. 84 L.Ed. 849 (1940), demands that
those courts be given an opportunity to consider the
constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and,
equally important, proposed changes in existing

remedies for unconstitutional *222 actions. Finally, by
requiring that the State first argue to the state courts
that the federal exclusionary rule should be modified,
we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the State
as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an
adequate and independent state ground.
See
Cardinale. supra, 394 U.S., at 439, 89 S.Ct., at 1163.
Illinois, for example, adopted an exclusionary rule as
early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp. 307 111. 448, 138
N.E. 728 (1923). and might adhere to its view even if
it thought we would conclude that the federal rule
should be modified. In short, the reasons supporting
our refusal to hear federal claims not raised in state
court apply with equal force to the State's failure to
challenge the availability of a well-settled federal
remedy. Whether the "not pressed or passed upon
below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier decisions
indicate, see 2320, supra, or prudential, as several of
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character
might be different in cases like **2324 this from its
character elsewhere, we need not decide. Whatever
the character of the rule may be, consideration of the
question presented in our order of November 29, 1982,
would be contrary to the sound justifications for the
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we thus
decide not to pass on the issue.
[5] The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively
applied the federal exclusionary rule-suppressing
evidence against respondents—does not affect our
conclusion. In Morrison v. Watson. 154 U.S. 111. 14
S.Ct. 995. 138 L.Ed. 927 (1894), the Court was asked
to consider whether a state statute impaired the
appellant's contractwith the appellee. It declined to
hear the case because the question presented here had
not been pressed or passed on below. The Court
acknowledged that the lower court's opinion had
restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier decision
of that court, that the state statute did not impermissibly
impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held
that there was no showing that "there was any real
contest at any stage of this case upon the point," id, at
115, 14 S.Ct.. at 997, and that without such a contest,
the routine restatement *223 and application of settled
law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not
pressed or passed upon below" rule. Similarly, in the
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the
federal exclusionary rule, there was never "any real
contest" upon the point. The application of the
exclusionary rule was merely a routine act, once a
violation of the Fourth Amendment had been found,
and not the considered judgment of the Illinois courts
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on the question whether application of a modified rule
would be warranted on the facts of this case. In such
circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary
to apprise the state court of the arguments for not
applying the exclusionary rule, we will not consider the
question whether the exclusionary rule should be
modified.
[6] Likewise, we do not believe that the State's
repeated opposition to respondent's substantive Fourth
Amendment claims suffices to have raised the question
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified.
The exclusionary rule is "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally" and not "a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra. 414
U.S. 338, 348. 94 S.Ct. 613. 620. 38 L.Ed.2d 561
(1974). The question whether the exclusionary rule's
remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long
been regarded as an issue separate from the question
whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S.
620. 100 S.Ct. 1912. 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); United
States v. Ceccolini. 435 U.S. 268. 98 S.Ct. 1054. 55
L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); United States v. Calandra. supra:
Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465. 96 S.Ct. 3037. 49
L.Ed.2d 1067(1976). Because of this distinction, we
cannot say that modification or abolition of the
exclusionary rule is "so connected with [the substantive
Fourth Amendment right at issue] as to form but
another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity" of
the judgment. Dewey v. Day Moines, supra, 173 U.S..
at 197-198, 19 S.Ct., at 380-381. Rather, the rule's
modification was, for purposes of the "not pressed or
passed upon below" rule, a separate claim that had to
be specifically presented to the State courts.
[7] *224 Finally, weighty prudential considerations
militate against our considering the question presented
in our order of November 29,1982. The extent of the
continued validity of the rules that have developed
from our decisions in Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S.
383. 34 S.Ct. 341. 58 L.Ed. 652 (1961), and Mapp v.
Ohio. 367 U.S. 643. 81 S.Ct. 1684. 6 L.Ed.2d 1081
(1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Sufficient
evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue
that members of this Court recently have made, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388.
415. 91 S.Ct. **23251999. 2014. 29 L.Ed.2d 619
(1971) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); Coolidze v. New
Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443.490.91 S.Ct. 2022.2050.29

L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at
502,91 S.Ct.. at 2056 (Black, J., dissenting); Stone v.
Powell. 428 U.S. 465. 537-539. 96 S.Ct. 3037,
3072-3073. 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (WHITE, J.,
dissenting); Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387,
413-414, 97 S.Ct. 1232, —-, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)
(POWELL, J., concurring); Robbinsv. California. 453
U.S. 420. 437. 443-444. 101 S.Ct. 2841. 2851.
2854-2855. 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (REHNOUIST. J.,
dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to
adhere scrupulously to the customary limitations on our
discretion. By doing so we "promote respect... for the
Court's adjudicatory process [and] the stability of [our]
decisions." Mapp v. Ohio, supra. 367 U.S.. at 677. 81
S.Ct.. at 1703 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover,
fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual record will
be available to us, thereby discouraging the framing of
broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts,
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances.
In Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens
the threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id, at
676. 81 S.Ct., at 1703 (Harlan, J., dissenting), not
foreseen at the time of decision.
The public
importance of our decisions in Weeks and Mapp and
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding
these decisions counsel that we meticulously observe
our customary procedural rules. By following this
course, we promote respect for the procedures by
which our decisions are rendered, as well as confidence
in the stability of prior decisions. A wise exercise of
the powers confided in this Court dictates that we
reserve for another day the question whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified.
*225 II
[8] We now turn to the question presented in the
State's original petition for certiorari, which requires us
to decide whether respondents' rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the
search of their car and house.
A chronological
statement of events usefully introduces the issues at
stake. Bloomingdale, 111., is a suburb of Chicago
located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an
anonymous handwritten letter which read as follows:
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in
your town who strictly make their living on selling
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the
condominiums. Most of their buys are done in
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Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida,
where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then
Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back
after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is
driving down there again and Lance will be flying
down in a few days to drive it back. At the time
Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded
with over $ 100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have
over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work,
and make their entire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will
make a big catch. They are friends with some big
drugs dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums"

Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing
facts, and submitted it to a judge of the Circuit Court of
DuPage County, together with a copy of the
anonymous letter. The judge of that court thereupon
issued a search warrant for the Gates' residence and for
their automobile. The judge, in deciding to issue the
warrant, could have determined that the modus
operandi of the Gates had been substantially
corroborated. As the anonymous letter predicted,
Lance Gates had flown from Chicago to West Palm
Beach late in the afternoon of May 5th, had checked
into a hotel room registered in the name of his wife,
and, at 7:00 a.m. the following morning, had headed
north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, *227
out of West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used
by travelers from South Florida to Chicago in an
automobile bearing a license plate issued to him.

The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the
Bloomingdale Police Department to Detective Mader,
who decided to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from
the office of the Illinois Secretary of State, that an
Illinois driver's license had *226 been issued to one
Lance Gates, residing at a stated address in
Bloomingdale. He contacted a confidential informant,
whose examination of certain financial records
revealed a more recent address for the Gates, and he
also learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare
Airport that "L. Gates" **2326 had made a reservation
on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West Palm Beach,
Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 5 at
4:15 p.m.

At 5:15 a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hours after he had
flown out of Chicago, Lance Gates, and his wife,
returned to their home in Bloomingdale, driving the car
in which they had left West Palm Beach some 22 hours
earlier. The Bloomingdale police were awaiting them,
searched the trunk of the Mercury, and uncovered
approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of
the Gates' home revealed marijuana, weapons, and
other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the
affidavit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to
support the necessary determination of probable cause
to believe that the Gates' automobile and home
contained the contraband in question. This decision
was affirmed in turn by the Illinois Appellate Court and
by a divided vote of the Supreme Court of Illinois.

Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the
Drug Enforcement Administration for surveillance of
the May 5 Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later
reported to Mader that Gates had boarded the flight,
and that federal agents in Florida had observed him
arrive in West Palm Beach and take a taxi to the nearby
Holiday Inn. They also reported that Gates went to a
room registered to one Susan Gates and that, at 7:00
a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidentified
woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois
license plates and drove northbound on an interstate
frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In
addition, the DEA agent informed Mader that the
license plate number on the Mercury registered to a
Hornet station wagon owned by Gates. The agent also
advised Mader that the driving time between West
Palm Beach and Bloomingdale was approximately 22
to 24 hours.

The Illinois Supreme Court concluded-and we are
inclined to agree-that, standing alone, the anonymous
letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department
would not provide the basis for a magistrate's
determination that there was probable cause to believe
contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home.
The letter provides virtually nothing from which one
might conclude that its author is either honest or his
information reliable;
likewise, the letter gives
absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's
predictions regarding the Gates' criminal activities.
Something more was required, then, before a magistrate
could conclude that there was probable cause to believe
that contraband would be found in the Gates' home and
car. See4gm7flrv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108. 109.n. 1. 84
S.Ct. 1509. 1511. n. 1. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964^:
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41. 54 S.Ct. IK
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78 L.Ed. 159(1933).
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized
that Detective Mader's affidavit might be capable of
supplementing *228 the anonymous letter with
information sufficient to peirmit a determination of
probable cause. See **2327Whitelevv. Warden, 401
U.S. 560. 567. 91 S.Ct. 1031. 1036. 28 L.Ed.2d 306
(197H. In holding that the affidavit in fact did not
contain sufficient additional information to sustain a
determination of probable cause, the Illinois court
applied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision
in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410.89 S.Ct. 584.
21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969V TFN31 The Illinois Supreme
Court, like some others, apparently understood Spinelli
as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each of
two independent requirements before it could be relied
on. J.A., at 5. According to this view, the letter, as
supplemented by Mader's affidavit, first had to
adequately reveal the "basis of knowledge" of the letter
writer—the particular means by which he came by the
information given in his report. Second, it had to
provide *229 facts sufficiently establishing either the
"veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively,
the "reliability" of the informant's report in this
particular case.

FN3. In Spinelli, police officers observed Mr.
Spinelli going to and from a particular
apartment, which the telephone company said
contained two telephones with stated
numbers. The officers also were "informed
by a confidential reliable informant that
William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal
gambling activities|" at the apartment, and
that he used two phones, with numbers
corresponding to those possessed by the
police. The officers submitted an affidavit
with this information to a magistrate and
obtained a warrant to search Spinelli's
apartment. We held that the magistrate could
have made his determination of probable
cause only by "abdicating his constitutional
function." id. at 416. 89 S.Ct.. at 589. The
Government's affidavit contained absolutely
no information regarding the informant's
reliability. Thus, it did not satisfy Aguilar 's
requirement that such affidavits contain
"some of the underlying circumstances"
indicating that "the informant... was 'credible'
" or that "his information [was] 'reliable.1 "

Azuilar. supra. 378 U.S.. at 114. 84 S.Ct.. at
1514. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy
Aguilar 's requirement that it detail "some of
the underlying circumstances from which the
informant concluded that ... narcotics were
where he claimed they were. We also held
that if the tip concerning Spinelli had
contained "sufficient detail" to permit the
magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying
on something more substantial than a casual
rumor circulating in the undei*world or an
accusation based merely on an individual's
general reputation," 393 U.S.. at 416. 89
S.Ct.. at 589, then he properly could have
relied on it; we thought, however, that the tip
lacked the requisite detail to permit this
"self-verifying detail" analysis.

The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal
rules that have developed among various lower courts
to enforce the "two-pronged test," [FN4] found that
the test had not been satisfied. First, the "veracity"
prong was not satisfied because, "there was simply no
basis [for]... conclud [ing] that the anon;/mous person
[who wrote the letter to the Bloomingdale Police
Department] was credible." J.A., at 7a. The court
indicated that corroboration by police of details
contained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity"
prong, and in any event, could not do so if, as in the
present case, only "innocent" details are corroborated.
**2328 J.A., at 12a. In addition, the letter gave no
indication of the basis of its writer's knowledge of the
*230 Gates' activities. The Illinois court understood
Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a tip to be
used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for
his statements, but it thought that the anonymous letter
failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an
inference. Thus, it concluded that no showing of
probable cause had been made.

FN4. See, e.g., Stanley v State. 19Md.App.
507. 313 A.2d 847 (Md.App. 1974V
In
summary, these rules posit that the "veracity"
prong of the Spinelli test has two "spurs"—the
informant's "credibility" and the "reliability"
of his information. Various interpretations
are advanced for the meaning of the
"reliability" spur of the "veracity" prong.
Both the "basis of knowledge" prong and the
"veracity" prong are treated as entirely
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separate requirements, which must be
independently satisfied in every case in order
to sustain a determination of probable cause.
See n. 5, infra. Some ancillary doctrines are
relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing
requirements.
For example, the "selfverifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis
of knowledge" requirement, although not the
"credibility" spur of the "veracity" prong. See
J.A. 10a. Conversely, corroboration would
seem not capable of supporting the "basis of
knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity"
prong. Id, at 12a.
The decision in Stanley, while expressly
approving and conscientiously attempting to
apply the "two-pronged test" observes that
"[t]he built-in subtleties [of the test] are such,
however, that a slipshod application calls
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law."
313 A.2d, at 860 (footnote omitted). The
decision also suggested that it is necessary "to
evolve analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules
employed in trial settings] for the reception of
hearsay in a probable cause setting." Id, at
857.

We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an
informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of
knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the
value of his report. We do not agree, however, that
these elements should be understood as entirely
separate and independent requirements to be rigidly
exacted in every case, [FN51 which the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as
detailed below, they should be understood simply as
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate
the commonsense, practical question whether there is
"probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence
is located in a particular place.

FN5. The entirely independent character that
the Spinelli prongs have assumed is indicated
both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme
Court in this case, and by decisions of other
courts.
One frequently cited decision,
Stanley v. State. 19 Md.App. 507. 313 A.2d
847. 861 (Md.App.1974), remarks that "the
dual requirements represented by the 'twopronged test' are 'analytically severable' and
an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over

to make up for a deficit on the other prong."
See also n. 9, infra.

Ill
This totality of the circumstances approach is far more
consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause
[FN6] than *231 is any rigid demand that specific
"tests" be satisfied by every informant's tip. Perhaps
the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the
probable cause standard is that it is a "practical,
nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United States.
338 U.S. 160, 176.69 S.Ct. 1302. 1311.93 L.Ed. 1879
(1949). "In dealing with probable cause,... as the very
name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id., at
175, 69 S.Ct., at 1310. Our observation in United
States v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 418. 101 S.Ct. 690.
695,66L.Ed.2d621 (1981V regarding "particularized
suspicion," is also applicable to the probable cause
standard:

FN6. Our original phrasing of the so-called
"two-pronged test" in Azuilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723
(1969), suggests that the two prongs were
intended simply as guides to a magistrate's
determination of probable cause, not as
inflexible, independent requirements
applicable in every case. In Aguilar, we
required only that:
the magistrate must be informed of some of
the underlying circumstances from which the
informant concluded that ... narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the
underlying circumstances from which the
officer concluded that the informant ... was
'credible' or his information 'reliable.'" Id, at
114, 84 S.Ct.. at 1514 (emphasis added).
As our language indicates, we intended
neither a rigid compartmentalization of the
inquiries into an informant's "veracity,"
"reliability" and "basis of knowledge," nor
that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of
an informant's tip. Rather, we required only
that some facts bearing on two particular
issues be provided to the magistrate. Our
decision in Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S.
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214. 85 S.Ct. 1365, 14 L.Ed.2d 345 n 9651
demonstrated this latter point. We held there
that a criminal complaint showed probable
cause to believe the defendant had attempted
to evade the payment of income taxes. We
commented that:
"Obviously any reliance upon factual
allegations necessarily entails some degree of
reliability upon the credibility of the source....
Nor does it indicate that each factual
allegation which the affiant puts forth must be
independently documented, or that each and
every fact which contributed to his
conclusions be spelled out in the complaint....
// simply requires that enough information be
presented to the Commissioner to enable him
to make thejudgment that the charges are not
capricious and are sufficiently supported to
justify bringing into play the further steps of
the criminal process." Id, at 224-225, 85
S.Ct., at 1371 (emphasis added).
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities. Long before the law of
probabilities was articulated **2329 as such,
practical people formulated certain common-sense
conclusions about human behavior; jurors as
factfinders are permitted to do the same-and *232 so
are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms
of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement.
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts~not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.
Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and
sizes from many different types of persons. As we said
in Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct.
1921, 1924. 32 L.Ed.2d 612(1972), "Informants' tips,
like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman
on the scene may vary greatly in their value and
reliability." Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of
such diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every
situation." Ibid TFN71

FN7. The diversity of informants' tips, as well
as the usefulness of the totality of the
circumstances approach to probable cause, is
reflected in our prior decisions on the subject.

In Jones v. United States. 362 U.S. 257.271,
80 S.Ct. 725, 736. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (I960), we
held that probable cause to search petitioners'
apartment was established by an affidavit
based principally on an informamt's tip. The
unnamed informant claimed to have
purchased narcotics from petitioners at their
apartment; the affiant stated that he had been
given correct information from the informant
on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that
petitioners had admitted to police officers on
another occasion that they were narcotics
users, sufficed to support the magistrate's
determination of probable cause.
Likewise, in Ruzendorfv. United States. 376
U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825. 11 L.Ed.2d 887
(1964). the Court upheld a magistrate's
determination that there was probable cause to
believe that certain stolen property would be
found in petitioner's apartment. The affidavit
submitted to the magistrate stated that certain
furs had been stolen, and that a confidential
informant, who previously had furnished
confidential information, said that he saw the
furs in petitioner's home. Moreover, another
confidential informant, also claimed to be
reliable, stated that one Schweuhs had stolen
the furs.
Police reports indicated that
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs'
company and a third informant stated that
petitioner was a fence for Schweihs.
Finally, in Ker v, California. 374 U.S. 23, 83
S.Ct. 1623. 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). we held
that information within the knowledge of
officers who searched the Ker's apartment
provided them with probable cause to believe
drugs would be found there. The officers
were aware that one Murphy had previously
sold marijuana to a police officer; the
transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to
which Murphy had led the police. The night
after this transaction, police observed Ker and
Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy
approached Ker's car, and, although police
could see nothing change hands, Murphy's
modus operandi was identical to what it had
been the night before.
Moreover, when
police followed Ker from the scene of the
meeting with Murphy he managed to lose
them after performing an abrupt U-turn.
Finally, the police had a statement from an
informant who had provided reliable
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information previously, that Ker was engaged
in selling marijuana, and that his source was
Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this
coincidence of information was sufficient to
support a reasonable belief of the officers that
Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana
is to indulge in understatement." M, at 36.83
S.Ct..atl631.

*233 Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs
analysis into two largely independent channels-the
informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of
knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5 supra. There are
persuasive arguments against according these two
elements such independent status. Instead, they are
better understood as relevant considerations in the
totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has
guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency in
one maybe compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other,
or by some other indicia of reliability. See, e.g.,
Adams v, Williams, supra. 407 U.S., at 146-147. 92
S.CU at 1923-1924; Harris v. United States. 403 U.S.
573. 91 S.Ct. 2075. 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971V
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the
unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of
criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a
particular case, to thoroughlyset forth the basis of his
knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to
a finding of probable **2330 cause based on his tip.
See United States v. Sellers. 483 F.2d 37 (CA5 1973V
[FN81 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen
comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which
if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability-we
have found *234 rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his
knowledge unnecessary. Adams v. Williams, supra.
Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an
informant's motives, his explicit and detailed
description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a
statement that the event was observed first-hand,
entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise
be the case.
Unlike a totality of circumstances
analysis, which permits a balanced assessment of the
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability
(and unreliability) attending an informant's tip, the
"two-pronged test" has encouraged an excessively
technical dissection of informants' tips, [FN91 with
undue attention *235 being focused on isolated issues
that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts
presented to the magistrate.

FN8. Compare Stanley v. State. 19 Md.App.
507. 313 A.2d 847. 861 (Md.App. 1974).
reasoning that "Even assuming 'credibility'
amounting to sainthood, the judge still may
not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and
known and trusted police-affiant."

FN9. Some lower court decisions, brought to
our attention by the State, reflect a rigid
application of such rules. In Bridzer v. State.
503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974V the
affiant had received a confession of armed
robbery from one of two suspects in the
robbery; in addition, the suspect had given
the officer $800 in cash stolen during the
robbery. The suspect also told the officer
that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in
the other suspect's apartment. A warrant
issued on the basis of this was invalidated on
the ground that the affidavit did not
satisfactorily describe how the accomplice
had obtained his information regarding the
gun.
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 55 IU.App.3d
1028. 13 Ill.Dec. 752. 371 N.E.2d 687
(111.App. 1978V the affidavit submitted in
support of an application for a search warrant
stated that an informant of proven and
uncontested reliability had seen, in
specifically described premises, "a quantity of
a white crystalline substance which was
represented to the informant by a white male
occupant of the premises to be cocaine.
Informant has observed cocaine on numerous
occasions in the past and is thoroughly
familiar with its appearance. The informant
states that the white crystalline powder he
observed in the above described premises
appeared to him to be cocaine." The warrant
issued on the basis of the affidavit was
invalidated because "There is no indication as
to how the informant or for that matter any
other person could tell whether a white
substance was cocaine and not some other
substance such as sugar or salt." Id., 13
Ill.Dec. at 754. 371 N.E.2& at 689.
Finally, in People v. Brethauer. 174 Colo. 29.
482 P.2d 369 (Colo.l971V an informant,
stated to have supplied reliable information in
the past, claimed that L.S.D. and marijuana
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were located on certain premises. The affiant
supplied police with drugs, which were tested
by police and confirmed to be illegal
substances. The affidavit setting forth these,
and other, facts was found defective under
both prongs of SpinellL

As early as Locke v. United States. 1 Cranch. 339,348,
3 L.Ed. 364 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed,
in a closely related context, that "the term 'probable
cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less
than evidence which would justify condemnation.... It
imports a seizure made under circumstances which
warrant suspicion." More recently, we said that "the
quanta ... of proof appropriate in ordinary judicial
proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a
warrant. Brinezar. supra, 338 U.S., at 173,69 S.Ct., at
1309. Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the
evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the
magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix some
general, numerically precise degree of certainty
corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful,
it is clear that "only the probability, and not a prima
facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of
probable cause." Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S., at 419, 89
S.Ct., at 590. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure § 210.1(7) (Proposed Off. Draft 1972); W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.2(3) (1978).
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a
criminal investigation. Technical requirements of
elaborate specificity once exacted under common law
**2331 pleading have no proper place in this area."
Ventresca. supra. 380 U.S., at 108, 85 S.Ct.. at 745.
Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been
issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges,
and who certainly do not remain abreast of each
judicial refinement of the nature of "probable cause."
See Shadwick v. City of Tampa. 407 U.S. 345.
348-350. 92 S.Ct. 2119. 2121-2122, 32 L.Ed.2d 783
(1972). The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs
and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and
analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact
that many warrants are-quite properly, ibid, -issued on
the basis of nontechnical, *236 common-sense
judgments of laymen applying a standard less
demanding than those used in more formal legal
proceedings.
Likewise, given the informal, often

hurried context in which it must be applied, the
"built-in subtleties," Stanley v. State. 19 Md.App. 507.
313 A.2d 847. 860 fMd.App.1974). of the
"two-pronged test" are particularly unlikely to assist
magistrates in determining probable cause.
Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit
should not take the form of de noyo review. A
magistrate's "determination of probable cause should be
paid great deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli.
supra, 393 U.S.. at 419, 89 S.Ct.. at 590. "A grudging
or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants," Ventresca. supra. 380 U.S.. at 108.85 S.Ct.,
at 745, is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant "courts should not invalidate .. warrants] by
interpreting affidavit [s] in a hypertechnical, rather than
a commonsense, manner." Id. at 109, 85 S.Ct., at 746.
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are
subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have
deemed appropriate, police might well resort to
warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on
consent or some other exception to the warrant clause
that might develop at the time of ihe search. In
addition, the possession of a warrant by officers
conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the
perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by
assuring "the individual whose property is searched or
seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer,
his need to search, and the limits of his power to
search." United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1, 9. 97
S.Ct. 2476. 2482, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). Reflecting
this preference for the warrant process, the traditional
standard for review of an issuing magistrate's probable
cause determination has been that so long as the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for... concluding]"
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing,
the Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v.
United States. 362 U.S. 257,271. 80 S Ct. 725. 736.4
L.Ed.2d 697 (I960).
See *231United States v.
Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 577-583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 20792082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). [FN 101 We think
reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose
of encouraging recourse to the warranl procedure and
is more consistent with our traditional deference to the
probable cause determinations of magistrates than is
the "two-pronged test."

FN10. We also have said that "Although in a

Page 15
particular case it may not be easy to determine
when an affidavit demonstrates the existence
of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful
or marginal cases in this area should be
largely determined by the preference to be
accorded to warrants," Ventresca, supra 380
U.S., at 109, 85 S.Ct., at 746. This reflects
both a desire to encourage use of the warrant
process by police officers and a recognition
that once a warrant has been obtained,
intrusion upon interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment is less severe than
otherwise may be the case. Even if we were
to accept the premise that the accurate
assessment of probable cause would be
furthered by the "two- pronged test," which
we do not, these Fourth Amendment policies
would require a less rigorous standard than
that which appears to have been read into
Aguilar and Spinelli.

Finally, the direction taken by decisions following
Spinelli poorly serves "the **2332 most basic function
of any government": "to provide for the security of the
individual and of his property." Miranda v. Arizona.
384 U.S. 436, 539, 86 S.Ct. 1602. 1661, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). The strictures
that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged test"
cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law
enforcement, see, e.g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois
Supreme Court apparently thought, that test must be
rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips
seldom would be of greatly diminished value in police
work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, see
Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Committee
Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive
recitations of the basis of their everyday observations.
Likewise, as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in
this case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous
tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and
unknowable. As a result, anonymous tips seldom
could survive a rigorous application of either of the
Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when
supplemented by *238 independent police
investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of
otherwise "perfect crimes." While a conscientious
assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is
required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that
leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen
informants is not.

For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to
abandon the "two- pronged test" established by our
decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. FFN111 In its place
we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis
that traditionally has informed probable cause
determinations. See Jones v. United States, supra:
United States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegarv. United
States, supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for...
conclud[ing]" that probable cause *239 existed. Jones
v. United States, supra. 362 U.S., at 271, 80 S.Ct., at
736.
We are convinced that this flexible, easily
applied standard will better achieve the accommodation
of public and private interests that the Fourth
Amendment requires than does the approach that has
developed from Aguilar and Spinelli.

FN11. The Court's decision in Spinelli has
been the subject of considerable criticism,
both by members of this Court and others.
Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in United
States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 585-586, 91
S.Ct. 2075, 2082-2083, 29 L.Ed.2d 723
(1971), noted his long-held view "that Spinelli
... was wrongly decided" by this Court.
Justice Black similarly would have overruled
that decision. Ibid. Likewise, a noted
commentator has observed that "[t]he
Aguilar-Spinelli formulation has provoked
apparently ceaseless litigation." 8A Moore's
Federal Practice % 41.04 (1981).
Whether the allegations submitted to the
magistrate in Spinelli would, under the view
we now take, have supported a finding of
probable cause, we think it would not be
profitable to decide. There are so many
variables in the probable cause equation that
one determination will seldom be a useful
"precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that
while we in no way abandon Spinelli 's
concern for the trustworthiness of informers
and for the principle that it is the magistrate
who must ultimately make a finding of
probable cause, we reject the rigid
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categorization suggested by some of its
language.

r91T 1 Oin I! Our earlier cases illustrate the limits
beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing
a warrant. A sworn statement of an affiant that "he has
cause to suspect and does believe that" liquor illegally
brought into the United States is located on certain
premises will not do. Nathanson v. United States. 290
U.S. 41.54 S.Ct. 11,78 L.Ed. 159(1933). An affidavit
must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for
determining the existence of probable cause, and the
wholly conclusory statement at issue in Nathanson
failed to meet this requirement. An **2333 officer's
statement that "affiants have received reliable
information from a credible person and believe" that
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate.
Amilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12
L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a mere
conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually
no basis at all for making a judgment regarding
probable cause.
Sufficient information must be
presented to the magistrate to allow that official to
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others. In order
to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's
duty does not occur, courts must continue to
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on
which warrants are issued. But when we move beyond
the "bare bones" affidavits present in cases such as
Nathanson and Aguilar, this area simply does not lend
itself to a prescribed set of rules, like that which had
developed from Spinelli.
Instead, the flexible,
common-sense standard articulated in Jones,
Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
Justice BRENN AN's dissent suggests in several places
that the approach we take today somehow downgrades
the *240 role of the neutral magistrate, because Aguilar
and Spinelli "preserve the role of magistrates as
independent arbiters of probable cause...." Post, at
2357. Quite the contrary, we believe, is the case. The
essential protection of the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, as stated in Johnson v. United
States. 333 U.S. 10,68 S.Ct. 367.92 L.Ed. 436 (1948),
is in "requiring that [the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id., at 13-14. 68

S.Ct., at 369. Nothing in our opinion in any way
lessens the authority of the magistrate to draw such
reasonable inferences as he will from the material
supplied to him by applicants for a warrant; indeed, he
is freer than under the regime of Aguilar and Spinelli to
draw such inferences, or to refuse to draw them if he is
so minded.
The real gist of Justice BRENNAN's criticism seems
to be a second argument, somewhat at odds with the
first, that magistrates should be restricted in their
authority to make probable cause determinations by the
standards laid down in Aguilar and Spinelli, and that
such findings "should not be authorized unless there is
some assurance that the information on which they are
based has been obtained in a reliable waiy by an honest
or credible person." However, under our opinion
magistrates remain perfectly free to exact such
assurances as they deem necessary, as well as those
required by this opinion, in making probable cause
determinations. Justice BRENNAN would apparently
prefer that magistrates be restricted in their findings of
probable cause by the development of an elaborate
body of case law dealing with the "veracity" prong of
the Spinelli test, which in turn is broken down into two
"spurs"—the informant's "credibility" and the
"reliability" of his information, together with the "basis
of knowledge" prong of the Spinelli test. See n. 4,
supra. That such a labyrinthine body of judicial
refinement bears any relationship to familiar definitions
of *241 probable cause is hard to imagine. Probable
cause deals "with probabilities.
These are not
technical;
they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act," Brinegar
v. United States. 338 U.S. 160. 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302,
1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879(1949).
Justice BRENNAN's dissent also suggests that "words
such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'common sense,'
as used in the Court's opinion, are but code words for
an overly-permissive attitude towards police practices
in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment." Infra, p. 2359. An easy, but not a
complete, answer to this rather florid statement would
be that nothing we know about Justice **2334
Rutledge suggests that he would have used the words
he chose in Brinegar in such a manner.
More
fundamentally, no one doubts that "under our
Constitution only measures consistent with the Fourth
Amendment may be employed by government to cure
[the horrors of drug trafficking]," post, at 2359; but
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this agreement does not advance the inquiry as to which
measures are, and which measures are not, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment. "Fidelity" to the
commands of the Constitution suggests balanced
judgment rather than exhortation.
The highest
"fidelity" is achieved neither by the judge who
instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the most
bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any
more than it is achieved by a judge who instinctively
goes furthest in accepting the most restrictive claims of
governmental authorities. The task of this Court, as of
other courts, is to "hold the balance true," and we think
we have done that in this case.
IV
[121 Our decisions applying the totality of
circumstances analysis outlined above have
consistently recognized the value of corroboration of
details of an informant's tip by independent police
work. In Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U.S.. at
269, 80 S.Ct.. at 735. we held that an affidavit relying
on hearsay "isnot to *242 be deemed insufficient on
that score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay is presented." We went on to say that even
in making a warrantless arrest an officer "may rely
upon information received through an informant, rather
than upon his direct observations, so long as the
informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by
other matters within the officer's knowledge." Ibid.
Likewise, we recognized the probative value of
corroborative efforts of police officials in Aguilar — the
source of the "two-pronged test"-by observing that if
the police had made some effort to corroborate the
informant's report at issue, "an entirely different case"
would have been presented. Aguilar. supra. 378 U.S..
at 109. n. 1.84S.Ct..atl5U.n. 1.
Our decision in Drapery. United States. 358 U.S. 307.
79 S.Ct. 329. 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). however, is the
classic case on the value of corroborative efforts of
police officials. There, an informant named Hereford
reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a train
from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also
supplied a fairly detailed physical description of
Draper, and predicted that he would be wearing a light
colored raincoat, brown slacks and black shoes, and
would be walking "real fast." Id. at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at
331. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for his
information. [FN 121

FN 12. The tip in Draper might well not have
survived the rigid application of the
"two-pronged test" that developed following
Spineili. The only reference to Hereford's
reliability was that he had "been engaged as a
'special employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics
at Denver for about six months, and from time
to time gave information to [the police] for
small sums of money, and that [the officer]
had always found the information given by
Hereford to be accurate and reliable." 358
U.S.. at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at 331. Likewise, the
tip gave no indication of how Hereford came
by his information. At most, the detailed and
accurate predictions in the tip indicated that,
however Hereford obtained his information, it
was reliable.

On one of the stated dates police officers observed a
man matching this description exit a train arriving from
Chicago; his attire and luggage matched Hereford's
report and he was *243 walking rapidly.
We
explained in Draper that, by this point in his
investigation, the arresting officer "had personally
verified every facet of the information given him by
Hereford except whether petitioner had accomplished
his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his
person or in his bag. And surely, with every other bit
of Hereford's information being thus personally
verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable grounds' to
believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's
information-that Draper would have the heroin with
him-was likewise true," id. at 313. 79 S.Ct.. at 333.
**2335 The showing of probable cause in the present
case was fully as compelling as that in Draper. Even
standing alone, the factsobtained through the
independent investigation of Mader and the DEA at
least suggested that the Gates were involved in drug
trafficking. In addition to being a popular vacation
site, Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics and
other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall.
446 U.S. 544. 562. 100 S.Ct. 1870. 1881. 64 L.Ed.2d
497 H980) (POWELL, J., concurring);
DEA,
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs
to the U.S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic
Sources 10(1979). Lance Gates' flight to Palm Beach,
his brief, overnight stay in a motel, and apparent
immediate return north to Chicago in the family car,
conveniently awaiting him in West Palm Beach, is as
suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it is of an
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ordinary vacation trip.
[131fl41 In addition, the magistrate could rely on the
anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in
major part by Mader's efforts-just as had occurred in
Draper. [TNI 31 The Supreme Court *244 of Illinois
reasoned that Draper involved an informant who had
given reliable information on previous occasions, while
the honesty and reliability of Ihe anonymous informant
in this case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police.
While this distinction might be an apt one at the time
the police department received the anonymous letter, it
became far less significant after Mader's independent
investigative work occurred. The corroboration of the
letter's predictions that the Gates' car would be in
Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the
next day or so, and that he v/ould drive the car north
toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with
certainty, that the informant's other assertions also were
true. "Because an informant is right about some things,
he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli,
sunra. 393 U.S.. at 427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594 (WHITE, J.,
concurring)--including the claim regarding the Gates'
illegal activity. This may well not be the type of
"reliability" or "veracity" necessary to satisfy some
views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we think
it suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment
called for in making a probable cause determination.
It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause,
that "corroboration through other sources of
information reduced the *245 chances of a reckless or
prevaricating tale," thus providing "a substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. United States,
supra. 362 U.S.. at 269. 271.. 80 S.Ct.. at 735. 736.

FN13. The Illinois Supreme Court thought
that the verification of details contained in the
anonymous letter in this case amounted only
to "the corroboration of innocent activity,"
J.A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to
support a finding of probable cause. We are
inclined to agree, however, with the
observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting
opinion that "In this case, just as in Draper,
seemingly innocent activity became
suspicious in the light of the initial tip." J.A.
18a. And it bears noting that all of the
corroborating detail established in Draper,
supra, was of entirely innocent activity~a fact
later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v.
United States. 362 U.S. 257. 269-270. 80

S.Ct. 725. 735-736. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960V
and Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23. 36. 83
S.Ct. 1623. 1631. 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963V
This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed
previously, probable cause requires only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such
activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent
behavior frequently will provide the basis for
a showing of probable cause; to require
otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a
drastically more rigorous definition of
probable cause than the security of our
citizens demands. We think the Illinois court
attempted a too rigid classification of the
types of conduct that may be relied upon in
seeking to demonstrate probable cause. See
Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47. 52. n. 2. 99
S.Ct. 2637. 2641. n. 2. 61 L.Ed.2d 357
(1979).
In making a determination of
probable cause the relevant inquiry is not
whether particular conduct is "innocent" or
"guilty," but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal
acts.

[151 Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of
details relating not just to easily obtained facts and
conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future
**2336 actions of third parties ordinarily not easily
predicted. The letter writer's accurate information as
to the travel plans of each of the GEites was of a
character likely obtained only from the Gates
themselves, or from someone familiar with their not
entirely ordinary travel plans. If the informant had
access to accurate information of this type a magistrate
could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he
also had access to reliable information of the Gates'
alleged illegal activities. [TNI41 Of *246 course, the
Gates' travel plans might have been learned from a
talkative neighbor or travel agent;
under the
"two-pronged test" developed from Spinelli, the
character of the details in the anonymous letter might
well not permit a sufficiently clear inference regarding
the letter writer's "basis of knowledge."
But, as
discussed previously, supra, 2332, probsible cause does
not demand the certainty we associate with formal
trials. It is enough that there was a fair probability that
the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained his
entire story either from the Gates or someone they
trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the
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letter's predictions provides just this probability. It is
apparent, therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant
had a "substantial basis for ... concluding]" that
probable cause to search the Gates' home and car
existed.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Illinois therefore must be

he probably also had a reliable basis for his
statements that the Gates' kept a large quantity
of drugs in their home and frequently were
visited by other drug traffickers there.

Reversed.
FN 14. The dissent seizes on one inaccuracy in
the anonymous informant's letter—its
statement that Sue Gates would fly from
Florida to Illinois, when in fact she
drove—and argues that the probative value of
the entire tip was undermined by this
allegedly "material mistake." We have never
required that informants used by the police be
infallible, and can see no reason to impose
such a requirement in this case. Probable
cause, particularly when police have obtained
a warrant, simply does not require the
perfection the dissent finds necessary.
Likewise, there is no force to the dissent's
argument that the Gates' action in leaving their
home unguarded undercut the informant's
claim that drugs were hidden there. Indeed,
the line-by-line scrutiny that the dissent
applies to the anonymous letter is akin to that
we find inappropriate in reviewing
magistrate's decisions.
The dissent
apparently attributes to the magistrate who
issued the warrant in this case the rather
implausible notion that persons dealing in
drugs always stay at home, apparently out of
fear that to leave might risk intrusion by
criminals. If accurate, one could not help
sympathizing with the self-imposed isolation
of people so situated. In reality, however, it
is scarcely likely that the magistrate ever
thought that the anonymous tip "kept one
spouse" at home, much less that he relied on
the theory advanced by the dissent. The letter
simply says that Sue would fly from Florida to
Illinois, without indicating whether the Gates'
made the bitter choice of leaving the drugs in
their house, or those in their car, unguarded.
The magistrate's determination that there
might be drugs or evidence of criminal
activity in the Gates' home was
well-supported by the less speculative theory,
noted in text, that if the informant could
predict with considerable accuracy the
somewhat unusual travel plans of the Gates,

Justice WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, the question regarding modification of the
exclusionary rule framed in our order of November 29,
1982, — U.S. — (1982), is properly before us and
should be addressed. I continue to believe that the
exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy where law
enforcement officials act in the reasonable belief that a
search and seizure was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment-a position I set forth in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465. 537-539. 96 S.Ct. 3027, 3032-3033, 49
L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
In this case, it was fully
reasonable for the Bloomingdale, Illinois police to
believe that their search of respondents' house and
automobile comported with the Fourth Amendment as
the search was conducted pursuant to a
judicially-issued warrant. The *247 exclusion of
probative evidence where the constable has not
blundered not only sets the criminal free but also fails
to serve any constitutional interest in securing
compliance with the important requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. On this basis, I **2337 concur in
the Court's judgment that the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court must be reversed.
I
The Court declines to address the exclusionary rule
question because the Illinois courts were not invited to
modify the rule in the first instance. The Court's refusal
to face this important question cannot be ascribed to
jurisdictional limitations. I fully agree that the statute
which gives us jurisdiction in this cause, 18 U.S.C. §
1257(3), prevents us from deciding federal
constitutional claims raised here for the first time on
review of state court decisions.
Cardinale v.
Louisiana 394 U.S. 437. 438-439. 89 S.Ct. 1161.
1162-1163. 22 L.Ed.2d 398 (1969). But it is equally
well-established that "[n]o particular form of words or
phrases is essential, but only that the claim of invalidity
and the ground therefore be brought to the attention of
the state court with fair precision and in due time."
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Street v. New York. 394 U.S. 576, 584, 89 S.Ct. 1354.
1361.22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969) (quoting New York ex rei
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67. 49 S.Ct. 61.
63. 73 L.Ed. 184 (1928)). Notwithstanding the select
and controversial instances in which the Court has
reversed a state court decision for "plain error," TFN11
we have consistently dismissed for want ofjurisdiction
where the federal claim asserted in this Court was not
raised below. But this obviously is not such a case.
As the Court points out, "It is clear in this case that
respondents expressly raised, at every level of the
Illinois judicial system, the claim that the Fourth
Amendment had been violated by the actions of the
Illinois *248 police and that the evidence seized by the
officers should be excluded from their trial." Ante, at
2323. Until today, we have not required more.

FN1. See e.g., Eddinss v. Oklahoma. 455
U.S. 104.102 S.Ct. 869.71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982):
Woodv. Georxia. 450 U.S. 261. 101 S.Ct.
1097.67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1980); Vachon v. New
Hampshire. 414 U.S. 478. 94 S.Ct. 664. 38
L.Ed.2d 666 (1974) (per curiam ).
Of
course, to the extent these cases were
correctly decided, they indicate a fortiori that
the exclusionary rule issue in this case is
properly before us.

We have never suggested that the jurisdictional
stipulations of § 1257 require that all arguments on
behalf of, let alone in opposition to, a federal claim be
raised and decided below. TFN21 See R. Stern & E.
Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 230 (1978). Dewey
v. Pes Moines. 173 U.S. 193. 19 S.Ct. 379. 43 L.Ed.
665 (1898) distinguished the raising of constitutional
claims and the making of arguments in support of or in
opposition to those claims.

FN2. The Court has previously relied on
issues and arguments not raised in the state
court below in order to dispose of a federal
question that was properly raised. In Stanley
v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645, 658. 92 S.Ct. 1208.
1216.3lL.Ed.2d551 (1972), the Court held
that unmarried fathers could not be denied a
hearing on parental fitness that was afforded
other Illinois parents. Although this issue
was not presented in the Illinois courts, the
Court found that it could properly be

considered: "we dispose of the case on the
constitutional premise raised below, reaching
the result by a method of analysis readily
available to the state court. For the same
reason, the strictures of Cardinale... and Hill,
have been fully observed." 405 U.S., at 658.
n. 10, 92 S.Ct., at 1216, n. 10. The dissent
argued that the Court was deciding a due
process claim instead of an equal protection
one, but there was no suggestion that it
mattered at all that the Court had relied on a
different type of equal protection argument.
"If the question were only an enlargement of the one
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were
so connected with it in substance as to form but
another ground or reason for alleging the invalidity
of the personal judgment, we should have no
hesitation in holding the assignment sufficient to
permit the question to be now raised and argued.
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments
which were advanced in the courts below upon a
federal question there discussed* *2338" 173 U.S..
at 197-198, 19 S.Ct., at 380-381 (emphasis added).
TFN31

FN3. As the Court explains, ante, at 2322, n.
2, in Dewey, appellant argued only that the
imposition of personal liability against him
violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not
received personal notice of the assessment
proceedings. In this Court, appellant sought
to raise a takings argument for the first time.
The Court declined to pass on the issue
because, although arising from a single factual
occurrence the two claims "are not in anywise
necessarily connected," 173 U.S.. at 198, 19
S.Ct., at 380.

*249 Under Dewey, which the Court hails as the
"fullest treatment of the subject," ante, at 2322, the
exclusionary rule issue is but another argument
pertaining to the Fourth Amendment question squarely
presented in the Illinois courts.
The presentation and decision of respondent's Fourth
Amendment claim fully embraces the argument that
due to the nature of the alleged Fourth Amendment
violation, the seized evidence should not be excluded.
Our decisions concerning the scope of the
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exclusionary rule cannot be divorced from the Fourth
Amendment; they rest on the relationship of Fourth
Amendment interests to the objectives of the criminal
justice system. See, e.g. United States v. Ceccolini.
435 U.S. 268. 98 S.Ct. 1054. 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978);
Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465. 96 S.Ct. 3037. 49
L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). TFN41 Similarly, the issues
surrounding a proposed good faith modification are
intricately and inseverably tied to the nature of the
Fourth Amendment violation: the degree of probable
cause, the presence of a warrant, and the clarity of
previously announced Fourth Amendment principles all
inform the *250 good faith issue. The Court's own
holding that the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for
concluding that probable cause existed, ante, at 2334,
is itself but a variation on the good-faith theme. See
Brief of Petitioner on Reargument at 4-26.

FN4. The Court relies on these cases for the
surprising assertion that the Fourth
Amendment and exclusionary rule questions
are "distinct." I had understood the very
essence of Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128. 99
S.Ct. 421. 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) to be that
standing to seek exclusion of evidence could
not be divorced from substantive Fourth
Amendment rights. Past decisions finding that
the remedy of exclusion is not always
appropriate upon the finding of a Fourth
Amendment violation acknowledge the close
relationship of the issues. For example, in
United States v. Ceccolini it was said: "The
constitutional question under the Fourth
Amendment was phrased in Wong Sun v.
United States. 371 U.S. 471. 83 S.Ct. 407. 9
L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), as whether 'the
connection between the lawless conduct of the
police and the discovery of the challenged
evidence has become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.'" 435 U.S.. at 275-276.98
S.Ct.. at 1059-1060. It is also surprising to
learn that the issues in Stone v. Powell are
"distinct" from the Fourth Amendment.

As a jurisdictional requirement, I have no doubt that
the exclusionary rule question is before us as an
indivisible element of the claim that the Constitution
requires exclusion of certain evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As a prudential

matter, I am unmoved by the Court's lengthy discourse
as to why it must avoid the question. First, the Court
turns on its head the axiom that" 'due regard for the
appropriate relationship of this Court to state courts,'
McGoldrick v. Comyaznie Generate. 309 U.S. 430.
434- 435. 60 S.Ct. 670. 672-673. 84 L.Ed. 849 (1940).
demands that those courts be given an opportunity to
consider the constitutionality of the actions of state
officials" ante, at 2323. This statement, written to
explain why a state statute should not be struck down
on federal grounds not raised in the state courts, [FN51
**2339 hardly applies when the question is whether a
rule of federal law articulated by this Court should now
be narrowed to reduce the scope of federal intrusion
into the state's administration of criminal justice.
Insofar as modifications of the federal exclusionary
*251 rule are concerned, the Illinois courts are bound
by this Court's pronouncements. Cf. Oregon v. Hass.
420 U.S. 714. 719. 95 S.Ct. 1215. 1219. 43 L.Ed.2d
570 (1975). I see little point in requiring a litigant to
request a state court to overrule or modify one of this
Court's precedents. Far from encouraging the stability
of our precedents, the Court's proposed practice could
well undercut stare decisis. Either the presentation of
such issues to the lower courts will be a completely
futile gesture or the lower courts are now invited to
depart from this Court's decisions whenever they
conclude such a modification is in order. [FN61

FN5. Consider the full context of the
statement in McGoldrick:
"In cases coming here from state courts in
which a state statute is assailed as
unconstitutional, there are reasons of peculiar
force which should lead us to refrain from
deciding questions not presented or decided in
the highest court of the state whose judicial
action we are called upon to review. Apart
from the reluctance with which every court
should proceed to set aside legislation as
unconstitutional on grounds not properly
presented, due regard for the appropriate
relationship of this Court to state courts
requires us to decline to consider and decide
questions affecting the validity of state
statutes not urged or considered there. It is
for these reasons that this Court, where the
constitutionality of a statute has been upheld
in the state court, consistently refuses to
consider any grounds of attack not raised or
decided in that court." 309 U.S.. at 434. 60
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S.Ct., at 672.

FN6. The Court observes that "although the
Illinois courts applied the federal exclusionary
rule, there was never 'any real contest' upon
the point." Ante, at 2324. But the proper
forum for a "real contest" on the continued
vitality of the exclusionary rule that has
developed from our decisions in Weeks v.
United States. 232 U.S. 383,34 S.Ct. 341, 58
L.Ed. 652 H914) and Mappv. Ohio. 367 U.S.
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) is
this Court.

The Court correctly notes that Illinois may choose to
pursue a different course with respect to the state
exclusionary rule. If this Court were to formulate a
"good faith" exception to the federal exclusionary rule,
the Illinois Supreme Court would be free to consider on
remand whether the state exclusionary rule should be
modified accordingly. The possibility that it might
have relied upon the state exclusionary rule had the
"good-faith" question been posed does not constitute
independent and adequate state grounds.
"The
possibility that the state court might have reached the
same conclusion if it had decided the question purely as
a matter of state law does not create an adequate and
independent state ground that relieves this Court of the
necessity of considering the federal question." United
Air Lines v. Mahin. 410 U.S. 623. 630-631. 93 S.Ct.
1186. 1191-1192. 35 L.Ed.2d 545 (1973); Beecher v.
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35.37. n. 3. 88 S.Ct. 189,190, n. 3.
19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967): C. Wright, Federal Courts §
107, pp. 747-748 (4th ed. 1983). Nor does having the
state court first decide whether the federal exclusionary
rule should be modified—and presentation of the
federal question does not insure that the equivalent
state law issue will be *252 raised or decided
[FN71—avoid the unnecessary decision of a federal
question. The Court still must reach a federal question
to decide the instant case. Thus, in today's opinion, the
Court eschews modification of the exclusionary rule in
favor of interring the test established by Azuilar v.
Texas. 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723
(1964) and Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89
S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
Nor is the
exclusionary rule question avoided-it is simply
deferred until "another day."

FN7. Nor is there any reason for the Illinois
courts to decide that question in advance of
this Court's decision on the federal
exclusionary rule. Until the federal rule is
modified, the state law question is entirely
academic. The state courts should not be
expected to render such purely advisory
decisions.

It also appears that the Court, in disposing of the case,
does not strictly follow its own prudential advice. The
Illinois Supreme Court found not only a violation of the
Fourth Amendment but also of Article I, § 6 of the
Illinois Constitution which also provides assurance
against unreasonable searches and sei2:ures. Taking
the Court's new prudential standards on their own
terms, the Illinois courts should be given the
opportunity to consider in the first instance whether a
"totality of the circumstances" test should replace the
more precise rules of Aguilar and Spinelli.
The
Illinois Supreme Court may decide to retain the
established test for purposes **2340 of its state
constitution just as easily as it could decide to retain an
unmodified exclusionary rule. TFN8]

FN8. Respondents press this very argument.
Brief of Respondent at 24-27; Brief for
Respondent on Reargument, at 6. Of course,
under traditional principles the possibility that
the state court might reach a different
conclusion in interpreting its state constitution
does not make it improper for us to decide the
federal issue. Delaware v. Pronse. 440 U.S.
648, 651-653. 99 S.Ct. 1391. 1394-1395. 59
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979): Zacchini
v.
Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co.. 433 U.S
562, 568, 97 S.Ct. 2849. 2854. 53 L.Ed.2d
965(1977).

Finally, the Court correctly notes that a
fully-developed record is helpful if not indispensable
for the decision of many issues. 1 too resist the
decision of a constitutional question *253 when such
guidance is necessary, but the question of whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified is an issue of law
which obviously goes far beyond and depends little on
the subjective good faith of the police officers that
searched the Gates' property. Moreover, the case
comes here with a fully developed record as to the
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actions of the Bloomingdale, Illinois police. If further
factual development of whether the officers in this case
acted in good faith were important, that issue should
logically be considered on remand, following this
Court's statement of the proper legal standards. [FN91

FN9. It also should be noted that the
requirement that the good faith issue be
presented to the Illinois courts has little to do
with whether the record is complete. I doubt
that the raising of the good faith issue below
would have been accompanied by any
different record. And this Court may dismiss
a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted
when the record makes decision of a federal
question unwise. See, e.g., Minnickv. Calif
Department of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105,
101 S.Ct. 221L 68 L.Ed.2d 706 (1981).

The Court's straining to avoid coming to grips with the
exclusionary rule issue today may be hard for the
country to understand-particularly given earlier
statements by some members of the Court. TFN10] The
question has been fully briefed and argued by the
parties and amici curiae, including the United States.
[FN111 The issue is central to the enforcement of law
and the administration ofjustice throughout the nation.
The Court of Appeals for the second largest federal
circuit *254 has already adopted such an exception,
United States v. Williams. 622 F.2d 830 (CA5 1980)
(en banc), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1127,101 S.Ct. 946,
67L.Ed.2d 114(1981), and the new Eleventh Circuit
is presumably bound by its decision. Several members
of this Court have for some time expressed the need to
consider modifying the exclusionary rule, ante, at 2325,
and Congress as well has been active in exploring the
question. See The Exclusionary Rule Bills, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong.; 1st and 2d
Sess. At least one state has already enacted a good
faith exception. Colo.Rev.Stat.Tit. 16, Art. 3, § 308.
Of course, if there is a jurisdictional barrier to deciding
the issue, none of these considerations are relevant.
But if no such procedural obstacle exists, I see it as our
responsibility to end the uncertainty and decide
whether the rule will be modified. The question of
whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a
warrant and whether the evidence seized must be
excluded in this case should follow our reconsideration
of the framework by which such issues, as they **2341

arise from the Fourth Amendment, are to be handled.

FN 10. In California v. Miniares. 443 U.S.
916. 928. 100 S.Ct. 9. 15. 61 L.Ed.2d 892
(1979) (REHNQUIST, J., joined by THE
CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting from the denial
of stay), the author of today's opinion for the
Court urged that the parties be directed to
brief whether the exclusionary rule should be
retained.
In Minjares, like this case,
respondents had raised a Fourth Amendment
claim but petitioners had not attacked the
validity of the exclusionary rule in the state
court. See also Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420. 437, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2851, 69
L.Ed.2d 744 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting)
(advocating overruling of Maw v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081
(1961)).

FN11. Ironically, in Mapp v. Ohio, supra,
petitioners did not ask the Court to partially
overrule Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, 69
S.Ct. 1359. 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). The sole
argument to apply the exclusionary rule to the
states is found in a single paragraph in an
amicus brief filed by the American Civil
Liberties Union.

II

The exclusionary rule is a remedy adopted by this
Court to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of
citizens "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
..." Although early opinions suggested that the
Constitution required exclusion of all illegally obtained
evidence, the exclusionary rule "has never been
interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons." Stone v Powell. 428 U.S. 465,486,96 S.Ct.
3037, 3048. 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Because of the
inherent trustworthiness of seized tangible evidence
and the resulting social costs from its loss through
suppression, application *255 of the exclusionary rule
has been carefully "restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
observed." United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338.
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348. 94 S.Ct. 613, 620.38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974V Even
at criminal trials the exclusionary rule has not been
applied indiscriminately to ban all illegally obtained
evidence without regard to the costs and benefits of
doing so. Infra, at 2341. These developments, borne
of years of experience with the exclusionary rule in
operation, forcefully suggest that the exclusionary rule
be more generally modified to permit the introduction
of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief
that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth
Amendment.
This evolvement in the understanding of the proper
scope of the exclusionary rule embraces several lines of
cases. First, standing to invoke the exclusionary rule
has been limited to situations where the Government
seeks to use such evidence against the victim of the
unlawful search. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223.93 S.Ct. 1565.36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973V Alderman
v. United States. 394 U.S. 165. 89 S.Ct. 961. 22
L.Ed.2d 176(1969); Worn Sun v. United States. 371
U.S. 471. 491-492. 83 S.Ct. 407. 419-420. 9 L.Ed.2d
441 (1963V. Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128. 99 S.Ct.
421. 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978V
Second, the rule has not been applied in proceedings
other than the trial itself.
In United States v.
Calandra. 414 U.S. 338.94 S.Ct. 613.38 L.Ed.2d 561
(1974V the Court refused to extend the rule to grand
jury proceedings. "Any incremental deterrent effect
which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand
jury proceedings is uncertain at best.... We therefore
decline to embrace a view that would achieve a
speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the
deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of
substantially impeding the role of the grand jury." Id..
at 348. 94 S.Ct.. at 620. Similarly, in United States v.
Janis. 428 U.S. 433. 96 S.Ct. 3021. 49 L.Ed.2d 1046
£1976}, the exclusionary rule was not extended to
forbid the use in the federal civil proceedings of
evidence illegally seized by state officials, since the
likelihood of deterring unlawful police conduct was not
sufficient to outweigh the social costs imposed by the
exclusion.
*256 Third, even at a criminal trial, the same analysis
has led us to conclude that the costs of excluding
probative evidence outweighed the deterrence benefits
in several circumstances. We have refused to prohibit
the use of illegally seized evidence for the purpose of
impeaching a defendant who testifies in his own behalf.
UnitedStates v. Havens. 446 U.S. 620. lOOS.Ct. 1912.

64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980V Walderv. United States. 347
U.S. 62. 74 S.Ct. 354. 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954V We have
also declined to adopt a "per se or 'but for' rule" that
would make inadmissible any evidence which comes to
light through a chain of causation that began with an
illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois. All U.S. 590. 603. 95
S.Ct. 2254. -—. 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975V And we have
held that testimony of a live witness may be admitted,
notwithstanding that the testimony was derived from a
concededly unconstitutional search. United States v.
Ceccolini. 435 U.S. 268.98 S.Ct. 1054.55 L.Ed.2d 268
(1978). Nor is exclusion required **2342 when law
enforcement agents act in good-faith reliance upon a
statute or ordinance that is subsequently held to be
unconstitutional. United States v. Peltier. All U.S.
531. 95 S.Ct. 2313. 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1977V Michigan
v. DeFillivvo. 443 U.S. 31. 99 S.Ct. 2627. 61 L.Ed.2d
343 (1979V [FN 121 Cf United States v. Caceres. 440
U.S. 741. 754-757. 99 S.Ct. 1465. 1472-1474. 59
L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (exclusion not *257 required of
evidence tainted by violation of an executive
department's rules concerning electronic
eavesdropping).

FN 12. To be sure, Peltier and DeFillippo did
not modify the exclusionary rule itself.
Peltier held that Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States. 413 U.S. 266. 93 S.Ct. 2535. 37
L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). was not to be given
retroactive effect; DeFillippo upheld the
validity of an arrest made in good-faith
reliance on an ordinance subsequently
declared unconstitutional. The effect of these
decisions, of course, was that evidence was
not excluded because of the officer's
reasonable belief that he was acting lawfully,
and the Court's reasoning, as I discuss below,
infra, at 2343-2344, leads inexorably to the
more general modification of the exclusionary
rule I favor. Indeed, Justice BRENNAN
recognized this in his dissent in Peltier. All
U.S.. at 551-552. 95 S.Ct.. at 2324-2325.
I recognize that we have held that the
exclusionary rule required suppression of
evidence obtained in searches carried out
pursuant to statutes, not previously declared
unconstitutional, which purported to authorize
the searches in question without probable
cause and without a valid warrant. See, e.g.,
Torres v. Puerto Rico. AA1 U.S. 465. 99 S.Ct.
2425.61 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez
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v. United States, supra; Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889. 20 L.Ed.2d 917
(1968); Berzer v. New York, 388 U.S. 41. 87
S.Ct. 1873. 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). The
results in these cases may well be different
under a "good-faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule.

A similar balancing approach is employed in our
decisions limiting the scope of the exclusionary remedy
for Fifth Amendment violations, Oregon v. Hass. 420
U.S. 714. 95 S.Ct. 1215. 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975):
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222. 91 S.Ct. 643. 28
L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433.
94 S.Ct. 2357. 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). and our cases
considering whether Fourth Amendment decisions
should be applied retroactively, United States v. Peltier,
supra. 422 U.S.. at 538-539. 95 S.Ct.. at 2318;
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646. 654-655. 91
S.Ct. 1148. 1153-1154. 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971)
(plurality opinion); Desist v. United States. 394 U.S..
at 244. 249- 250. 89 S.Ct.. at 1030. 1033-1034. 22
L.Ed.2d 248: Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 618.
636-639. 85 S.Ct. 1731. 1741-1743. 14 L.Ed.2d 601.
But see United States v. Johnson, — U.S. — , 102
S.Ct. 2579. 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982).
These cases reflect that the exclusion of evidence is
not a personal constitutional right but a remedy, which,
like all remedies, must be sensitive to the costs and
benefits of its imposition. The trend and direction of
our exclusionary rule decisions indicate not a lesser
concern with safeguarding the Fourth Amendment but
a fuller appreciation of the high costs incurred when
probative, reliable evidence is barred because of
investigative error. The primary cost, of course, is that
the exclusionary rule interferes with the truthseeking
function of a criminal trial by barring relevant and
trustworthy evidence. [FN 131 We will never know
how many guilty defendants go free as a result of the
rule's operation. But any rule of evidence that denies
the jury access to clearly probative and reliable
evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification,
*258 and must be carefully limited to the circumstances
in which it will pay its way by deterring official
lawlessness. I do not presume that modification of the
exclusionary rule will, by itself, significantly reduce the
crime rate-but that **2343 is no excuse for
indiscriminate application of the rule.

FN 13. The effects of the exclusionary rule are
often felt before a case reaches trial. A
recent study by the National Institute of
Justice of felony arrests in California during
the years 1976-1979 "found a major impact of
the exclusionary rule on state prosecutions."
National Institute of Justice, The Effects of
the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California
2 (1982). The study found that 4.8% of the
more than 4,000 felony cases declined for
prosecution were rejected because of search
and seizure problems. The exclusionary rule
was found to have a particularly pronounced
effect in drug cases; prosecutors rejected
approximately 30% of all felony drug arrests
because of search and seizure problems.

The suppression doctrine entails other costs as well.
It would be surprising if the suppression of evidence
garnered in good-faith, but by means later found to
violate the Fourth Amendment, did not deter legitimate
as well as unlawful police activities. To the extent the
rule operates to discourage police from reasonable and
proper investigative actions, it hinders the solution and
even the prevention of crime. A tremendous burden is
also placed on the state and federal judicial systems.
One study reveals that one-third of federal defendants
going to trial file Fourth Amendment suppression
motions, and 70% to 90% of these involve formal
hearings. Comptroller General of the United States,
Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal
Prosecutions 10(1979).
The rule also exacts a heavy price in undermining
public confidence in the reasonableness of the
standards that govern the criminal justice system.
"[Although the [exclusionary] rule is thought to deter
unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of
respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied
indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of
generating disrespect for the law and the administration
of justice." Stone v. Powell 428 U.S.. at 490-491. 96
S.Ct.. at 3050-3051. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE
observed in his separate opinion in Stone v. Powell.
428 U.S.. at 490. 96 S.Ct.. at 3050: "The disparity in
particular cases between the error committed by the
police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty
defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the
idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of
justice."
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For these reasons, "application of the [exclusionary]
rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served." *259United States v. Calandra. supra. 414
U.S.. at 348,94 S.Ct.. at 620. TFN141 The reasoning of
our recent cases strongly suggests that there is
insufficient justification to suppress evidence at a
criminal trial which was seized in the reasonable belief
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. The
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule **2344 has
never been established by empirical evidence, despite
*260 repeated attempts. United States v. Jam's. 428
U.S.. at 449-453. 96 S.Ct.. at 3029- 3031; Irvine v.
California. 347 U.S. 128. 136. 74 S.Ct. 381. 385. 98
L.Ed. 561 (1954). But accepting that the rule deters
some police misconduct, it is apparent as a matter of
logic that there is little if any deterrence when the rule
is invoked to suppress evidence obtained by a police
officer acting in the reasonable belief that his conduct
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. As we initially
observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.. at 447. 94
S.Ct.. at 2365, and reiterated in United States v. Peltier.
422 U.S.. at 539. 95 S.Ct.. at 2318:

FN 14. Our decisions applying the
exclusionary rule have referred to the
"imperative of judicial integrity," Elkins v.
United States. 364 U.S. 206. 222. 80 S.Ct.
1437.1446.4L.Ed.2d 1669(1960). although
recent opinions of the Court make clear that
the primary function of the exclusionary rule
is to deter violations of the Fourth
Amendment, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.. at
486.96 S.Ct., at 3048; United States v. Janis.
428 U.S. 433. 446. 96 S.Ct. 3021. 3028. 49
L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976); United States v.
Calandra. 414 U.S. 338. 348. 94 S.Ct. 613.
620.38L.Ed.2d561(1974). I do not dismiss
the idea that the integrity of the courts may be
compromised when illegally seized evidence
is admitted, but I am convinced that the force
of the argument depends entirely on the type
of search or seizure involved.
At one
extreme, there are lawless invasions of
personal privacy that shock the conscience
and the admission of evidence so obtained
must be suppressed as a matter of Due
Process, entirely aside from the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Rochin v. California.
342 U.S. 165. 72 S.Ct. 205. 96 L.Ed. 183
(1952).
Also deserving of exclusionary

treatment are searches and seizures
perpetrated in intentional and flagrant
disregard of Fourth Amendment principles.
But the question of exclusion must be viewed
through a different lens when a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs because the
police have reasonably erred in assessing the
facts, mistakenly conducted a search
authorized under a presumably valid statute,
or relied in good-faith upon a warrant not
supported by probable cause,
In these
circumstances, the integrity of the courts is
not implicated. The violation of the Fourth
Amendment is complete before the evidence
is admitted. Thus, "[t]he primary meaning of
'judicial integrity' in the context of evidentiary
rules is that the courts must not commit or
encourage violations of the Constitution."
United States v. Janis. suvra. 428 U.S.. at
458. n. 35. 96 S.Ct.. at 3034, n. 35. Cf.
United States v. Peltier. All U.S., at 537, 95
S.Ct., at 2317 ("The teaching of these
retroactivity cases is that if the law
enforcement officers reasonably believed in
good faith that evidence they had seized was
admissible at trial, the 'imperative of judicial
integrity' is not offended by the introduction
into evidence of that material even if
decisions subsequent to the search or seizure
have broadened the exclusionary rule to
encompass evidence seized in that manner.")
I am content that the interests in judicial
integrity run along with rather than counter to
the deterrence concept, and that to focus upon
the latter is to promote, not denigrate, the
former.
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in
willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which
has deprived the defendant of some right. By
refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular
investigating officers, or in their future counterparts,
a greater degree of care toward the: rights of an
accused. Where the official action was pursued in
complete good faith, however, the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force."
The Court in Peltier continued, 422 U.S., at 542, 95
S.Ct.. at 2320:
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
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unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from
a search should be suppressed only if it can be said
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or
may properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment."
See also United States v. Janis. 428 U.S., at 459. n. 35.
96 S.Ct.. at 3034. n. 35 ("[T]he officers here were
clearly acting in good faith ... a factor that the Court
has recognized reduces significantly the potential
deterrent effect of exclusion.") The deterrent value of
the exclusionary sanction is most effective when
officers engage in searches and seizures under
circumstances "so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois. 411 U.S. 590.
610-611. 95 S.Ct. 2254. 2265-2266. 45 L.Ed.2d 416
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring). On the *261 other
hand, when officers perform their tasks in the
good-faith belief that their action comported with
constitutional requirements, the deterrent function of
the exclusionary rule is so minimal, if not non-existent,
that the balance clearly favors the rule's modification.
rFN151

FN 15. It has been suggested that the
deterrence function of the exclusionary rule
has been understated by viewing the rule as
aimed at special deterrence, when, in fact, the
exclusionary rule is directed at "affecting the
wider audience of law enforcement officials
and society at large." W. LaFave, 1 Search
and Seizure 6 (1983 Supp.). See also W.
Mertens and S. Wasserstrom, "The Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the
Law," 70 Georgetown L.J. 365, 399-401
(1981). I agree that the exclusionary rule's
purpose is not only, or even primarily, to deter
the individual police officer involved in the
instant case. It appears that this objection
assumes that the proposed modification of the
exclusionary rule will turn only the subjective
"good-faith" of the officer. Grounding the
modification in objective reasonableness,
however, retains the value of the exclusionary
rule as an incentive for the law enforcement
profession as a whole to conduct themselves
in accord with the Fourth Amendment.
Dunawav v. New York 442 U.S. 200.221.99

S.Ct. 2248. 2261. 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)
(STEVENS, J., concurring).
Indeed, the present indiscriminate application
of the exclusionary rule may hinder the
educative and deterrent function of the
suppression remedy. "Instead of disciplining
their employees, police departments generally
have adopted the attitude that the courts
cannot be satisfied, that the rules are
hopelessly complicated and subject to change,
and that the suppression of evidence is the
court's problem and not the departments'." J.
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule,
26 Stan.L.Rev. 1027, 1050 (1974). If
evidence is suppressed only when a law
enforcement officer should have known that
he was violating the Fourth Amendment,
police departments may look more seriously at
the officer's misconduct when suppression is
invoked.
Moreover, by providing that
evidence gathered in good-faith reliance on a
reasonable rule will not be excluded, a
good-faith exception creates an incentive for
police departments to formulate rules
governing activities of officers in the search
and seizure area.
Many commentators,
including proponents of the exclusionary
sanction, recognize that the formulation of
such rules by police departments, and the
training necessary to implement these
guidelines in practice, is perhaps the most
effective means of protecting Fourth
Amendment rights.
See K. Davis,
Discretionary Justice (1971); McGowan,
Rule-Making and the Police, 70 Mich.L.Rev.
659 (1972); A. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349,
416-431(1974).

*262 **2345 B
There are several types of Fourth Amendment
violations that may be said to fall under the rubric of
"good faith." "There will be thoseoccasions where the
trial or appellate court will disagree on the issue of
probable cause, no matter how reasonable the grounds
for arrest appeared to the officer and though reasonable
men could easily differ on the question.
It also
happens that after the events at issue have occurred, the
law may change, dramatically or ever so slightly, but in
any event sufficiently to require the trial judge to hold
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that there was not probable cause to make the arrest and
to seize the evidence offered by the prosecution...."
Stone v. Powell 428 U.S., at 539- 540, 96 S.Ct.. at
3073-3074. (WHITE, J., dissenting). The argument
for a good-faith exception is strongest, however, when
law enforcement officers have reasonably relied on a
judicially-issued search warrant.
This Court has never set forth a rationale for applying
the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained
pursuant to a search warrant; it has simply done so
without considering whether Fourth Amendment
interests will be advanced. It is my view that they
generally will not be. When officers have dutifully
obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate,
and execute the warrant as directed by its terms,
exclusion of the evidence thus obtained cannot be
expected to deter future reliance on such warrants.
The warrant is prima- facie proof that the officers acted
reasonably in conducting the search or seizure; "once
the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law."
Stone v. Powell. 428 U.S.. at 498, 96 S.Ct.. at 3054
(BURGER, C.J., concurring). TFN161 As Justice
STEVENS *263 put it in writing for the Court in
United States v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 823, n. 32. 102
S.Ct. 2157. 2172. n. 32. 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982): "A
warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to
establish," that a law enforcement officer has "acted in
good faith in conducting the search." Nevertheless, the
warrant may be invalidated because of a technical
defect or because, as in this case, the judge issued a
warrant on information later determined to fall short of
probable cause. Excluding evidence for these reasons
can have no possible deterrent effect on future police
conduct, unless it is to make officers less willing to do
their duty. Indeed, applying the exclusionary rule to
warrant searches may well reduce incentives for police
to utilize the preferred warrant procedure when a
warrantless search may be permissible under one of the
established exceptions to the warrant requirement. See
ante, at 2331; Brown v. Illinois. All U.S., at 611. and
n. 3. 95 S.Ct.. at 2266. and n. 3 (POWELL, J.,
concurring);
P. Johnson, New Approaches to
Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 11 (Working Paper,
1978). See also United States v. United States District
Court. 407 U.S. 297. 316- 317. 92 S.Ct. 2125.
2136-2137, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972); United States v.
Ventresca. 380 U.S. 102, 106-107, 85 S.Ct. 741.
744-745. 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).

FN 16. The Attorney General's Task Force on
Violent Crime concluded that the situation in
which an officer relies on a duly authorized
warrant "is a particularly compelling example
of good faith.
A warranl: is a judicial
mandate to an officer to conduct a search or
make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn
duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly,
we believe that there should be a rule which
states that evidence obtained pursuant to and
within the scope of a warrant: is prima facie
the result of good faith on the part of the
officer seizing the evidence."
Final Report 55 (1981).

**2346 Opponents of the proposed "reasonable belief
exception suggest that such a modification would allow
magistrates and judges to flout the probable cause
requirements in issuing warrants. This is a novel
concept: the exclusionary rule was adopted to deter
unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of
magistrates and judges. Magistrates must be neutral
and detached from law enforcement operations and I
would not presume that a modification of the
exclusionary rule will lead magistrates to abdicate their
responsibility to apply the law. [FN 171 In any event, I
would apply the exclusionary *264 rule when it is
plainly evident that a magistrate or judge had no
business issuing a warrant. See, e.g., Azuilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964);
Nathanson v. United States. 290 U.S. 41. 54 S.Ct. 11,
78 L.Ed. 159 H933V
Similarly, the good-faith
exception would not apply if the material presented to
the magistrate or judge is false or misleading, Franks v.
Delaware. 438 U.S. 154. 98 S.Ct. 2674. 57 L.Ed.2d
667, or so clearly lacking in probable cause that no
well-trained officer could reasonably have thought that
a warrant should issue.

FN 17. Much is made of Shadwick v. City of
Tampa. 407 U.S. 345. 92 S.Ct. 2119. 32
L.Ed.2d 783 (1971). where we held that
magistrates need not be legally trained.
Shadwick's holding was quite narrow. First,
the Court insisted that "an issuing magistrate
must meet two tests. He must be neutral and
detached, and he must be capable of
determining whether probable cause exists for
the requested arrest or search." 407 U.S., at
345. 92 S.Ct., at 2119. Second, in Shadwick,
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the court clerk's authority extended only to the
relatively straightforward task of issuing
arrest warrants for breach of municipal
ordinances. To issue search warrants, an
individual must be capable of making the
probable cause judgments involved. In this
regard, I reject the Court's insinuation that it is
too much to expect that persons who issue
warrants remain abreast of judicial
refinements of probable cause. Ante, at 2330.
Finally, as indicated in text, I do not propose
that a warrant clearly lacking a basing in
probable cause can support a "good-faith"
defense to invocation of the exclusionary rule.

Another objection is that a reasonable belief exception
will encompass all searches and seizures on the frontier
of the Fourth Amendment, that such cases will escape
review on the question of whether the officer's action
was permissible, denying needed guidance from the
courts and freezing Fourth Amendment law in its
present state. These fears are unjustified.
The
premise of the argument is that a court must first decide
the reasonable belief issue before turning to the
question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred. I see no need for such an inflexible practice.
When a Fourth Amendment case presents a novel
question of law whose resolution is necessary to guide
future action by law enforcement officers and
magistrates, there is sufficient reason for the Court to
decide the violation issue before turning to the
good-faith question. Indeed, it may be difficult to
*265 determine whether the officers acted reasonably
until the Fourth Amendment issue is resolved. TFN181
**2347 In other circumstances, however, a suppression
motion poses no Fourth Amendment question of broad
import-the issue is simply whether the facts in a given
case amounted to probable cause-in these cases, it
would be prudent for a reviewing court to immediately
turn to the question of whether the officers acted in
good faith. Upon finding that they had, there would
generally be no need to consider the probable cause
question.
I doubt that our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence would suffer thereby. It is not entirely
clear to me that the law in this area has benefitted from
the constant pressure of fully-litigated suppression
motions. The result usually has been that initially
bright-line rules have disappeared in a sea of ever-finer
distinctions. Moreover, there is much to be said for
having Fourth Amendment jurisprudence *266 evolve
in part, albeit perhaps at a slower pace, in other

settings. fFN 191

FN18. Respondents and some amici contend
that this practice would be inconsistent with
the Article III requirement of an actual case or
controversy. I have no doubt that a defendant
who claims that he has been subjected to an
unlawful search or seizure and seeks
suppression of the evidentiary fruits thereof
raises a live controversy within the Article III
authority of federal courts to adjudicate. It is
fully appropriate for a court to decide whether
there has been a wrong before deciding what
remedy to impose.
When questions of
good-faith immunity have arisen under 42
U.S.C. $ 1983, we have not been constrained
to reach invariably the immunity question
before the violation issue.
Compare
O'Connor v. Donaldson. All U S . 563. 95
S.Ct. 2486. 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (finding
constitutional violation and remanding for
consideration of good-faith defense) with
Procnnier v. Navarette. 434 U.S. 555,566, n.
14, 98 S.Ct. 855. 862, n. 14. 55 L.Ed.2d 24
(1978) (finding good-faith defense first).
Similarly, we have exercised discretion in at
times deciding the merits of a claim even
though the error was harmless, while on other
occasions resolving the case solely by reliance
on the harmless error doctrine. Compare
Milton v, Wainwrizht. 407 U.S. 371. 372, 92
S.Ct. 2174, 2175. 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972)
(declining to decide whether admission of
confession was constitutional violation
because error, if any, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt), with Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1. 90 S.Ct. 1999. 26 L.Ed.2d 387
(1970) (upholding right to counsel at
preliminary hearing and remanding for
harmless error determination).

FN 19. For example, a pattern or practice of
official conduct that is alleged to violate
Fourth Amendment rights may be challenged
by an aggrieved individual in a suit for
declaratory or injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
lurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547. 98
S.Ct. 1970. 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). (Of
course, there are limits on the circumstances
in which such actions will lie. Rizzo v.
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Goode. 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598. 46
L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Los Angeles v. Lyons.
461 U.S. 95. 103 S.Ct. 1660. 75 L.Ed.2d 675
£]983}). Although a municipality is not
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of
respondeat superior, local governing bodies
are subject to suit for constitutional torts
resulting from implementation of local
ordinances, regulations, policies, or even
customary practices. Monellv. Department of
Social Services. 436 U.S. 658.98 S.Ct. 2018.
56L.Ed.2d611 (1978). Such entities enjoy
no immunity defense that might impede
resolution of the substantive constitutional
issue. Owen v. City of Independence. 445
U.S. 622. 100 S.Ct. 1398. 63 L.Ed.2d 673
(1980). In addition, certain state courts may
continue to suppress, as a matter of state law,
evidence in state trials for any Fourth
Amendment violation. These cases would
likely provide a sufficient supply of state
criminal cases in which to resolve unsettled
questions of Fourth Amendment law. As a
final alternative, I would entertain the
possibility of according the benefits of a new
Fourth Amendment rule to the party in whose
case the rule is first announced. See Stovall
v. Pernio. 388 U.S. 293. 301. 87 S.Ct. 1967.
1972. 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).

reasonableness, 1 would measure the reasonableness of
a particular search or seizure only by objective
standards.
Even for warrantless searches, the
requirement should be no more difficult to apply than
the closely related good-faith test which governs civil
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the burden
will likely be offset by the reduction in the number of
cases which will require elongated considerations of
the probable cause question, and will be greatly
outweighed by the advantages in limiting the bite of the
exclusionary rule to the field in which it is most likely
to have its intended effects.

Finally, it is contended that a good-faith exception will
be difficult to apply in practice. This concern appears
grounded in the assumption that courts would inquire
into the subjective belief of the law enforcement
officers involved. I would eschew such investigations.
"Sending state and federal courts into the minds of
police officers would produce a grave and fruitless
mis-allocation ofjudicial resources." Massachusetts v.
Painten. 389 U.S. 560. 565. 88 S.Ct. 660. 663. 19
L.Ed.2d 770 (1968) (WHITE, J., dissenting).
Moreover, "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does not make
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."
Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128.98 S.Ct. 1717. 56
L.Ed.2d 168(1978). Just last Term, we modified the
qualified immunity public officials enjoy in suits
seeking damages against federal officials for alleged
deprivations of constitutional rights, eliminating the
subjective component of the standard. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800. 102 S.Ct. 2727. 73 L.Ed.2d
396 (1982). Although *267 searches pursuant to a
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into

For present purposes, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules can be
summed up as follows. First, an affidavit based on an
informer's tip, standing alone, cannot provide probable
cause for issuance of a warrant unless the tip includes
information that apprises the magistrate of the
informant's basis for concluding that the contraband is
where he claims it is (the "basis of know ledge" prong),
and the affiant informs the magistrate of his basis for
believing that the informant is credible (the "veracity"
prong). Azuilar. supra. 378 U.S.. at 114. 84 S.Ct.. at
1514; *268SpinellL supra. 393 U.S.. at412-413.416.
89 S.Ct.. at 586-587.589. IFN201 Second, if a tip fails
under either or both of the two prongs, probable cause
may yet be established by independent police
investigatory work that corroborates the tip to such an
extent that it supports "both the inference that the
informer was generally trustworthy and that he made
his charge on the basis of information obtained in a
reliable way." Spinelli. supra, at 417. 89 S.Ct.. at 589.
In instances where the officers rely on corroboration,
the ultimate question is whether the corroborated tip "is

Ill
Since a majority of the Court deems it inappropriate to
address the good faith issue, I briefly address the
question that the Court does reach-whether the warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of respondents' car
and home was constitutionally **2348 valid.
Abandoning the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 12 L.Ed.2d 723
(1964). and Spinelliv. United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89
S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). the Court upholds
the validity of the warrant under a new "totality of the
circumstances" approach. Although I agree that the
warrant should be upheld, I reach this conclusion in
accordance with the Aguilar-Spinelli framework.
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as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar 's tests
without independent corroboration." Id. at 415. 89
S.Ct. at 588.

FN20. The "veracity" prong is satisfied by a
recitation in the affidavit that the informant
previously supplied accurate information to
the police, see McCrav v. Illinois. 386 U.S.
300. 303-304. 87 S.Ct. 1056. 1058-1059. 18
L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), or by proof that the
informant gave his information against his
penal interest, see United States v. Harris.
403 U.S. 573. 583-584. 91 S.Ct. 2075.
2082-2083. 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (plurality
opinion). The "basis of knowledge" prong is
satisfied by a statement from the informant
that he personally observed the criminal
activity, or, if he came by the information
indirectly, by a satisfactory explanation of
why his sources were reliable, or, in the
absence of a statement detailing the manner in
which the information was gathered, by a
description of the accused's criminal activity
in sufficient detail that the magistrate may
infer that the informant is relying on
something more substantial than casual rumor
or an individual's general reputation. Spinelli
v. United States. 393 U.S. 410.416. 89 S.Ct.
584. 589. 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the anonymous
tip, by itself, did not furnish probable cause. The
question is whether those portions of the affidavit
describing the results of the police investigation of the
respondents, when considered in light of the tip,
"would permit the suspicions engendered by the
informant's report to ripen into a judgment that a crime
was probably being committed." Spinelli. supra, at
418. 89 S.Ct.. at 590. The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the corroboration was insufficient to
permit such a ripening. App. 9a. The court reasoned
as follows:
"[T]he nature of the corroborating evidence in this
case would satisfy neither the "basis of knowledge"
nor the *269 "veracity" prong of Aguilar. Looking
to the affidavit submitted as support for Detective
Mader's request that a search warrant issue, we note
that the corroborative evidence here was only of
innocent activity. Mader's independent investigation
revealed only that Lance and Sue Gates lived on

Greenway Drive; that Lance Gates booked passage
on a flight to Florida; that upon arriving he entered
a room registered to his wife; and that he and his
wife left the hotel together by car.
The
corroboration of innocent activity is insufficient to
support a finding of probable cause." App. 12a.
In my view, the lower court's characterization of the
Gates' activity here as totally "innocent" is dubious. In
fact, the behavior was quite suspicious. I agree with the
**2349 Court, ante, at 2333, that Lance Gates' flight to
Palm Beach, an area known to be a source of narcotics,
the brief overnight stay in a motel, and apparent
immediate return North, suggest a pattern that trained
law-enforcement officers have recognized as indicative
of illicit drug-dealing activity. [FN211

FN21. See ante, at 2333; United States v.
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544. 562. 100 S.Ct.
1870. 1881. 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)
(POWELL, J., concurring).

Even, however, had the corroboration related only to
completely innocuous activities, this fact alone would
not preclude the issuance of a valid warrant. The
critical issue is not whether the activities observed by
the police are innocent or suspicious. Instead, the
proper focus should be on whether the actions of the
suspects, whatever their nature, give rise to an
inference that the informant is credible and that he
obtained his information in a reliable manner.
Thus, in Draper v. United States. 358 U.S. 307. 79
S.Ct. 329. 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). an informant stated
on Sept. 7 that Draper would be carrying narcotics
when he arrived by train in Denver on the morning of
Sept. 8 or Sept. 9. The informant also provided the
police with a detailed physical description *270 of the
clothes Draper would be wearing when he alighted
from the train. The police observed Draper leaving a
train on the morning of Sept. 9, and he was wearing the
precise clothing described by the informant. The Court
held that the police had probable cause to arrest Draper
at this point, even though the police had seen nothing
more than the totally innocent act of a man getting off
a train carrying a briefcase. As we later explained in
Spinelli, the important point was that the corroboration
showed both that the informant was credible,i.e. that he
"had not been fabricating his report out of whole
cloth," Spinelli. supra. 393 U.S.. at 417. 89 S.Ct.. at
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589, and that he had an adequate basis of knowledge
for his allegations, "since the report was of the sort
which in common experience may be recognized as
having been obtained in a reliable way." Id, at
417-418, 89 S.Ct., at 589-590. The fact that the
informer was able to predict, two days in advance, the
exact clothing Draper would be wearing dispelled the
possibility that his tip was just based on rumor or "an
off-hand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." Id, at
417, 89 S.Ct., at 589. Probably Draper had planned in
advance to wear these specific clothes so that an
accomplice could identify him. A clear inference
could therefore be drawn that the informant was either
involved in the criminal scheme himself or that he
otherwise had access to reliable, inside information.
TFN221

FN22. Thus, as interpreted in Spinelli, the
Court in Draper held that there was probable
cause because "the kind of information related
by the informant [was] not generally sent
ahead of a person's arrival in a city except to
those who are intimately connected with
making careful arrangements for meeting
him." Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S., at 426, 89
S.Ct., at 594 (WHITE, J., concurring). As I
said in Spinelli, the conclusion that Draper
itself was based on this fact is far from
inescapable. Prior to Spinelli, Draper was
susceptible to the interpretation that it stood
for the proposition that "the existence of the
tenth and critical fact is made sufficiently
probable to justify the issuance of a warrant
by verifying nine other facts coming from the
same source." Spinelli, supra, at 426-427, 89
S.Ct., at 594-595 (WHITE, J., concurring).
But it now seems clear that the Court in
Spinelli rejected this reading of Draper.
Justice BRENNAN, post, at 2354-2355,
erroneously interprets my
Spinelli
concurrence as espousing the view that
"corroboration of certain details in a tip may
be sufficient to satisfy the veracity, but not the
basis of knowledge, prong of Aguilar."
Others have made the same mistake. See, e.g.,
Comment, 20 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 99, 105
(1982). I did not say that corroboration could
never satisfy the basis of knowledge prong.
My concern was, and still is, that the prong
might be deemed satisfied on the basis of
corroboration of information that does not in

any way suggest that the informant had an
adequate basis of knowledge for his report.
If, however, as in Draper, the police
corroborate information from which it can be
inferred that the informant's tip was grounded
on inside information, this corroboration is
sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge
prong. Spinelli, supra, at 426, 89 S.Ct., at
594 (WHITE, J., concurring). The rules
would indeed be strange if, as Justice
BRENNAN suggests, post, at 2356, the basis
of knowledge prong could be satisfied by
detail in the tip alone, but not by independent
police work.

*271 **2350 As in Draper, the police investigation in
the present case satisfactorily demonstrated that the
informant's tip was as trustworthy as one that would
alone satisfy the Aguilar tests. The tip predicted that
Sue Gates would drive to Florida, that Lance Gates
would fly there a few days after May 3, and that Lance
would then drive the car back.
After the police
corroborated these facts, [FN231 the magistrate could
reasonably have inferred, as he apparently did, that the
informant, who had specific knowledge of these
unusual travel plans, did not make up his story and that
he obtained his information in a reliable way. It is
theoretically possible, as respondents insist, that the tip
could have been supplied by a "vindictive travel agent"
and that the Gates' activities, although unusual, might
not have been unlawful. [PN24] But Aguilar and
Spinelli, like our other cases, do not require that certain
guilt be established before a warrant may properly be
issued. "[Ojnly the probability, and not a prima facie
showing, *272 of criminal activity is the standard of
probable cause." Spinelli, supra, at 419, 89 S.Ct., at
590 (citing Beck v. Ohio. 379 U.S. 89,96,85 S.Ct. 223,
228,13 L.Ed.2d 142(1964)). I therefore conclude that
the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court invalidating
the warrant must be reversed.

FN23. Justice STEVENS is correct, post, at
2360, that one of the informant's predictions
proved to be inaccurate. However, I agree
with the Court, ante, at 2335, n. 14, that an
informant need not be infallible.

FN24. It is also true, as Justice STEVENS
points owl,post, at 2360, n. 3, that the fact that
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respondents were last seen leaving West Palm
Beach on a northbound interstate highway is
far from conclusive proof that they were
heading directly to Bloomington.

B
The Court agrees that the warrant was valid, but, in the
process of reaching this conclusion, it overrules the
Aguilar-Spinelli tests and replaces them with a "totality
of the circumstances" standard. As shown above, it is
not at all necessary to overrule Aguilar-Spinelli in order
to reverse the judgment below. Therefore, because I
am inclined to believe that, when applied properly, the
Aguilar-Spinelli rules play an appropriate role in
probable cause determinations, and because the Court's
holding may foretell an evisceration of the probable
cause standard, I do not join the Court's holding.
The Court reasons, ante, at 2329, that the "veracity"
and "basis of knowledge" tests are not independent,
and that a deficiency as to one can be compensated for
by a strong showing as to the other. Thus, a finding of
probable cause may be based on a tip from an
informant "known for the unusual reliability of his
predictions" or from "an unquestionably honest
citizen," even if the report fails thoroughly to set forth
the basis upon which the information was obtained.
Ibid. If this is so, then it must follow a fortiori that
"the affidavit of an officer, known by the magistrate to
be honest and experienced, stating that [contraband] is
located in a certain building" must be acceptable.
SDinelli. 393 U.S.. at 424,89 S.Ct.. at 593 (WHITE, J.,
concurring).
It would be "quixotic" if a similar
statement from an honest informant, but not one from
an honest officer, could furnish probable cause. Ibid.
But we have repeatedly held that the unsupported
assertion or belief of an officer does not satisfy the
probable cause requirement. See, e.g., Whitelev v.
Warden. 401 U.S. 560. 564-565. 91 S.Ct. 1031.
1034-1035. 28 L.Ed.2d 306: *273 Jones v. United
States. 362 U.S. 257.269.80 S.Ct. 725.735.4 L.Ed.2d
697(1960); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41.
54 S.Ct. 11. 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). fFN251 Thus, this
portion of today's holding can be read as implicitly
rejecting the teachings of these prior holdings.

FN25. I have already indicated my view,
supra, at 2329-2330, that such a "bare-bones"
affidavit could not be the basis for a

good-faith issuance of a warrant.

**2351 The Court may not intend so drastic a result.
Indeed, the Court expressly reaffirms, ante, at 2332,
the validity of cases such as Nathanson that have held
that, no matter how reliable the affiant-officer may be,
a warrant should not be issued unless the affidavit
discloses supporting facts and circumstances. The
Court limits these cases to situations involving
affidavits containing only "bare conclusions" and holds
that, if an affidavit contains anything more, it should be
left to the issuing magistrate to decide, based solely on
"practicality]" and "common-sense," whether there is
a fair probability that contraband will be found in a
particular place. Ibid.
Thus, as I read the majority opinion, it appears that the
question whether the probable cause standard is to be
diluted is left to the common-sense judgments of
issuing magistrates. I am reluctant to approve any
standard that does not expressly require, as a
prerequisite to issuance of a warrant, some showing of
facts from which an inference may be drawn that the
informant is credible and that his information was
obtained in a reliable way. The Court is correctly
concerned with the fact that some lower courts have
been applying Aguilar- Spinelli in an unduly rigid
manner. [FN261 I believe, however, that with
clarification of the rule of corroborating *274
information, the lower courts are fully able to properly
interpret Aguilar-Spinelli and avoid such unduly-rigid
applications. I may be wrong; it ultimately may prove
to be the case that the only profitable instruction we
can provide to magistrates is to rely on common sense.
But the question whether a particular anonymous tip
provides the basis for issuance of a warrant will often
be a difficult one, and I would at least attempt to
provide more precise guidance by clarifying
Aguilar-Spinelli and the relationship of those cases
with Draper before totally abdicating our responsibility
in this area. Hence, I do not join the Court's opinion
rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli rules.

FN26. Bridzer v. State. 503 S.W.2d 801
(Tex.Cr.App.1974). and People v. Palanza,
55 Ill.Anp.3d 1028. 13 Ill.Dec. 752. 371
N.E.2d 687 (111.ADD. 1978V which the Court
describes ante, at 2330, n. 9, appear to me to
be excellent examples of overly-technical
applications of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard.
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The holdings in these cases could easily be
disapproved without reliance on a "totality of
the circumstances" analysis.

Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL
joins, dissenting.
Although I join Justice STEVENS' dissenting opinion
and agree with him that the warrant is invalid even
under the Court's newly announced "totality of the
circumstances" test, see post, at 2361-2362, and n. 8,1
write separately to dissent from the Court's unjustified
and ill-advised rejection of the two-prong test for
evaluating the validity of a warrant based on hearsay
announced in Aeuilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct.
1509.12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and refined in Spinelliv.
United States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d
637(1969).
I
The Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
as reflected by today's unfortunate decision, patently
disregards Justice Jackson's admonition in Brinegar v.
United States. 338 U.S. 160. 69 S.Ct. 1302. 93 L.Ed.
1879(1949):
"[Fourth Amendment rights] ... are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of
indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of
rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror
in every heart.
*275 Uncontrolled search and
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons
in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.... "But
the right to be secure against searches and seizures is
one of the most difficult to protect.
Since the
officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no
enforcement outside of court." Id. at 180-181. 69
S.Ct.. at 1313 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
**2352 In recognition of the judiciary's role as the
only effective guardian of Fourth Amendment rights,
this Court has developed over the last half century a set
of coherent rules governing a magistrate's consideration
of a warrant application and the showings that are
necessary to support a finding of probable cause. We
start with the proposition that a neutral and detached
magistrate, and not the police, should determine
whether there is probable cause to support the issuance
of a warrant. In Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S.

10.68 S.Ct. 367.92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). the Court stated:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime....
When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent." Id^ at 13-14. 68 S.Ct.. at
368-369 (footnote omitted).
See also Whitelev v. Warden. 401 U.S. 560. 564. 91
S.Ct. 1031. 1034. 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971V. Svinelli v.
United States, supra, 393 U.S.. at 415.89 S.Ct., at 588;
United States v. Ventresca. 380 U.S. 102.109. 85 S.Ct.
741. 746. 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965): Asniilar v. Texas,
supra. 378 U.S.. at 111, 84 S.Ct.. at 1512: *276Jones
v. United States. 362 U.S. 257.270-271. 80 S.Ct. 725,
736-737,4L.Ed.2d697 (1960): Giordenellov. United
States. 357 U.S. 480. 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 1250. 2
L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); United States v. Lefkowitz. 285
U.S. 452,464. 52 S.Ct. 420.423. 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932).
In order to emphasize the magistrate's role as an
independent arbiter of probable cause and to insure that
searches or seizures are not effected on less than
probable cause, the Court has insisted that police
officers provide magistrates with the underlying facts
and circumstances that support the officers'
conclusions. In Nathamon v. United States. 290 U.S.
41. 54 S.Ct. 11. 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). the Court held
invalid a search warrant that was based on a customs
agent's "mere affirmation of suspicion and belief
without any statement of adequate supporting facts."
Id. at 46,54 S.Ct., at 12. The Court stated that "[u]nder
the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly
issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he
can find probable cause therefor from facts or
circumstances presented to him under oath or
affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is
not enough." Id. at 47, 54 S.Ct., at 13.
In Giordenello v. United States, supra, the Court
reviewed an arrest warrant issued under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure based on a complaint
sworn to by a Federal Bureau of Narcotics agent. Id..
357 U.S., at 481. 78 S.Ct.. at 1247. fFNll Based on
the agent's testimony at the suppression hearing, the
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Court noted that "until the warrant was issued ... [the
agent's] suspicions of petitioner's guilt derived entirely
from information given him by law enforcement
officers and other persons in Houston, none of whom
either appeared before the Commissioner or submitted
affidavits." Id. at 485, 78 S.Ct., at 1249. The Court
found it unnecessary to decide whether a warrant could
be based solely on hearsay information, for the
complaint was "defective in not providing a sufficient
basis upon which a *277 finding of probable cause
could be made." Ibid. In particular, the **2353
complaint contained no affirmative allegation that the
agent spoke with personal knowledge nor did it indicate
any sources for the agent's conclusion. Id, at 486, 78
S.Ct., at 1250. The Court expressly rejected the
argument that these deficiencies could be cured by "the
Commissioner's reliance upon a presumption that the
complaint was made on the personal knowledge of the
complaining officer." Ibid.

FN1. Although the warrant was issued under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Court stated that "[t]he provisions of these
Rules must be read in light of the
constitutional requirements they implement."
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480.
485. 78 S.Ct. 1245. 1249. 2 L.Ed.2d 1503
0958V SQeAznilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108.
112. n. 3. 84 S.Ct. 1509. 1512, n. 3. 12
L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) ("The principles
announced in Giordenello derived... from the
Fourth Amendment, and not from our
supervisory power").

As noted, the Court did not decide the hearsay
question lurking in Giordenello. The use of hearsay
to support the issuance of a warrant presents special
problems because informants, unlike police officers,
are not regarded as presumptively reliable or honest.
Moreover, the basis for an informant's conclusions is
not always clear from an affidavit that merely reports
those conclusions. If the conclusory allegations of a
police officer are insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause, surely the conclusory allegations of an
informant should a fortiori be insufficient.
In Jones v. United States, supra, the Court considered
"whether an affidavit which sets out personal
observations relating to the existence of cause to search
is to be deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact that it

sets out not the affiant's observations but those of
another." 362 U.S.. at 269. 80 S.Ct., at 735. The
Court held that hearsay information can support the
issuance of a warrant "so long as a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay is presented." Ibid. The Court
found that there was a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay involved in Jones. The informant's report was
based on the informant's personal knowledge, and the
informant previously had provided accurate
information. Moreover, the informant's story was
corroborated by other sources. Finally, the defendant
was known to the police to be a narcotics user. Id, at
271, 80 S.Ct.. at 736.
Azuilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108. 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12
L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), merely made explicit what was
implicit in Jones. In considering a search warrant
based on hearsay, the Court reviewed Nathanson *278
and Giordenello and noted the requirement established
by those cases that an officer provide the magistrate
with the underlying facts or circumstances that support
the officer's conclusion that there is probable cause to
justify the issuance of a warrant. The Court stated:
"The vice in the present affidavit is at least as great
as in Nathanson and Giordenello. Here, the 'mere
conclusion' that petitioner possessed narcotics was
not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an
unidentified informant. The affidavit here not only
'contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant
spoke with personal knowledge of the matters
contained therein,' it does not even contain an
'affirmative allegation' that the affiant's unidentified
source 'spoke with personal knowledge.' For all that
appears, the source here merely suspected, believed
or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner's
possession. The magistrate here certainly could not
'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts
relied on... to show probable cause.' He necessarily
accepted 'without question' the informant's
'suspicion,' 'belief or 'mere conclusion.'" Id. at 113114, 84 S.Ct., at 1513-1514 (footnote omitted).
TFN21

FN2. The Court noted that approval of the
affidavit before it "would open the door to
easy circumvention of the rule announced in
Nathanson and Giordenello." Aguilar v.
Texas, supra, at 114, n. 4,84 S.Ct., at 1514, n.
4. The Court stated:
"A police officer who arrived at the
'suspicion,' 'belief or 'mere conclusion' that
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narcotics were in someone's possession could
not obtain a warrant. But he could convey
this conclusion to another police officer, who
could then secure the warrant by swearing that
he had 'received reliable information from a
credible person' that the narcotics were in
someone's possession." Ibid.

While recognizing that a warrant may be based on
hearsay, the Court established the following standard:
"[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded *279 that **2354 the narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the
underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant, whose identity need
not be disclosed ... was 'credible' or his information
'reliable.' Otherwise, 'the inferences from the facts
which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a
neutral and detached magistrate,' as the Constitution
requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime' ... or, as in this case, by an unidentified
informant." Id. at 114-115. 84 S.Ct. at 1513-1514
(footnote omitted).
The Aguilar standard was refined in Spinelliv. United
States. 393 U.S. 410. 89 S.Ct. 584. 21 L.Ed.2d 637
(1969).
In Spinelli, the Court reviewed a search
warrant based on an affidavit that was "more ample,"
id., at 413, than the one in Aguilar. The affidavit in
Spinelli contained not only a tip from an informant, but
also a report of an independent police investigation that
allegedly corroborated the informant's tip. Ibid. Under
these circumstances, the Court stated that it was
"required to delineate the manner in which Aguilar 's
two-pronged test should be applied...." Ibid.
The Court held that the Aguilar test should be applied
to the tip, and approved two additional ways of
satisfying that test. First, the Court suggested that if
the tip contained sufficient detail describing the
accused's criminal activity it might satisfy Aguilar 's
basis of knowledge prong. Id. at416,89S.Ct.,at589.
Such detail might assure the magistrate that he is
"relying on something more substantial than a casual
rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation
based merely on an individual's general reputation."
Ibid. Although the tip in the case before it did not meet
this standard, "[t]he detail provided by the informant in
Draper v. United States. 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329.3

L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), provide[d] a suitable benchmark,"
ibid, because "[a] magistrate, when confronted with
such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant
*280 had gained his information in a reliable way." Id,
at 417, 89 S.Ct.. at 589 (footnote omitted). TFN31

FN3. There is some tension between Draper
v. United States. 358 U.S. 307. 79 S.Ct. 329.
3 L.Ed.2d 327 (\9S9\ and Aguilar.
In
Draper, the Court considered the validity of a
warrantless arrest based on an informant's tip
and police corroboration of certain details of
the tip. The informant, who in the past had
always given accurate and reliable
information, told the police that Draper was
peddling narcotics. The informant later told
the police that Draper had left for Chicago by
train to pick up some heroin and would return
by train on the morning of one of two days.
The informant gave the police a detailed
physical description of Draper and of the
clothing he was wearing. The i tiformant also
said that Draper would be carrying a tan
zipper bag and that he walked very fast. 358
U.S.. at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at 331.
On the second morning specified by the
informant, the police saw a man "having the
exact physical attributes and wearing the
precise clothing described by [the informant],
alight from an incoming Chicago train and
start walking 'fast* toward the exit." Id, at
309-310. 79 S.Ct.. at 331. The man was
carrying a tan zipper bag. The police arrested
him and searched him incident to the arrest.
Ibid.
The Court found that the arrest had been
based on probable cause. Having verified
every detail of the tip "except whether
[Draper] had accomplished his mission and
had the three ounces of heroin on his person
or in his bag," id. at 313. 79 S.Ct.. at 333, the
police "had 'reasonable grounds' to believe
that the remaining unverified bit of [the
informant's] information ... was likewise
true." Ibid.
There is no doubt that the tip satisfied
Aguilar's veracity prong. The informant had
given accurate information in the past.
Moreover, under Spinelli, the police
corroborated most of the details of the
informant's tip. See Spinelli v. United States.
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393 U.S.. at 417. 89 S.Ct.. at 589: id. at
426-427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594-595 (WHITE, J.,
concurring); infra, at 2354, and n. 4. There is
some question, however, about whether the
tip satisfied Aguilar fs basis of knowledge
prong. The fact that an informant is right
about most things may suggest that he is
credible, but it does not establish that he has
acquired his information in a reliable way.
See Spinelli v. United States, supra, at
426-427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594-595 (WHITE, J.,
concurring). Spinelli's "self-verifying detail"
element resolves this tension.
As one
commentator has suggested, "under Spinelli,
the Draper decision is sound as applied to its
facts." Note, The Informer's Tip As Probable
Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 Cornell L.Rev.
958, 964, n. 34 (1969).

**2355 Second, the Court stated that police
corroboration of the details of a tip could provide a
basis for satisfying Aguilar. Id, at 417, 89 S.Ct.. at
589. *281 The Court's opinion is not a model of
clarity on this issue since it appears to suggest that
corroboration can satisfy both the basis of knowledge
and veracity prongs of Aguilar. Id., at 417-418. 89
S.Ct, at 589-590. TFN41 Justice WHITE'S concurring
opinion, however, points the way to a proper reading of
the Court's opinion.
After reviewing the Court's
decision in Draper v. United States, supra, Justice
WHITE concluded that "[t]he thrust of Draper is not
that the verified facts have independent significance
with respect to proof of [another unverified fact]." Id.
at 427. 89 S.Ct.. at 594. In his view, "[t]he argument
instead relates to the reliability of the source: because
an informant is right about some things, he is more
probably right about other facts, usually the critical,
unverified facts." Ibid. Justice WHITE then pointed
out that prior cases had rejected "the notion that the
past *282 reliability of an officer is sufficient reason
for believing his current assertions." Ibid. Justice
WHITE went on to state:

FN4. The Court stated that the FBI's
independent investigative efforts could not
"support both the inference that the informer
was generally trustworthy and that he had
made his charge against Spinelli on the basis
of information obtained in a reliable way."
Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 417. 89

S.Ct.. at 589. The Court suggested that
Draper again provided "a relevant
comparison." Ibid. Once the police had
corroborated most of the details of the tip in
Draper "[i]t was ... apparent that the
informant had not been fabricating his report
out of whole cloth; since the report was of
the sort which in common experience may be
recognized as having been obtained in a
reliable way, it was perfectly clear that
probable cause had been established." Id., at
417-418. 89 S.Ct.. at 589-590.
It is the Court's citation of Draper which
creates most of the confusion.
The
informant's credibility was not at issue in
Draper irrespective of the corroboration of
the details of his tip. See n. 3, supra. The
Court's opinion, therefore, might be read as
suggesting that corroboration also could
satisfy Aguilar's basis of knowledge test. I
think it is more likely^ however, especially in
view of the discussion infra, at 2356, that the
Court simply was discussing an alternative
means of satisfying Aguilar's veracity prong,
using the facts of Draper as an example, and
relying on its earlier determination that the
detail of the tip in Draper was self-verifying.
See 393 U.S.. at 416-417. 89 S.Ct.. at
589-590. It is noteworthy that although the
affiant in Spinelli had sworn that the informer
was reliable, "he [had] offered the magistrate
no reason in support of this conclusion." Id.
at 416. 89 S.Ct.. at 589. Aguilar 's veracity
prong, therefore, was not satisfied. Ibid.
"Nor would it suffice, I suppose, if a reliable
informant states there is gambling equipment in
Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe in
detail Apartment 201, a description which is verified
before applying for the warrant. He was right about
201, but that hardly makes him more believable
about the equipment in 607. But what if he states
that there are narcotics locked in a safe in Apartment
300, which is described in detail, and the apartment
manager verifies everything but the contents of the
safe? I doubt that the report about the narcotics is
made appreciably more believable by the
verification. The informant could still have gotten
his information concerning the safe from others
about whom nothing is known or could have inferred
the presence of narcotics from circumstances which
a magistrate would find unacceptable." Id. at 427.
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89 S.Ct.. at 594.
I find this reasoning persuasive. Properly understood,
therefore, Spinelli stands for the proposition that
corroboration of certain details in a tip may be
sufficient to satisfy the veracity, but not the basis of
knowledge, prong of Aguilar. As noted, Spinelli also
suggests that in some limited circumstances
considerable detail in an informant's tip may be
adequate to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of
Aguilar. [FN51

FN5. After concluding that the tip was not
sufficient to support a finding of probable
cause, the Court stated:
"This is not to say that the tip was so
insubstantial that it could not properly have
counted in the magistrate's determination.
Rather, it needed some further support.
When we look to the other parts of the
application, however, we find nothing alleged
which would permit the suspicions
engendered by the informant's report to ripen
into a judgment that a crime was probably
being committed." Spinelli v. United States.
393 U.S.. at 418. 89 S.Ct.. at 590.
The Court went on to suggest that
corroboration of incriminating facts would be
needed. See ibid.

*283 **2356 Although the rules drawn from the cases
discussed above are cast in procedural terms, they
advance an important underlying substantive value:
Findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions,
should not be authorized unless there is some assurance
that the information on which they are based has been
obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible
person. As applied to police officers, the rules focus on
the way in which the information was acquired. As
applied to informants, the rules focus both on the
honesty or credibility of the informant and on the
reliability of the way in which the information was
acquired.
Insofar as it is more complicated, an
evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay involves a
more difficult inquiry. This suggests a need to structure
the inquiry in an effort to insure greater accuracy. The
standards announced in Aguilar, as refined by Spinelli,
fulfill that need. The standards inform the police of
what information they have to provide and magistrates
of what information they should demand.
The

standards also inform magistrates of the subsidiary
findings they must make in order to arrive at an
ultimate finding of probable cause. Spinelli, properly
understood, directs the magistrate's attention to the
possibility that the presence of self-verifying detail
might satisfy Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong and
that corroboration of the details of a tip might satisfy
Aguilar 's veracity prong. By requiring police to
provide certain crucial information to magistrates and
by structuring magistrates' probable cause inquiries,
Aguilar and Spinelli assure the magistrate's role as an
independent arbiter of probable cause, insure greater
accuracy in probable cause determinations, and
advance the substantive value identified above.
Until today the Court has never squarely addressed the
application of the Aguilar and Spinelli standards to tips
from anonymous informants.
Both Aguilar and
Spinelli dealt with tips from informants known at least
to the police. See also, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143. 146. 92 S.Ct. 1921. 1923. 32 L.Ed.2d 612
(1972): United States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573.575.91
S.Ct. 2075. 2078. 29 L.Ed.2d 723 0 9 7 0 ; Whitelev v.
Warden. 401 U.S. 560. 565. 91 S.Ct. 1031. 1035. 28
L.Ed.2d 306 f 1971V. *2S4McCravv. Illinois. 386 U.S.
300. 302. 87 S.Ct. 1056. 1057. 18 L.Ed 2d 62 (1967V
Jones v. United States. 362 U.S. 257.268-269.80 S.Ct.
725. 735. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960V And surely there is
even more reason to subject anonymous informants'
tips to the tests established by Aguilar and Spinelli.
By definition nothing is known about an anonymous
informant's identity, honesty, or reliability.
One
commentator has suggested that anonymous informants
should be treated as presumptively unreliable. See
Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and
Probable Cause: Reconciling The Spinelli/Draper
Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 99,
107(1982). See also Adams v. Williams, supra. 407
U.S.. at 146. 92 S.Ct.. at 1923 (suggesting that an
anonymous telephone tip provides a weaker case for a
Terry stop than a tip from an informant known to the
police who had provided information in the past);
United States v. Harris, supra. 403 U.S.. at 599. 91
S.Ct.. at 2089 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("We cannot
assume that the ordinary law-abiding citizen has
qualms about [appearing before a magistrate]"). In any
event, there certainly is no basis for treating anonymous
informants as presumptively reliable. Nor is there any
basis for assuming that the information provided by an
anonymous informant has been obtained in a reliable
way.
If we are unwilling to accept conclusory
allegations from the police, who are presumptively
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reliable, or from informants who are known, at **2357
least to the police, there cannot possibly be any rational
basis for accepting conclusory allegations from
anonymous informants.
To suggest that anonymous informants' tips are subject
to the tests established by Aguilar and Spinelli is not to
suggest that they can never provide a basis for a finding
of probable cause.
It is conceivable that police
corroboration of the details of the tip might establish
the reliability of the informant under Aguilar's veracity
prong, as refined in Spinelli, and that the details in the
tip might be sufficient to qualify under the "selfverifying detail" test established by Spinelli as a means
of satisfying Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong. The
Aguilar and Spinelli tests must be applied to
anonymous informants' tips, however, if we are to
continue to insure *285 that findings of probable cause,
and attendant intrusions, are based on information
provided by an honest or credible person who has
acquired the information in a reliable way. [FN61

FN6. As noted, supra, at 2353-2356, Aguilar
and Spinelli inform the police of what
information they have to provide and
magistrates of what information they should
demand.
This advances the important
process value, which is intimately related to
substantive Fourth Amendment concerns, of
having magistrates, rather than police, or
informants, determine whether there is
probable cause to support the issuance of a
warrant.
We want the police to provide
magistrates with the information on which
they base their conclusions so that magistrates
can perform their important function. When
the police rely on facts about which they have
personal knowledge, requiring them to
disclose those facts to magistrates imposes no
significant burden on the police. When the
police rely on information obtained from
confidential informants, requiring the police
to disclose the facts on which the informants
based their conclusions imposes a more
substantial burden on the police, but it is one
that they can meet because they presumably
have access to their confidential informants.
In cases in which the police rely on
information obtained from an anonymous
informant, the police, by hypothesis, cannot
obtain further information from the informant

regarding the facts and circumstances on
which the informant based his conclusion.
When the police seek a warrant based solely
on an anonymous informants' tip, therefore,
they are providing the magistrate with all the
information on which they have based their
conclusion. In this respect, the command of
Aguilar and Spinelli has been met and the
process value identified above has been
served. But Aguilar and Spinelli advance
other values which argue for their application
even to anonymous informants' tips. They
structure the magistrate's probable cause
inquiry and, more importantly, they guard
against findings of probable cause, and
attendant intrusions, based on anything other
than information which magistrates
reasonably can conclude has been obtained in
a reliable way by an honest or credible person.

In light of the important purposes served by Aguilar
and Spinelli, I would not reject the standards they
establish. If anything, I simply would make more clear
that Spinelli, properly understood, does not depart in
any fundamental way from the test established by
Aguilar. For reasons I shall next state, I do not find
persuasive the Court's justifications for rejecting the
test established by Aguilar and refined by Spinelli.
*286 II
In rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli standards, the Court
suggests that a "totality of the circumstances approach
is far more consistent with our prior treatment of
probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific
'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip." Ante, at
2328 (footnote omitted). In support of this proposition
the Court relies on several cases that purportedly reflect
this approach, ante, at 2328, n. 6, n. 7, and on the
"practical, nontechnical," ante, at 2329, nature of
probable cause.
Only one of the cases cited by the Court in support of
its "totality of the circumstances" approach, Jaben v.
UnitedStates. 381 U.S. 214.85 S.Ct. 1365,14L.Ed.2d
345 (1965V was decided subsequent to Aguilar. It is
by no means inconsistent with Aguilar. JFN]} The
other three cases TFN81 cited by the **2358 Court as
supporting its *287 totality of the circumstances
approach were decided before Aguilar. In any event,
it is apparent from the Court's discussion of them, see
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ante, at 2329, n. 7, that they are not inconsistent with
Aguilar.

FN7. In Jabenv. United States, 381 U.S. 214.
85 S.Ct. 1365, 14 L.Ed.2d 345 (19651 the
Court considered whether there was probable
cause to support a complaint charging
petitioner with willfully filing a false tax
return. Id, at 221, 85 S.Ct., at 1369. After
reviewing the extensive detail contained in the
complaint, id, at 223. 85 S.Ct., at 1370. the
Court expressly distinguished tax offenses
from other types of offenses: "Some offenses
are subject to putative establishment by blunt
and concise factual allegations, e.g., 'A saw
narcotics in B 's possession,' whereas XA saw B
file a false tax return' does not mean very
much in a tax evasion case. Establishment of
grounds for belief that the offense of tax
evasion has been committed often requires a
reconstruction of the taxpayer's income from
many individually unrevealing facts which are
not susceptible of a concise statement in a
complaint. Furthermore, unlike narcotics
informants, for example, whose credibility
may often be suspect, the sources in this tax
evasion case are much less likely to produce
false or untrustworthy information. Thus,
whereas some supporting information
concerning the credibility of informants in
narcotics cases or other common garden
varieties of crime may be required, such
information is not so necessary in the context
of the case before us." Id, at 223-224. 85
S.Ct.. at 1370-1371.
Obviously, Jaben is not inconsistent with
Aguilar and involved no general rejection of
the Aguilar standards.

FNS. Rwendorfv. United States, 376 U.S.
528. 84 S.Ct. 825. 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964V
Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23.83 S.Ct. 1623.
10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257,80 S.Ct. 725.4 L.Ed.2d
697(1960).

In addition, one can concede that probable cause is a
"practical, nontechnical" concept without betraying the
values that Aguilar and Spinelli reflect. As noted, see

supra, at 2347, Aguilar and Spinelli require the police
to provide magistrates with certain crucial information.
They also provide structure for magistrates' probable
cause inquiries. In so doing, Aguilar and Spinelli
preserve the role of magistrates as independent arbiters
of probable cause, insure greater accuracy in probable
cause determinations, and advance the substantive
value of precluding findings of probable cause, and
attendant intrusions, based on anything less than
information from an honest or credible person who has
acquired his information in a reliable way. Neither the
standards nor their effects are inconsistent with a
"practical, nontechnical" conception of probable cause.
Once a magistrate has determined that he has
information before him that he can reasonably say has
been obtained in a reliable way by a credible person, he
has ample room to use his common sense and to apply
a practical, nontechnical conception of probable cause.
It also should be emphasized that cases such as
Nathanson v. United States. 290 U.S. 41. 54 S.Ct. 11,
78 L.Ed. 159 (1933V and Giordenellov United States.
357 U.S. 480. 78 S.Ct. 1245. 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958),
discussed supra, at 2352, directly contradict the Court's
suggestion, ante, at 2329, that a strong showing on one
prong of the Aguilar test should compensate for a
deficient showing on the other. If the conclusory
allegations of a presumptively reliable police officer
are insufficient to establish probable cause, there is no
conceivable reason why the conclusory allegations of
an anonymous informant should not be insufficient as
well.
Moreover, contrary to the Court's implicit
suggestion, Aguilar and Spinelli do not stand as an
insuperable barrier to the use *288 of even anonymous
informants' tips to establish probable cause. See
supra, at 2330. It is no justification for rejecting them
outright that some courts may have employed an overly
technical version of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards, see
ante, at 2330, and n. 9.
The Court also insists that the Aguilar-Spinelli
standards must be abandoned because they are
inconsistent with the fact that non-lawyers frequently
serve as magistrates. Ante, at 2332. To the contrary,
the standards help to structure probable cause inquiries
and, properly interpreted, may actually help a
non-lawyer magistrate in making a probable cause
determination. Moreover, the Aguilar and Spinelli
tests are not inconsistent with deference to magistrates'
determinations of probable cause. Aguilar expressly
acknowledged that reviewing courts "will pay
substantial deference to judicial determinations of
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probable cause...." 378 U.S., at 11 1,84 S.Ct.. at 1512.
In Spinelli, the Court noted that it was not retreating
from the proposition **2359 that magistrates'
determinations of probable cause "should be paid great
deference by reviewing courts...." 393 U.S.. at 419.89
S.Ct. at 590. It is also noteworthy that the language
from United States v. Venlresca, 380 U.S. 102.
108-109. 85 S.Ct. 741. 745-746. 13 L.Ed.2d 684
(1965). which the Court repeatedly quotes, see ante, at
2330,2331, and n. 10, brackets the following passage,
which the Court does not quote:
"This is not to say that probable cause can be made
out by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating
only the affiant's or an informer's belief that probable
cause exists without detailing any of the 'underlying
circumstances' upon which that belief is based. See
Aguilar v. Texas, supra. Recital of some of the
underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential
if the magistrate is to perform his detached function
and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.
However, where these circumstances are detailed,
where reason for crediting the source of the
information is given, and when a magistrate has
found probable cause, the courts should not *289
invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in
a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense,
manner." 380 U.S.. at 108-109.85 S.Ct., at 745-746.
fFN91

FN9. The Court also argues that "[i]f the
affidavits submitted by police officers are
subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts
have deemed appropriate, police might well
resort to warrantless searches, with the hope
of relying on consent or some other exception
to the warrant clause that might develop at the
time of the search." Ante, at 2331. If the
Court is suggesting, as it appears to be, that
the police will intentionally disregard the law,
it need only be noted in response that the
courts are not helpless to deal with such
conduct.
Moreover, as was noted in
Coolidze v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443.
91 S.Ct. 2022. 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (197H:
"[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this
area is that 'searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to
a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.' The exceptions

are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there
must be 'a showing by those who seek
exemption ... that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative.' '[T]he
burden is on those seeking the exemption to
show the need for it.' " Id. at 454-455. 91
S.Ct.. at 2031-2032 (plurality opinion)
(footnotes omitted).
It therefore would appear to be not only
inadvisable, but also unavailing, for the police
to conduct warrantless searches in "the hope
of relying on consent or some other exception
to the warrant clause that might develop at the
time of the search." Ante, at 2331.

At the heart of the Court's decision to abandon Aguilar
and Spinelli appears to be its belief that "the direction
taken by decisions following Spinelli poorly serves 'the
most basic function of any government: to provide for
the security of the individual and of his property.' "
Ante, at 2331. This conclusion rests on the judgment
that Aguilar and Spinelli "seriously impedfe] the task of
law enforcement," ibid, and render anonymous tips
valueless in police work. Ibid. Surely, the Court
overstates its case. See supra, at 2331. But of
particular concern to all Americans must be that the
Court gives virtually no consideration to the value of
insuring that findings of probable cause are based on
information that a magistrate can reasonably say has
been obtained in a reliable *290 way by an honest or
credible person. I share Justice WHITE'S fear that the
Court's rejection of Aguilar and Spinelli and its
adoption of a new totality of the circumstances test,
ante, at 2332, "may foretell an evisceration of the
probable cause standard...." Ante, at 2334 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Ill
The Court's complete failure to provide any persuasive
reason for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly
reflects impatience with what it perceives to be "overly
technical" rules governing searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment. Words such as "practical,"
"nontechnical," and "commonsense," as used in the
Court's opinion, are but codewords for an overly
permissive attitude towards police practices in
derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment. Everyone shares the Court's concern
over the **2360 horrors of drug trafficking, but under
our Constitution only measures consistent with the
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Fourth Amendment may be employed by government
to cure this evil. We must be ever mindful of Justice
Stewart's admonition in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443. 91 S.Ct. 2022. 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1970.
that M[i]n times of unrest, whether caused by crime or
racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic
law and the values that it represents may appear
unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values
were those of the authors of our fundamental
constitutional concepts." Id. at 455.91 S.Ct.. at 2032
(plurality opinion).
In the same vein, Glasser v.
United States. 315 U.S. 60.62 S.Ct. 457. 86 L.Ed. 680
(1942), warned that "[s]teps innocently taken may, one
by one, lead to the irretrievable impairment of
substantial liberties." Id. at 86.62 S.Ct.. at 472.
Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are
particularly difficult to protect because their "advocates
are usually criminals." Drapery. United States. 358
U.S. 307.314.79 S.Ct. 329., 333.3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). But the rules "we fashion
[are] for the innocent and guilty alike." Ibid. See also
Kolender v. Lawson, — U.S. — , — , 103 S.Ct. 1855.
1861. 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring); Brinezarv. United States. 338 U.S. 160.
181. 69 S.Ct. 1302. 1313. 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). *291 By replacing Aguilar
and Spinelli with a test that provides no assurance that
magistrates, rather than the police, or informants, will
make determinations of probable cause; imposes no
structure on magistrates' probable cause inquiries; and
invites the possibility that intrusions may be justified
on less than reliable information from an honest or
credible person, today's dec ision threatens to "obliterate
one of the most fundamental distinctions between our
form of government, where officers are under the law,
and the police-state where they are the law." Johnson
v. United States. 333 U.S. 10. 17.68 S.Ct. 367.370.92
L.Ed. 436 (1948).

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN
joins, dissenting.
The fact that Lance and Sue Gates made a 22-hour
nonstop drive from West Palm Beach, Florida, to
Bloomingdale, Illinois, only a few hours after Lance
had flown to Florida provided persuasive evidence that
they were engaged in illicit activity.
That fact,
however, was not known to the magistrate when he
issued the warrant to search their home.

What the magistrate did know at that time was that the
anonymous informant had not been completely accurate
in his or her predictions. The informant had indicated
that "Sue drives their car to Florida where she leaves it
to be loaded up with drugs.... Sue flies back after she
drops the car off in Florida"
App. la (emphasis
added). Yet Detective Mader's affidavit reported that
she "left the West Palm Beach area driving the Mercury
northbound." App. 12a.
The discrepancy between the informant's predictions
and the facts known to Detective Mader is significant
for three reasons.
First, it cast doubt on the
informant's hypothesis that the Gates already had "over
$100,000 worth of drugs in their basement," App. la.
The informant had predicted an itinerary that always
kept one *292 spouse in Bloomingdale, suggesting that
the Gates did not want to leave their home unguarded
because something valuable was hidden within. That
inference obviously could not be drawn when it was
known that the pair was actually together over a
thousand miles from home.
Second, the discrepancy made the Gates* conduct seem
substantially less unusual than the informant had
predicted it would be. It would have been odd if, as
predicted, Sue had driven down to Florida on
Wednesday, left the car, and flown right back to
Illinois. But the mere facts that **2361 Sue was in
West Palm Beach with the car. fFNll that she was
joined by her husband at the Holiday Inn on Friday,
FFN21 and that the couple drove north together the next
morning FFN31 are neither unusual nor probative of
criminal activity.

FN1. The anonymous note suggested that she
was going down on Wednesday, App. la, but
for all the officers knew she had been in
Florida for a month. App. 10b-13b.

FN2. Lance does not appear to have behaved
suspiciously in flying down to Florida. He
made a reservation in his own name and gave
an accurate home phone number to the
airlines. Compare Florida v. Royer, —U.S.
— 9 _ n . 2, 103 S.Ct. 1319. 1322. n. 2. 75
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983);
United States v.
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544. 548. 100 S.Ct.
1870. 1874. 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Stewart,
J., announcing the judgment). And Detective
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Mader's affidavit does not report that he did
any of the other things drug couriers are
notorious for doing, such as paying for the
ticket in cash, Rover, supra, 460 U.S.. at — .
n. 2. 103 S.Ct.. at 1322, n. 2. dressing
casually, ibid, looking pale and nervous,
ibid; Mendenhall. supra. 446 U.S.. at 548.
100 S.Ct.. at 1874. improperly filling out
baggage tags, Rover, supra. 460 U.S.. at — .
n. 2. 103 S.Ct.. at 1322. n. 2. carrying
American Tourister luggage, ibid, not
carrying any luggage, Mendenhall. supra. 446
U.S.. at 564-565. 100 S.Ct.. at 1882-1883
(POWELL, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), or changing
airlines en route, ibid.

FN3. Detective Mader's affidavit hinted
darkly that the couple had set out upon "that
interstate highway commonly used by
travelers to the Chicago area." But the same
highway is also commonly used by travelers
to Disney World, Sea World, and Ringling
Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus
World. It is also the road to Cocoa Beach,
Cape Canaveral, and Washington, D.C. I
would venture that each year dozens of
perfectly innocent people fly to Florida, meet
a waiting spouse, and drive off together in the
family car.

*293 Third, the fact that the anonymous letter
contained a material mistake undermines the
reasonableness of relying on it as a basis for making a
forcible entry into a private home._[FN4]

FN4. The Court purports to rely on the
proposition that "if the [anonymous]
informant could predict with considerable
accuracy the somewhat unusual travel plans
of the Gates, he probably also had a reliable
basis for his statements that the Gates kept a
large quantity of drugs in their home." Ante,
at 2336, n. 14 (emphasis added). Even if this
syllogism were sound, but see Spinelli v.
United States. 393 U.S. 410. 427. 89 S.Ct.
584.594.21 L.Ed.2d 637 0969) (WHITE, J.,
concurring), its premises are not met in this
case.

Of course, the activities in this case did not stop when
the magistrate issued the warrant. The Gates drove all
night to Bloomingdale, the officers searched the car
and found 400 pounds of marijuana, and then they
searched the house. TFN51 However, none of these
subsequent events may be considered in evaluating the
warrant. [FN61 and the search of the house was legal
only if the warrant was valid. Vale v. Louisiana. 399
U.S. 30. 33-35. 90 S.Ct. 1969. 1971-1972.26 L.Ed.2d
409 (1970).
I cannot accept the Court's casual
conclusion that, before the Gates arrived in
Bloomingdale, there was probable cause to justify a
valid entry and search of a private home. No one
knows who the informant in this case was, or what
motivated him or her to write the note. Given that the
note's predictions were faulty in one *294 significant
respect, and were corroborated by nothing except
ordinary **2362 innocent activity, I must surmise that
the Court's evaluation of the warrant's validity has been
colored by subsequent events. [FN71

FN5. The officers did not enter the
unoccupied house as soon as the warrant
issued; instead, they waited until the Gates
returned. It is unclear whether they waited
because they wanted to execute the warrant
without unnecessary property damage or
because they had doubts about whether the
informant's tip was really valid. In either
event their judgment is to be commended.

FN6. It is a truism that "a search warrant is
valid only if probable cause has been shown
to the magistrate and that an inadequate
showing may not be rescued by post-search
testimony on information known to the
searching officers at the time of the search."
Rice v. Wolff. 513 F.2d 1280 (CA8 1975).
See Coolidze v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S.
443. 450-451. 91 S.Ct. 2022. 2029-2030. 29
L.Ed.2d 564 (1971): Whitelev v. Warden. 401
U.S. 560.565. n. 8.91 S.Ct. 1031.1035. n. 8.
28L.Ed.2d306(1971): Amilarv. Texas. 378
U.S. 108. 109. n. 1.84 S.Ct. 1509. 151 l.n. 1.
12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964V. Jones v. United
States. 357U.S. 493.497-498.78 S.Ct. 1253.
1256-1257. 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958);
Giordenello v. United States. 357 U.S. 480.
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486. 78 S.Ct. 1245. 1250, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503
(1958); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1.
6. 52 S.Ct. 466. 467. 76 L.Ed. 951 (1932):
Amello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20. 33.46
S.Ct. 4. 6. 70 L.Ed. 145(1925).

FN7. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307.
79 S.Ct. 329. 3 L.EdL2d 327 (1959). affords
no support for today's holding. That case did
not involve an anonymous informant. On the
contrary, as the Court twice noted, Mr.
Hereford was "employed for that purpose and
[his] information had always been found
accurate and reliable." Id, at 313.79 S.Ct.. at
333; see id, at 309. 79 S.Ct.. at 331. In this
case, the police had no prior experience with
the informant, and some of his or her
information in this case was unreliable and
inaccurate.

Although the foregoing analysis is determinative as to
the house search, the car search raises additional issues
because "there is a constitutional difference between
houses and cars." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42.
52. 90 S.Ct. 1975. 1981. 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). Cf.
Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573. 589-590. 100 S.Ct.
1371. 1381-1382. 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). An officer
who has probable cause to suspect that a highly
movable automobile contains contraband does not need
a valid warrant in order to search it. This point was
developed in our opinion in United States v. Ross. 456
U.S. 798. 102 S.Ct. 2157. 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).
which was not decided until after the Illinois Supreme
Court rendered its decision in this case. Under Ross,
the car search may have been valid if the officers had
probable cause after the Gates arrived.
In apologizing for its belated realization that we should
not have ordered reargument in this case, the Court
today shows high regard for the appropriate
relationship of this Court to state courts. Ante, at 2323.
When the Court discusses the merits, however, it
attaches no weight to the conclusions of the Circuit
Judge of DuPage County, Illinois, of the three judges
of the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court,
or of the five justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, all
of whom concluded that the warrant was not based on
probable cause. In a fact-bound inquiry of this sort,
the judgment of three levels of state courts, all of whom
are better able to evaluate the probable reliability of

anonymous informants in *295 Bloomingdale, Illinois,
than we are, should be entitled to at least a presumption
of accuracy. TFN81 I would simply vacate the
judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remand the
case for reconsideration in the light of our intervening
decision in United States v. Ross.

FN8. The Court holds that what were
heretofore considered two independent
"prongs"—"veracity" and "basis of
knowledge"—are now to be considered
together as circumstances whose totality must
be appraised. Ante, at 2329. "A deficiency in
one may be compensated for, in determining
the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong
showing as to the other, or by some other
indicia of reliability." Ibid. Yet in this case,
the lower courts found neither factor present.
App. 12a. And the supposed "other indicia"
in the affidavit take the form of activity that is
not particularly remarkable.
I do not
understand how the Court can find that the
"totality" so far exceeds the sum of its
"circumstances."
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

: ss
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That

(X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73,
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a
single family dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front
door faces to the east, the numbers 3194 South appear on the front
of the home mail box in front of the home, to include all
containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics, basements,
outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage.
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or
evidence described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
and that said property or evidence:
(X)
(X)
(X)

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of Possession of Marijuana and Possession
of Cocaine With Intent To Distribute.

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE,
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES,
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS.
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant are:
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022 , is employed
by the West Valley City Police Department, and is currently
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been
given the responsibility to investigate narcotic offenses occurring
in West Valley City and surrounding areas.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification
and in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in
relation to police investigations. Affiant was previously assigned
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force and the Drug Enforcement Strike
Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training
includes the DEA basic and advanced investigators seminars, as well
as the California Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug
recognition, identification and investigative techniques. Your
affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb
Technician.
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and
distribution of controlled substances, specifically marijuana and
cocaine. Your affiant received information from a confidential
informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. Your affiant ask the
courts not to require your affiant to publish the CI's name. Your
affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were
published. Your affiant was told the following by the CI:
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year,
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on
numerous occasions during the last year,
3. CI has used marij.uana with the suspect on several
occasions,
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent
being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to
4 pounds of marijuana,
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the
suspect uses to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale,
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with
packaging material,
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on
his person,
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells
marijuana and cocaine,
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled
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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
substances, inside the named premises,
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently
purchased the listed premises,
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City
restaurant, BACCI's,
12. CI staters that the suspect sells controlled substances to
be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income,
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle
frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and
hours of operation for the suspect,
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and
usually during the late evening hours,
Your affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his
home address in West Valley on 6/14/00.
During the initial
surveillance your affiant did not observed anyone at the residence,
the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600
6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related.
Your affiant had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic
stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed premises. During
the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of
marijuana, approximately one half ounce. During the search of the
vehicle a small section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and
appears to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the
bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and would
like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the
ingestion of marijuana or cocaine, was located.
Your affiant was
told by the transporting officers, of the arrested person, that no
drug paraphernalia was found on the subject, Oba Tramel.
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are
first hand, accurate and truth full, for the following reasons.
CI's observations are first hand and from a person that has used
marijuana and would recognized the substance when observed. CI has
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided. CI
has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to
stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the
community. CI's observations were over a long period of time, even
though the suspect has only recently occupied the listed premises,
within the last couple of months. CI states that the illicit sales
operation is ongoing and has been long term.
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named
premises and the registered owner was a described by CI. Your
affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic,
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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
short term traffic coming and going to the listed premises.
Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of
cocaine. Further the arrested person was not found with any
instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which
your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from
the listed premises.
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently
and works at a restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was
told that the employment is part time, your affiant checked on
6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was unknown when he
was scheduled to return.
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for
marijuana,
cocaine
and
associated
packaging
material
and
instruments used to ingest controlled substances. Affiant has been
told that all these items have been observed inside the -listed
premises.
Your affiant believes that the suspect should be
searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and
carries controlled substances on his person.
Your affiant prays for any time , announced authority of
service. Your affiant has been told that the suspect is usually
only at home during the late evening hours and your affiant's
observations have confirmed this.
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy
Salt Lake County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben
approved to be presented to the courts for anytime and announced
authority of service.
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WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
( ) in the day time.
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the
officer's authority or purpose because:
( )

physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given; or
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted.
N/A

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

/5

day of

^^7^2000.

Time Vh^ tb, > ^ °

JUDGi
IN THE fTHiKD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND EOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

ADDENDUM E

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
NO
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the state of Utah.
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det.
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

(X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73,
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a single family
dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front door faces to the east, the
numbers 3194 South appear on the front of the home mail box in front of the
home, to include all containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics,
basements, outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage.
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence
described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
which property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense or
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
You are ther^pre commanded:
tgt) in the day time^
7$tf at any time of the day or night (good cause having been shown)
( J to execute without notice of authority or purpose,
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.)

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE,
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES,
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS.
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
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SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third
District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property
in your custody, subject to the order of this court.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

/S

day of

2000.
>

=

